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Treating The SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF Like Any Other Investment

Summary The fund holds several dividend champions, but the yield on the index and the ETF are still a bit weak. The sector allocation is fairly aggressive even though the individual companies should be safer than the rest of the sector they represent. Concerns about the strong dollar and rising domestic rates make me prefer a more defensive sector allocation. DIA has an interesting allocation strategy that made a great deal of sense prior to the invention of computers. The SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF (NYSEARCA: DIA ) is an ETF that is often referenced in stock trackers or in articles referencing the entire economy. However, there seems to be little analysis focused on the real ETF despite having over $10 billion in assets under management. I intend to treat DIA like any other equity ETF in this analysis and look at the fund as an investment rather than as a proxy for parts of the economy. Quick Facts The expense ratio is a mere .17%. That isn’t absurdly high for domestic equity, but it is higher than I would have expected for a very large ETF with a remarkably simple allocation strategy. Holdings I put together the following chart to demonstrate the weight of the top 10 holdings: (click to enlarge) The underlying holdings don’t bother me. 3M (NYSE: MMM ) is a great dividend champion and has an exceptionally diversified product line which includes so many brands and household items that there are probably several items created by 3M within a few feet of you. The portfolio is filled with established dividend champions. Okay, Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ) won’t be confused with a dividend champion any time soon but for the sheer size of the company it would be strange for DIA to exclude them from the group. Sectors (click to enlarge) The sector exposure feels fairly aggressive to me with the top weightings coming from the industrial sector and consumer discretionary. You may notice that health care and consumer staples each appear to be underweight with utilities coming in at a solid 0%. These are three relatively defensive sectors that I would want to be overweighting when the P/E ratios across the market are getting fairly high. With a strong U.S. Dollar weakening exports and driving down expectations for sales and earnings in the domestic economy and an expectation for higher short term rates coming, it feels like an aggressive sector allocation. On the other hand, if I was going to run such an aggressive sector allocation I would want to be overweighting the companies with a long history and a solid dividend. The individual companies look like some of the safer allocations for their respective sectors. Energy That energy allocation is fairly light. I’ll grant that the sector has done very poorly, but I still like having exposure to the larger companies in the sector like Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ). Exxon Mobil and Chevron (NYSE: CVX ) are the two oil exposures here and I like both of them for the long term despite the potential for more pressure on prices in the short term. Strategy It would be absurd to talk about the ETF directly without bringing up the allocation strategy. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is oldest continuing U.S. market index with over 100 years of index history. It simply holds an equal number of shares in each of the 30 companies within the index. The method is a little strange since many ETFs would simply use a market cap weighting. Instead, the weightings are fairly arbitrary as a function of share prices which results in overweighting anything with a high share price and underweighting anything with a low share price. Dividend Yield If we’re going to contemplate DIA as a normal ETF investment, then it is natural to incorporate the dividend yield. The fund dividend yield is 2.31% while the underlying index has a dividend yield of 2.53%. Conclusion The SPDR Dow Jones Industrial Average ETF tracks the oldest continuing index in the United States. The expense ratio isn’t very high, but it is higher than I would expect for the incredibly simple allocation strategy. The simple strategy, which made great sense prior to computers, results in a fairly interesting sector weighting. I find the underlying companies to be less dangerous than the sectors they represent, but as an investment I would prefer something more defensive sector allocations given my concerns about the potential for the market to suffer some setbacks in a challenging macroeconomic environment.

