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What If I Had Stayed Away From The ‘Sell’ Button?

Summary Does it pay off to sit on one’s hands and do nothing? I wanted to know and carried out a brief review of my past sell decisions. Holding clearly outperformed selling, but selling seems to have lowered both, returns and risk. Never look back? With regards to closed positions I used to follow a strict ‘never look back’ policy, because I considered it unhelpful to spend time thinking about what could have been. Recently, I broke with this paradigm. Not because I like to kick myself, but rather to test which of the following competing concepts would work better for me: Monitoring all holdings closely and trying to optimize capital gains and portfolio structure by selling when the time has come (whenever that may be) Sitting on my hands and doing nothing while accumulating shares. It may not have been a conscious decision, but I happened to follow the former approach in the past. I felt not looking after the portfolio might be irresponsible. However, when looking after the portfolio I found there were always reasons to worry. Typical reasons to sell were: Concerns about the respective company’s business model Immediate issues with unclear outcome (e.g. accounting issues, legal disputes) Perceived lofty valuations Then I wondered: What are the worst losses that I managed to avoid through trading and what are best opportunities that I missed out on? Would I be better off if I stayed hands-off? Looking back Past sell decisions can help to find answers to these questions. If you are happy to gain valuable, but potentially painful insights, you might want to carry out a review as follows: Put together the data on all positions that you ever closed. Establish the respective cost base of these positions and the profit/loss that you realized when you closed the positions. Look up the current prices of the securities you sold. Calculate what your former holdings would have been worth today. Compare with the realized profit/loss. Results This is what I did and here is what I found as I went through the 32 trades that are on my records of the past four years: I made a profit on 29 positions. The average gain was 16% with the largest gain being 58% (these are total, not annualized gains in local currencies, including all trading fees, but no dividends). I made a loss on three positions. The average loss was -19% with the biggest loss being -33%. The average profit across these 32 trades was 13%. Comparing the realized profits and losses with current prices, I figured out that I made 15 good exit decisions (=current prices are below the prices at which I sold) and 17 poor exit decisions (=current prices are above the prices at which I sold). All three stocks that I sold at a loss were among the good exits. Also, pulling the plug on my long-term government bonds in late January this year turned out to be a good move. A further pattern is that it was mostly a good idea to get rid of the more speculative plays (special situations, turnarounds). The biggest loss that I managed to avoid was -56 percentage points (=my realized profit was 9% and I would be under water by -47% now had I kept the stock). The poorest exit decisions were taken more than two years ago. Today, I find it difficult to understand what made me sell, since I cannot remember any red flags. The best explanation I can offer is that the share prices did not go up as I expected and I lost patience assuming that I missed something in my assessment. In that situation I was almost looking for black cats in dark alleyways. The biggest gain that I missed by selling was 300% percentage points (=my realized profit was 1%, but the stock has gained a further 299% since I have sold). Had I kept all the positions that I sold the total gain would have been 37% rather than 13%. Conclusions The interpretation of the results is not straight forward. Given the overall bull market for stocks and bonds in recent years, it had to be expected that keeping would win over selling on average. My brief review did only compare selling against keeping. It did not compare keeping against reinvesting of realized proceeds. Also, of course, I did not consider time frames in that I only looked at overall returns not at annualized ones. Still, there are some conclusions that I find useful: When I sold it was due to concerns (or fear if you like). The ‘never look back’ policy implied already that I could miss out on opportunities by selling, but I never realized by how much missed opportunities can outweigh risks in total even when some of the risks do eventually materialize. Being lazy, I was actually hoping to find evidence that a complete hands-off approach would be superior to my trading activity. Things turned out to be a bit more complicated, though. It feels reassuring that I proved to be right whenever I closed a position at a loss. The best and worst performers in my current portfolio have returned +191% and -17% respectively so far which compares against +300% and -57% among my past holdings. Although it was not an outspoken goal, I do feel more comfortable in the current range that seems to offer a more limited downside. Apparently, I could not expect the portfolio to be low maintenance, when (some of) the stock picks were not. Now that I have eliminated the stocks that were a bit too exciting for me, it may have become easier to stay away from the sell button. Stocks In order to keep the focus on method and results, I decided not to mention specific stocks above. If you are curious about the stocks behind the numbers, here is a small list: Largest realized gain: Novartis (NYSE: NVS ) Biggest realized loss: Finavera ( OTC:FNVRF ) Biggest avoided loss: Power REIT (NYSEMKT: PW ) Biggest opportunity I missed: Royal Wessanen ( OTC:KJWNF ) Best performer in my current portfolio: I.A.R. Systems ( OTC:IARSD ) Worst performer in my current portfolio: HCP (NYSE: HCP ). Disclosure: I am/we are long IARSD, HCP. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

PIMCO High Income Fund: Is The Pain Over?

