Tag Archives: time

Simple Investing Strategies Cannot Remain Entirely Simple For Long

By Rob Bennett Simple investing strategies are sound investing strategies. The key to success is sticking with a strategy long enough for it to pay off. Complex strategies cause investors to lose focus. Unfocused investors have a hard time sticking with their strategies through dramatic changes in circumstances. The greatest virtue of Buy-and-Hold is its simplicity. However, Buy-and-Hold purists take the desire for simplicity too far. Buy-and-Holders have told me that one big reason why the strategy was not changed following Robert Shiller’s “revolutionary” (his word) finding that valuations affect long-term returns is that it would complicate it to add a requirement that investors adjust their stock allocations in response to big valuation shifts in an effort to keep their risk profiles roughly constant. If that’s so, they made a terrible mistake. Buy-and-Hold does not call for allocation adjustments to be made in response to valuation shifts because the research showing the need for them did not exist at the time the Buy-and-Hiold strategy was being developed. Once the strategy was set up in the way that it was, changing allocations came to be seen as a complication. Isn’t it more simple to stick with one allocation at all times? I don’t think so. Buy-and-Hold seemed simple in the days when we did not realize how much the long-term value proposition of stocks is altered by the valuation level that applies at the time the purchase is made. We now know that the investor who fails to make allocation adjustments is thereby permitting his risk profile to swing wildly about as valuations move from low levels to moderate levels to high levels. In the long term, there is more complexity in a strategy that calls for wild risk profile shifts than in one that requires the investor to check valuation levels once per year and to change his stock allocation once every ten years or so. That’s all that is required for investors seeking to keep their risk profiles roughly stable. That extra one hour or so of work performed every decade reduces the risk of stock investing by 70 percent and saves the investor a lot of emotional angst during price crashes. It is the losses suffered in price crashes that cause investors to abandon Buy-and-Hold strategies (at the worst possible time!). Devoting an additional one hour of work to the investing project renders price crashes virtually painless for investors following the updated Buy-and-Hold approach (Valuation-Informed Indexing). It’s not only engaging in transactions that adds complexity. Figuring out how to respond when large losses of accumulated wealth are experienced is a huge complication, one that Buy-and-Holders did not consider when devising the first-draft version of the strategy. There are other ways in which Buy-and-Hold has become more complicated over the years. In the early days, there were few types of index funds available. Investors were generally advised to go with a Total Stock Market Index Fund. That’s still a good choice. But today’s investor has dozens of options available to him. He can invest only in small caps or only in mid caps or only in large caps or can mix or match in all sorts of ways. Traditionalist Buy-and-Holders often express dismay at the number of choices available, bemoaning the added complexity that comes with added options. I am sympathetic to those feelings. The core Buy-and-Hold idea – that it is by keeping it simple that investors avoid falling into emotional traps and confusions – is an idea of great power. Purchasing a Total Stock Market Index Fund still makes a great deal of sense for the typical, average investor. But I don’t believe that dogmatism on this question is justified. It adds only a limited amount of complexity for an investor to focus on small caps or large caps or mid caps. And some investors find appeal in focusing their investing dollars in the ways that new types of index funds permit. Some investors don’t feel safe investing in anything other than large caps. Some like the excitement of small caps and would be inclined to try to pick individual stocks rather than to index if investing in a Total Stock Market Index Fund were the only available option. In relative terms, an investor who purchases a large cap index fund or a small cap index fund or a mid cap index fund might thereby be avoiding more complex options that would draw him in if he were to try to follow a purist path. And of course many investors like to invest in different segments of the market. Investing in a high-tech index fund is riskier than investing in a broad index fund. But it is less risky than investing in any one high-tech company. Buy-and-Hold dogmatics would argue that only the investor who chooses a broad index fund is a true Buy-and-Holder. My take is that the success of the Buy-and-Hold strategy inevitably created demand for a greater variety of investing options and that there is no way to keep the Buy-and-Hold concept from becoming a bit more complicated over time. Another big change since the early days of Buy-and-Hold is that many investors no longer limit themselves to broad U.S. indexes but seek participation in the global marketplace. That makes sense, doesn’t it? Our economy is gradually becoming a global economy. There are numerous complexities that come into play as the transition proceeds. The U.S. has long had a stable economic system. So going global adds risk. However, that might be true only historically and not on a going-forward basis. It might be that the risky thing on a going-forward basis is to continue to invest solely in the U.S. market. The Buy-and-Hold Pioneers did not anticipate having to make decisions re such questions. They thought they had solved the complexity problems once and for all. These questions just turned up as time passed. The full reality is that they always do! Simple investing strategies cannot remain entirely simple for long. Valuation-Informed Indexing will become more complex over time too. We have 145 years of U.S. stock market data available to us today to determine when valuations have changed enough to require an allocation adjustment and how big a allocation adjustment is required. As more years of data are recorded, our understanding of what sorts of allocation adjustments are either needed or desired will become sharpened and refined. That’s good. We want to have as much historical data available to us for guiding our allocation shifts as possible. But it cannot be denied that the decision-making process will become somewhat more complex as more considerations are taken into account. That’s just the way of the world. Humankind’s understanding of the world about it improves over time and those improvements undermine our ability to keep things simple. Simple is good. But a purist stance is not realistic in the fast-changing (because it is fast improving!) world in which we live today.