Consolidated Edison – An Unsettling Look At Shareholder Yield

In a prior commentary I looked at the “shareholder yield,” that is dividends and share repurchases, for Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil. In both instances the shareholder yield was greater than the dividend yield. Alternatively, a company like Consolidated Edison has a shareholder yield that has been routinely lower than its dividend yield. In a previous article I compared the “shareholder yield” of both Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ) and Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ). The idea was to take it a step further than simply looking at dividend yield, and instead focus on funds used for both dividends and share repurchases. As a part owner, share repurchases are commonplace. Yet if you owned the entire business, there would be no need to repurchase shares and thus these funds could be diverted elsewhere. For Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil, this meant that the “shareholder yield” – dividends plus buybacks – was reasonably higher than the ordinary dividend yield that you commonly see quoted. Exxon Mobil turned out to have a higher shareholder yield than Coca-Cola (it’s share repurchase program has more room and a lower valuation of purchased shares) but the takeaway was that both companies had the ability to send away more cash without impairing the business. Which brings us to a company like Consolidated Edison (NYSE: ED ). Unlike Coca-Cola or Exxon Mobil or any number of well-known dividend paying companies, Consolidated Edison’s share count has been increasing over the years rather than decreasing. Thus conversely the shareholder yield tends to be lower than the quoted dividend yield. Let’s look at the past decade to see what I mean: Year Divs Sh Re Shares Total / Sh Price Sh Yield 2005 $518 -$78 245 $1.79 $46.33 3.9% 2006 $533 -$510 257 $0.09 $48.07 0.2% 2007 $582 -$685 272 -$0.38 $48.85 -0.8% 2008 $618 -$51 274 $2.07 $38.93 5.3% 2009 $612 -$257 281 $1.26 $45.43 2.8% 2010 $640 -$439 292 $0.69 $49.57 1.4% 2011 $704 -$31 293 $2.30 $62.03 3.7% 2012 $712 $0 293 $2.43 $55.54 4.4% 2013 $721 $0 293 $2.46 $55.28 4.5% 2014 $739 $0 293 $2.52 $66.01 3.8% The first three numerical columns are in millions, while the next two represent a per share basis. On the dividend front we can see that Consolidated Edison has been paying more and more total dividends, as to be expected from a company with a long history of regularly increasing its payout . What’s not readily obvious until you take a closer look is that the company had been issuing a good amount shares during the 2005 through 2011 period. This makes sense when think about it – the business is inherently capital intensive – but it might not be something that you would instantly notice. As such, the share count has been increasing. The company had 245 million shares outstanding in 2005, which has now become 293 million. This makes a difference when you’re thinking like an owner rather than a small shareholder. Here’s a comparison of the shareholder yield and the dividend yield over the years: Year Div Yield Sh Yield Difference 2005 4.6% 3.9% 0.7% 2006 4.3% 0.2% 4.1% 2007 4.4% -0.8% 5.2% 2008 5.8% 5.3% 0.5% 2009 4.8% 2.8% 2.0% 2010 4.4% 1.4% 3.0% 2011 3.9% 3.7% 0.2% 2012 4.4% 4.4% 0.0% 2013 4.5% 4.5% 0.0% 2014 3.8% 3.8% 0.0% The first number is what you’re accustomed to seeing quoted on any financial website – a dividend yield in the 3.5% to 5% range. The next column – shareholder yield – illustrates what magnitude of cash is actually being returned to shareholders. Consolidated Edison was indeed paying the full dividend, but it was also receiving cash back from shareholders to increase the share count. If you owned Coca-Cola or Exxon Mobil or any number of other firms in their entirety, the amount of cash that would be available to you would likely be greater than the current dividend yield. When a company both pays a dividend and buys back shares, the shareholder yield is greater than the dividend yield. With Consolidated Edison you have the opposite effect take place. The amount of cash that can be extracted from utility-like business models (without impairment) is lessened when you think about owning the entire thing. Issuing shares is common practice in the utility world (and other worlds for that matter) but it likely wouldn’t be occurring if there was just one owner. (You wouldn’t buy more shares yourself, or you could, but that would simply be inputting more capital). Thus you have a couple other options: issue more debt or reduce the dividend payment. The second option is what is being illustrated in a “shareholder yield” way, but the first one is much more common. Incidentally, whether you own all of it or not, this is exactly what we have seen with Consolidated Edison in the past decade. Notice the difference in the 2005 through 2011 period and the 2012 through 2014 timeframe. In the first period you had an increasing dividend to go along with a good deal of shares being issued. In 2007 shareholders