Summary PHK’s premium has fallen from over 50% to around 30%. That’s a big drop and well below the CEF’s 3-year average premium. So is the pain over and now the time to buy back in? The PIMCO High Income Fund (NYSE: PHK ) is a contentious closed-end fund, or CEF, that has a long history of trading at an impressive premium to its net asset value, or NAV. Right up front, I’m not a big fan of any CEF trading above its NAV, particularly at such an extreme premium. However, after such a large drop, some investors may be wondering if the hurt is over and whether now might be a good time to buy in. A little background To understand why a closed-end fund trades at a price different than its net asset value, you have to understand how CEFs differ from their mutual fund cousins. Mutual fund sponsors stand ready to buy and sell shares at the close of every trading day at NAV. Therefore, there’s a premade liquid market at NAV. Closed-end funds, meanwhile, sell a set number of shares to the public. Those shares then trade based on supply and demand on the open market. If investors like a CEF for whatever reason, they will demand a higher price to get them to sell. And if investors don’t like a CEF for some reason, they will take lower prices to get out. Thus, CEFs trade above and below their NAV. The NAV is still what the shares are worth – it is their intrinsic value, if you will. But it isn’t always what they will trade for. Using a simple example, if investors are fond of biotechnology a biotech-focused CEF might find itself trading at a 10% premium to NAV. The reason is investor sentiment; essentially investors are saying they expect good things from the CEF in the future. The important take away is that investor sentiment is the driving factor – not the actual value of the CEF’s shares. People really like PHK Closed-end funds normally trade around their NAV or at a discount. It’s unusual to see a CEF with a long history of trading well above NAV. PHK, then, is an exception to the norm. It’s long traded at a premium, and notably, at an extreme premium to its NAV. For example, its three-year average premium is nearly 50%. Its five-year average is just over 50%. People really like PHK. I’ve posited that the reason for this premium was partially because Bill Gross took over managing the fund in 2009, the year in which the premium started to widen. Since he’s no longer there, others have noted the fund’s steady distribution even through a difficult market period – notably the 2007 to 2009 recession. In the end, it’s probably a combination of the two. But whatever the reason, the CEF has a long history of trading well above its NAV. Which is why some argue that the selloff from an over 50% premium to the more recent 30% premium is a buying opportunity. This is a normal investment approach in the closed-end fund space, buying when a CEF is notably below its average premium/discount. The idea being that investor sentiment likely went too far in one direction and will eventually swing back toward the historical level. On the one hand, this makes sense for PHK. The average premium is close to 50% in recent history, so at a 30% premium, it’s fallen pretty far from the norm. In fact, this isn’t the first time there’s been such a drop. In the back half of 2012, PHK went from a roughly 75% premium down to a 25% premium before recovering to a 40% premium and eventually to the 50% and 60% levels seen earlier this year. I’d say, for aggressive investors who like to trade premiums and discounts, this is a CEF you should be looking at. Still too expensive But if you are a conservative investor, you should still avoid PHK. Why? We know with almost no doubt what PHK is worth; that’s the point of net asset value. That’s the value of PHK, no more and no less. If you buy PHK for a 30% premium, you are paying 30% more than its portfolio is worth on a per share basis. One of the reasons why playing premiums and discounts works is because you know the value of the asset you are buying – its NAV. So when a CEF is trading well below its NAV, there’s a clear catalyst for the discount to narrow. As investors realize the disconnect between price and value, they’ll correct it. PHK, however, is trading below its historical premium . Which means that anyone buying now is betting that investor sentiment will improve so that the premium gets wider. That’s akin to momentum investing in which you buy an expensive stock hoping that you can eventually sell it to someone at an even more expensive price – with little regard to its intrinsic value. There’s nothing wrong with this when it works, and it does work for some people. But it can also go horribly wrong when investors have changed