Gundlach: Buy Closed-End Bond Funds And Mortgage REITs

It seems that bond king Jeffrey Gundlach and I are reading from the same playbook. In the Barron’s Roundtable (registration required), he made his case for deeply-discounted closed-end bond funds and mortgage REITs. I’ve been bullish on both for over a year… and I’ve taken my lumps for it. But the values are there, and I’m collecting outsized payouts while I wait. Some of Gundlach’s comments are worth passing on: A portion of the credit market has a safety cushion large enough to absorb another 200- or 300-basis-point widening in junk-bond spreads versus Treasuries. I’m referring to closed-end bond funds, which trade on the New York Stock Exchange. Closed-ends are one of the best plays on the Fed not raising interest rates… Closed-end funds are leveraged, and investors have been afraid to own them because they fear that the Fed has launched a tightening cycle. Also, based on daily data going back 20 years, they have traded at a 2% discount, on average, to net asset value. Recently, however, the sector traded at a 10% to 12% discount to NAV. It has traded at such a steep discount only 5% of the time. In the past 20 years, the discount has been wider than that only during the financial crisis in 2008-’09… If history is any guide, discounts would widen further only in a 2008-type scenario, which is possible, although doubtful so soon after the prior crisis. Under current circumstances, you have about two percentage points of downside, and 10 points of upside to return to the historical discount. That makes a basket of closed-ends attractive. If you bought a junk-bond-oriented closed-end trading at a 12% discount to NAV, some of the bonds would be trading at a 15% discount. This isn’t a bad idea, but I prefer Brookfield Total Return (HTR). It is trading just as poorly as some other closed-ends, but is vastly safer. Gundlach’s firm, DoubleLine, is far too big to buy closed-end funds in any meaningful size. He’d end up single-handedly moving the market. But for individual investors, these may be the best option available these days. As Gundlach puts it, “If the S&P rises 10%, closed-ends could return 20%. If the stock market falls 30%, a decline is already priced into these funds. I look at closed-end funds as a good place to put your risk money.” I agree. Given the yawning discounts among closed-end bond funds, we have that all-important margin of safety in this space. Moving on, Gundlach had some interesting things to say about mortgage REITs: Fears that the Fed will raise rates significantly are overblown. This brings me to Annaly Capital Management (NYSE: NLY ), one of the largest mortgage REITs [real-estate investment trust]. It has an $8 billion market cap and has been trading at a 25% discount to book value for some time… It is selling for $9.41. A few years back, it sold for $18. These sorts of stocks have step-function moves. They don’t move by a few percent; they go from $18 to $12 and from $12 to $9, and if the yield curve is inverted, and they have to cut their dividends, things get really bad. But a discount of 30% to book value is the widest ever for Annaly, and historically very wide for a mortgage REIT. Annaly is paying a dividend of 30 cents per quarter. It yields 12.75%. The environment for Annaly has improved… At today’s discount, a lot of bad things are priced in. If the Fed doesn’t raise interest rates much, the stock should go higher. I’m not currently long Annaly. Rather than bet on a single mortgage REIT, I opted to buy a broader basket via an ETF. But my rationale was much the same. Across the sector, you have quality names trading at enormous discounts to their underlying portfolio values. The sector is worth more dead than alive. The rationale move here would be for mortgage REITs to plow the proceeds from maturing and prepaid mortgage securities into buying back their own stock. An m-REIT yielding 10% and trading at 80 cents on the dollar is going to deliver a better return than the mortgage securities they’re currently buying. Annaly, for one, has done exactly that, announcing over the summer that they intended to buy back about $1 billion in shares . At today’s prices, that amounts to about 12% of Annaly’s market cap. Expect more of their peers to follow suit. Disclaimer : This article is for informational purposes only and should not be considered specific investment advice or as a solicitation to buy or sell any securities. Sizemore Capital personnel and clients will often have an interest in the securities mentioned. There is risk in any investment in traded securities, and all Sizemore Capital investment strategies have the possibility of loss. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Original Post

SilverPepper Posts Pair Of First-Place Finishes

Alternative mutual fund company SilverPepper prides itself on making “hedge fund strategies” available to “the rest of us.” The Lake Forest, Illinois-based firm has a number of investor-friendly videos at its website , and its marketing materials generally aim to entertain as well as inform. SilverPepper’s approach is working. The firm recently celebrated its second anniversary, and for the second straight year, two of its mutual funds had the honor of finishing first within their categories: the SilverPepper Merger Arbitrage Fund (MUTF: SPAIX ) was the top-performing merger-arbitrage mutual fund for the 12 months ending October 31, and the SilverPepper Commodity Strategies Global Macro Fund (MUTF: SPCIX ) finished first out of 157 funds in the “Commodities Broad Basket” Morningstar category. SPAIX also had a strong showing in comparison to funds in the broader Market Neutral category, finishing 11th out of 158 funds for the time period being considered. For the year ending December 31, 2015, the fund returned an impressive 8.49%, ranking in the top 3% of the broad category. SilverPepper president Patrick Reinkemeyer attributed the fund’s outperformance to “hedge fund expert” Steve Gerbel, who “controlled risk by avoiding failed mergers” and boosted returns by investing in smaller-cap companies “where regulatory hurdles tend to be less, yet merger spreads are typically wider.” SPCIX finished 1st out of 157 funds for the year ending Halloween 2015, but that doesn’t mean it actually generated positive returns for what was a tough 12 months for commodities. Nevertheless, it outperformed the category average by a whopping 14 percentage points, and over the next three months, its -0.80% return remained in the top 4% of the category. Mr. Reinkemeyer said fund manager Renee Haugerud “deserves credit” for “using her fingernails-in-the-dirt research to largely avoid some of the worst commodity sectors,” including oil, and “hedging its bets” as part of “an overt tactic to protect investors’ assets.” For more information, visit silverpepperfunds.com. Past performance does not necessarily predict future results. Jason Seagraves contributed to this article.