received $582 million in dividend payments, but gave back $685 million to add to the share count. You can call the dividend payment yield, but in the aggregate the company was actually a net beneficiary of cash received. The amount of funds available had been quite a bit lower than what the dividend yield alone would indicate. Notably, Consolidated Edison did not issue shares in 2012, 2013 or 2014. Which means that the shareholder yield was equal to the dividend yield in those periods. Yet there was still impairment during this time. The company had net debt issuances of $1.1 billion, $1.4 billion and $1.1 billion during those years. Instead of issuing shares, debt was used – much like what might be required if you owned the business in its entirety. The shareholder yield gives a reasonable gauge as to the type of cash flow that could be extracted from the business, but naturally it’s just a first step in the process. In this instance, it shows that while the dividend has been above average and increasing, the amount of cash than can be taken out of the business without impairment has been consistently lower than this yield. Warren Buffett had a particularly revealing commentary related to this concept (and incidentally Consolidated Edison itself) back in the 1970’s: “In recent years the electric-utility industry has had little or no dividend-paying capacity. Or, rather, it has had the power to pay dividends if investors agree to buy stock from them. In 1975 electric utilities paid common dividends of $3.3 billion and asked investors to return $3.4 billion. Of course, they mixed in a little solicit-Peter-to-pay-Paul technique so as not to acquire a Con Ed reputation. Con Ed, you will remember, was unwise enough in 1974 to simply tell its shareholders it didn’t have the money to pay the dividend. Candor was rewarded with calamity in the marketplace.” “The more sophisticated utility maintains – perhaps increases – the quarterly dividend and then ask shareholders (either old or new) to mail back the money. In other words, the company issues new stock. This procedure diverts massive amounts of capital to the tax collector and substantial sums to underwriters. Everyone, however, seems to remain in good spirits (particularly the underwriters).” Naturally today you can make a bevy of arguments (rock bottom interest rates, for one) that did not qualify back then. However, the concept is similar: the amount of money that can be taken out from owning the entire business is apt to be lower, not higher, than the stated dividend yield. Ideally you’d like to think in “owner’s earnings” terms, but the shareholder yield provides a short cut to get you started. Whereas a company that regularly repurchases shares has a bit of wiggle room (those repurchase funds could be diverted toward sustaining the dividend in dire times) a company issuing shares has the opposite effect occurring. A company that regularly issues shares has “negative” wiggle room. Now I’m not suggesting that Consolidated Edison is a poor business or that it’s bound for doom – far from it. Utilities tend to exist out of necessity and have been churning out cash for decades. However, looking at shareholder yield (and ultimately owner earnings) is a bit of a different way to think about it. If you owned all of Exxon Mobil you could pay yourself a 5% or 8% dividend in regular times and not put an added burden on the business. That is, the quoted dividend yield understates the amount of cash that could be extracted without impairing the company. With Consolidated Edison, this likely isn’t the case. If you owned all of Consolidated Edison, you’d be more likely to see a lower not higher percentage of cash being paid out. No longer would you be issuing shares and thus the focus would turn to added debt or a reduced payout. The debt could go on indefinitely, but the capital necessities are such that the current dividend payment coexists with other pressing requirements. When they say that you’re “buying it for the dividend” this could be even more applicable than it first appears.

BDCL Attractive With 21.5% Yield And Deep Component Discounts To Book Value

Summary BDCL’s quarterly dividend paid in January 2016 is projected to be $0.8216, an increase from October 2015 . On an annualized quarterly compounded basis the yield is 21.5%. While there are problems and high fees associated with some of the business development companies, the discounts to book value and high yields make BDCL attractive. The ETRACS 2xLeveraged Long Wells Fargo Business Development Company ETN (NYSEARCA: BDCL ) will soon be declaring its dividend for the quarter ending December 31, 2015. The dividend will be paid in January 2016. BDCL is an exchanged-traded note that employs 2X leverage to generate exceptionally high yields. Most of the 44 Business Development Companies that comprise the index portfolio upon which BDCL is based have announced dividends with ex-dates in the fourth quarter of 2015. American Capital Ltd. (NASDAQ: ACAS ) and Harris & Harris Group Inc. (NASDAQ: TINY ) do