their minds. Think back to the carnage in the dotcom bust, when investors realized that they didn’t like Internet companies as much as they thought they did. The companies didn’t change, investor psychology did. So, if you are a conservative investor, why bother buying something you know is overpriced? There are so many investment options in the market that taking such risks just isn’t worth it. And that’s true even taking into consideration PHK’s 15% yield. I’d rather take a yield half that and sleep well knowing that I don’t have to rely on fickle investors to buy my shares at a higher price. Or, better, yet, I’d rather buy something trading below its NAV and below its average discount, and wait for the market to realize the price disparity. With the NAV being a magnet to draw investors in to an undervalued investment opportunity. So, if you are an aggressive CEF investor looking to play discounts and premiums, PHK is definitely worth a look. Just go in knowing the game you are playing. I’d still suggest caution, but the fall from the average at PHK fits the bill for the trade. For conservative investors, don’t get sucked in by a big yield or the fall in the premium. PHK is still expensive even after its premium has fallen some 20 percentage points, and the yield just isn’t worth paying a still high 30% premium. You’ll be better off investing elsewhere. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Lipper Closed-End Fund Summary: July 2015

By Tom Roseen While for the third consecutive month equity CEFs suffered negative NAV-based returns (-0.72% on average for July) and market-based returns (-1.96%), for the first month in three fixed income CEFs were able to claw their way into positive territory, returning 0.45% on a NAV basis and 0.82% on a market basis While the NASDAQ Composite managed to break into record territory in mid-July after a strong tech rally following Google’s surprising second quarter result, as in June advances to new highs were generally just at the margin. Despite signs of improvement in Greece’s debt crisis and on China’s stock market meltdown, investors turned their attention to second quarter earnings reports and began to evaluate the possible impacts slowing growth from China and the global economy will have on market valuations. The markets remained fairly volatile during July. At the beginning of the month rate-hike worries declined slightly after an inline jobs report and soft wage growth were thought to give policy makers an excuse to postpone rate hikes until December. The Labor Department reported that the U.S. economy had added 233,000 jobs for June. And while the unemployment rate declined to 5.3%, most of it was due to people leaving the labor force. With the Chinese market taking back some of its losses and the Greek debt saga appearing to be closer to a resolution, European stocks rallied mid-month. However, later in the month disappointing earnings results from the likes of Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ), Caterpillar (NYSE: CAT ), and Exxon (NYSE: XOM ) and commodities’ continuing their freefall placed a pall over the markets. Concerns over slowing global growth and the Shanghai Composite’s recent meltdown weighed on emerging markets, sending Lipper’s world equity CEFs macro-group (-1.52%) to the bottom of the equity CEFs universe for the month. While plummeting commodity prices weren’t much kinder to domestic equity funds (-0.80%), investors’ search for yield helped catapult mixed-asset CEFs (+0.77%) to the top of the charts for July. With China suffering its worst monthly market decline in six years, crude oil prices closing at a four-month low, and gold futures posting their worst monthly performance in two years, investors experienced bouts of panic and sought safe-haven plays intermittently throughout the month. At maturities greater than two years Treasury yields declined, with the ten-year yield declining 15 bps to 2.20% by month-end. For the first month in four all of Lipper’s municipal bond CEFs classifications (+1.10%) witnessed plus-side returns for July. However, domestic taxable bond CEFs (-0.13%) and world bond CEFs (-0.98%) were pulled down by investors’ risk-off mentality. For July the median discount of all CEFs narrowed 2 bps to 10.50%-worse than the 12-month moving average discount (9.13%). Equity CEFs’ median discount widened 41 bps to 11.15%, while fixed income CEFs’ median discount narrowed 58 bps to 9.86%. For the month 46% of all funds’ discounts or premiums improved, while 51% worsened. To read the complete Month in Closed-End Funds: July 2015 Fund Market Insight Report, which includes the month’s closed-end fund corporate events, please click here .