not pay dividends. Capital Southwest Corp. (NASDAQ: CSWC ) pays semiannually and did have an ex-date in the second quarter of 2015 but has declared one since, so I did not include it in the dividend calculation. Main Street Capital Corp (NYSE: MAIN ) pays $0.18 monthly and had a $0.275 special dividend in the fourth quarter of 2015 that is included in the dividend calculation. From 41 of the 44 Business Development Companies who pay dividends with ex-dates in the fourth quarter of 2015, I projected that BDCL’s quarterly dividend paid in January 2016 will be $0.8216. This is an increase of 5.6% from the quarterly $0.7782 dividend paid in September 2015. Most of the increase is due to the increase in the indicative or net asset value of BDCL from $15.6699 on September 30, 2015 to the current $16.5565. The dividend of a leveraged ETN is impacted by the rebalancing of the portfolio each month to bring the amount of leverage back to 2X. If the value of the portfolio declines, portfolio assets must be reduced to maintain the leverage level. This reduces the dividend, is in addition to any reductions from dividend cuts by any of the components in the portfolio. Conversely, if the prices of the component securities increases, the dividend paid by the ETN will increase even if the components of the ETN do not change their dividends. That was the case in the fourth quarter of 2015. The relationship between the net asset value of MORL and the dividend is explained more fully in: MORL’s Net Asset Value Rises – Implications For The Dividends. The table below shows the weight of each of the components of the index upon which BDCL is based. The prices are as of December 23, 2015. The weights are the latest on the BDCL website. The table also shows the dividend rate, the ex-dates, and the contribution by component of the components that pay dividends. In the frequency column “q” denotes quarterly, those that pay monthly have an “m”, and the semi-annual payers are denoted by “s”. Interestingly, the second-largest component of the index upon which BDCL is based, American Capital Ltd., with a weight of 11.51%, is one the 2 components that do not currently pay any dividends. The other component that does not currently pay dividends is TINY has a weight of 0.27%. Thus, 11.78% by weight of the components of BDCL do not pay any dividends now. If CSWC, with a weight of 2.3%, which has not declared a semi-annual dividend after last doing so on 04/24/2015, is included as a non-payer, then 14.08% by weight of the components of BDCL do not pay any dividends now Some readers have asked to see the details of my dividend calculations. I have changed my procedure, and now use the contribution by component method. It should give the exact same result as my previous method that could be called the total imputed dividends divided by the number of shares outstanding method. An example of that methodology using actual numbers can be seen in the article ” MORL Yielding 24.7% Based On Projected June Dividend “. In the total imputed dividends divided by the number of shares outstanding methodology, the number of shares outstanding appears both as a numerator and a denominator. Thus, the same result can be obtained by using the contribution by component method. This method involves multiplying the net asset value of BDCL by weight of each component with an ex-date during the month prior to the month in question, and then multiplying that product by 2 to account for the 2X leverage. That product is then divided by the share price of the component. This is an imputed value for how many shares of the component each share of BDCL represents. Multiplying the shares of the component per BDCL share times the dividend declared by the component gives the contribution by component for each component. Adding all of the contributions of all of the components with an ex-date in the month prior to the month for which the dividend is being computed and adjusting for expenses, gives a projection for the dividend. The index upon which BDCL is based is a float-adjusted, capitalization-weighted index that includes the Business Development Companies listed on the major exchanges. The fact that 14.08% of the companies that comprise BDCL are not currently paying dividends can be looked at with either a “glass is half full” or “glass half empty” perspective. On the bright side, there could be considerable room for an increase in the dividends paid by BDCL if those components not presently paying dividends were to resume them. On the other hand, the fact that 14.08% of the companies that comprise BDCL are not currently paying dividends could be seen as a warning that other components in the portfolio might also suspend dividends at some point in the future. The premise for using 2x leveraged ETNs such BDCL to generate high income is that the extra income resulting from the spread between the dividends paid by the components of index upon which the ETN is based and the interest effectively paid by the ETN on the leveraged portion, should offset any declines in price by the business development companies in the index upon which BEDCL is based. With BDCL the weighted average of the dividends paid by the business development companies that comprise the portfolio is about 10% on a non-compounded basis. With 2x leverage the dividend yield on BDCL, before compounding is the 10% paid by the portfolio plus the amount generated by the leverage spread which is currently 10% less the financing expense based on three-month LIBOR, now 0.6%. Thus, before compounding, the dividend yield will be approximately 10% + 19.6% = 19.6%. While the dividend yield on BDCL has been consistently above 20%, the prices of the business development companies that comprise the index upon which BDCL is based have declined so much that for some holding periods the total return on BDCL has actually been negative. This has exacerbated with the recent general aversion to most high-yielding securities whether they be junk bonds, mREITS or high-dividend closed-end funds. With BDCL, concerns over high fees and problems with specific business development companies in the index and that sector in general have caused BDCL to underperform the equity markets in recent months. This has led many of them to trade at large discounts to book value. Computing the book value for business development companies can be problematic since many of their assets are not publicly traded. However, the higher yielding business development companies that compose the index upon which BDCL is based are generally thought be at historically large discounts to book value. This, could allow the slide in the market prices of the business development companies to reverse at some point. The relatively high yield and high beta or systematic risk is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model. One wrinkle is that for investors seeking higher yields, BDCL may actually be a relatively efficient diversifier, if those investors are now heavily invested in higher-yielding instruments that are very interest rate-sensitive. Previously, I pointed out in the article ” 17.8%-Yielding CEFL – Diversification On Top Of Diversification, Or Fees On Top Of Fees? ” that those investors who have significant portions of their portfolios in mREITs, and in particular, a leveraged basket of mREITs such as the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (NYSEARCA: MORL ), could benefit from diversifying into an instrument that was highly correlated to SPY. The UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA: CEFL ) is highly correlated to SPY, while only 5% of the variation in daily returns for MORL can be explained by the daily variation in the S&P index. Since CEFL yields almost as much as MORL, this suggests that a portfolio consisting of both MORL and CEFL would have almost as much yield as a portfolio with only MORL, but considerably less risk. Adding BDCL to such as portfolio could result in a more efficient risk/return profile. There is an unlevered fund that uses the same index as BDCL — the UBS ETRACS Wells Fargo Business Development Company ETN (NYSEARCA: BDCS ). BDCS could also be a good investment for those who want higher yields and want to use their own leverage to do so. Buying BDCS on a 50% margin would return a higher, or at least comparable, yield to buying BDCL for those who could borrow at LIBOR or some similar level. Many retail investors cannot borrow at interest rates low enough to make buying BDCS on margin a better proposition than buying BDCL. However, larger investors with access to low margin rates might do better by buying BDCS on margin. Even some small investors could do better buying BDCS rather than BDCL, in some cases. For example, an investor might have $10,000 in a brokerage account in a money market fund and want to get at least some return by investing a small part of the $10,000 in BDCL or BDCS. Most brokerage firms pay just 0.01% on money market funds. The annual return on $10,000, at 0.01%, is $1 per year. If this hypothetical investor were thinking of either investing $1,000 of his $10,000 in BDCL and keeping $9,000 in the money market fund, or investing $2,000 of his $10,000 in BDCS and keeping $8,000 in the money market fund, either choice would entail the same amount of risk and potential capital gain. This is because BDCL, being 2X leveraged, would be expected to move either way twice as much as a basket of Business Development Companies, while BDCS would move in line with a basket of Business Development Companies. For this hypothetical investor, his effective borrowing cost is the rate on the money market fund. Thus, his income from the $2,000 of his $10,000 in BDCS and $8,000 in the money market fund should exceed that of $1,000 of his $10,000 invested in BDCL and $9,000 in the money market fund, since his effective borrowing rate on the extra $1,000 invested in BDCS is less than what the imputed borrowing cost that BDCL uses. As I indicated in the article ” BDCL: The Third Leg Of The High-Yielding Leveraged ETN Stool, ” the 44 Business Development Companies that comprise the index upon which BDCL is based are a varied lot. Medallion Financial finances taxi cab companies. ACAS manages $20 billion worth of assets, including American Capital Agency Corp. (NASDAQ: AGNC ) and American Capital Mortgage Investment (NASDAQ: MTGE ), which are mREITs that are included in MORL. Each of the 44 Business Development Companies that comprise the index upon which BDCL is based have their own specific risk factors. The power of diversification can make a portfolio now comprised mainly of high-yielding interest rate-sensitive instruments more efficient when BDCL is added to that portfolio. As I explained in the article ” 30% Yielding MORL, MORT And The mREITs: A Real World Application And Test Of Modern Portfolio Theory ,” a security or a portfolio of securities is more efficient than another asset if it has a higher expected return than the other asset but no more risk, or has the same expected return but less risk. Portfolios of assets will generally be more efficient than individual assets. Compare investing all of your money in one security that had an expected return of 10% with some level of risk to a portfolio comprised of 20 securities each with an expected return of 10% with the same level of risk as the single security. The portfolio would provide the exact same expected return of 10%, but with less risk than the individual security. Thus, the portfolio is more efficient than any of the individual assets in the portfolio. My projection of $0.8216 for the BDCL January 2016 dividend would be an annual rate of $3.29 This would be a 19.9% simple yield, with BDCL priced at $16.5 and an annualized quarterly compounded yield of 21.5%. If someone thought that over the next five years market and credit conditions would remain relatively stable, and thus, BDCL would continue to yield 21.5% on a compounded basis, the return on a strategy of reinvesting all dividends would be enormous. An investment of $100,000 would be worth $264,290 in five years. More interestingly, for those investing for future income, the income from the initial $100,000 would increase from the $20,800 first-year annual rate to $56,822 annually. BDCL prices and dividends as of December 23, 2015 name ticker weight(%) price ex-date dividend freq contribution American Capital Ltd ACAS 11.51 14.19 Ares Capital Corp ARCC 9.97 14.63 12/11/2015 0.38 q 0.0857 Prospect Capital Corp PSEC 9.2 7.22 1/27/2016 0.08333 m 0.1055 Fs Investment Corp FSIC 8.61 9.21 12/18/2015 0.22275 q 0.0690 Main Street Capital Corp MAIN 5.5 30.2 2/18/2016 0.18 m 0.0491 Apollo Investment Corp AINV 4.86 5.41 12/17/2015 0.2 q 0.0595 Fifth Street Finance Corp FSC 3.58 6.29 2/10/2016 0.06 m 0.0339 Golub Capital BDC Inc GBDC 3.29 16.88 12/9/2015 0.32 q 0.0207 TPG Specialty Lending Inc TSLX 3.25 16.86 12/29/2015 0.39 q 0.0249 Hercules Technology Growth Capital Inc HTGC 3.24 12.38 11/12/2015 0.31 q 0.0269 BlackRock Kelso Capital Corp BKCC 2.67 9.53 12/22/2015 0.21 q 0.0195 TCP Capital Corp TCPC 2.66 14.34 12/15/2015 0.36 q 0.0221 Solar Capital Ltd SLRC 2.64 16.82 12/15/2015 0.4 q 0.0208 New Mountain Finance Corp NMFC 2.57 12.9 12/14/2015 0.34 q 0.0224 Goldman Sachs Bdc Closed End Fund GSBD 2.42 19.85 12/29/2015 0.45 q 0.0182 Triangle Capital Corp TCAP 2.35 19.52 12/7/2015 0.59 q 0.0235 Capital Southwest Corp CSWC 2.3 14.29 5/12/2015 s 0.0000 PennantPark Investment Corp PNNT 1.81 6.45 12/22/2015 0.28 q 0.0260 Medley Capital Corp MCC 1.73 7.84 11/23/2015 0.3 q 0.0219 THL Credit Inc TCRD 1.37 11.2 12/11/2015 0.34 q 0.0138 TICC Capital Corp TICC 1.36 6.1 12/14/2015 0.29 q 0.0214 PennantPark Floating Rate Capital Ltd PFLT 1.15 11.44 12/22/2015 0.095 m 0.0095 Fidus Investment Corp FDUS 0.89 14.38 12/2/2015 0.43 q 0.0088 Gladstone Investment Corp GAIN 0.89 7.9 12/16/2015 0.0625 m 0.0070 Fifth Street Senior Floating Rate Corp FSFR 0.87 8.52 2/3/2016 0.075 m 0.0076 Triplepoint Venture Growth BDC Corp TPVG 0.8 12.12 11/25/2015 0.36 q 0.0079 Garrison Capital Inc. GARS 0.78 12.66 12/9/2015 0.35 q 0.0071 Capitala Finance Corp CPTA 0.69 12.21 12/22/2015 0.2067 m 0.0116 Monroe Capital Corp MRCC 0.61 12.94 12/11/2015 0.35 q 0.0055 Newtek Business Services Corp NEWT 0.61 13.52 11/16/2015 3.19 q 0.0477 MVC Capital Inc MVC 0.58 7.58 12/29/2015 0.305 q 0.0077 Gladstone Capital Corp GLAD 0.55 7.3 12/16/2015 0.07 m 0.0052 KCAP Financial Inc KCAP 0.52 4.27 10/9/2015 0.21 q 0.0085 Solar Senior Capital Ltd SUNS 0.51 15.01 12/15/2015 0.1175 m 0.0040 Medallion Financial Corp TAXI 0.49 7.1 11/10/2015 0.25 q 0.0057 Horizon Technology Finance Corp HRZN 0.48 11.72 12/16/2015 0.115 m 0.0047 Stellus Capital Investment Corp SCM 0.47 10.14 12/29/2015 0.1133 m 0.0052 Alcentra Capital Corp ABDC 0.41 12.17 12/29/2015 0.34 q 0.0038 American Capital Senior Floating Closed Fund ACSF 0.4 9.96 1/20/2016 0.097 m 0.0039 CM Finance Inc CMFN 0.3 10.55 12/16/2015 0.3469 q 0.0033 WhiteHorse Finance Inc WHF 0.29 11.48 12/17/2015 0.355 q 0.0030 Oha Investment Corp OHAI 0.28 3.99 12/29/2015 0.12 q 0.0028 OFS Capital Corp OFS 0.28 10.87 12/15/2015 0.34 q 0.0029 Harris & Harris Group Inc TINY 0.27 2.21 0 0.0000