Tag Archives: spy

The Real Cost Of Hedging With Leveraged ETFs

Summary Scaled hedging has some advantages over usual market-timing. Leveraged ETFs are convenient hedging tools, but they suffer from a decay. This article calculates the additional cost of hedging a stock portfolio with leveraged ETFs. A timed, scalable hedging tactic has at least 3 advantages over usual market-timing consisting in going out of the market: adaptability to the risk level, lower transaction costs, and cashing all dividends. This previous article shows how to use a systemic risk indicator to scale a hedging position and protect my premium portfolio with SPXU . ETFs are not necessarily the best hedging tools, but they are available and understandable for all investors. SPXU has the advantage to allow hedging in an account where only long positions in stocks and ETFs are possible, and without margin. Like all leveraged ETFs, it has the drawback of suffering from a decay called beta-slippage. This article calculates the real additional hedging cost incurred by this decay in 2015 for SPXU, and for another leveraged inverse S&P 500 ETF: SDS . It also shows the decay of long leveraged ETFs. What is beta-slippage? If a volatile asset goes up 25% one day and down 20% the day after, a perfect double leveraged ETF goes up 50% the first day and down 40% the second day. On the close of the second day, the underlying asset is back to its initial price. At the same time, the perfect leveraged ETF has lost 10%: (1 + 0.5) x (1 – 0.4) = 0.9 This decay is called beta-slippage. It is a mathematical property of a leveraged and frequently rebalanced portfolio (leveraged ETFs may hold futures, options and/or swap contracts). In a trending market, beta-slippage can be positive. If an asset goes up 10% two days in a row, on the second day, the asset has gone up 21%. The perfect 2x leveraged ETF is up 44%: (1 + 0.2) x (1 + 0.2) = 1.44 It is 2% better than holding the underlying leveraged 2x on margin. Beta-slippage is path-dependent. If the underlying gains 50% on day 1 and loses 33.33% on day 2, it is back to its initial value, exactly like in the first example. This time, the perfect leveraged ETF loses one third of its value, which is much worse than the 10% of the first case: (1 + 1) x (1 – 0.6667) = 0.6667 Without a formal demonstration, it shows that the higher the volatility, the higher the decay. Hence the name of beta-slippage: “beta” is the best known statistical parameter of volatility. Of course, it is uncommon to have such price variations on an ETF’s underlying asset. These numbers are here to give an amplified vision of what happens with more realistic daily returns, day after day and month after month. (click to enlarge) SPXU in red, SPY in blue. Chart and data: portfolio123 Decay of S&P 500 ETFs in 2015 The next table gives the decay of leveraged ETFs on the S&P 500 index from 1/1/2015 to 10/15/2015 (9.5 months). It was a sideways and quite volatile market, with a worse than usual beta-slippage. The decay includes beta-slippage, and also tracking errors and management fees. Ticker Return Return of SPY x leveraging factor Decay (difference) Drag on portfolio SPY -0.52% SH (1xshort) -1.84% 0.52% -2.36% -1.18% SSO (2xlong) -3.92% -1.04% -2.88% -0.96% UPRO (3xlong) -8.69% -1.56% -7.13% -1.78% SDS(2xshort) -4.84% 1.04% -5.88% -1.96% SPXU(2xshort) -9.45% 1.56% -11.01% -2.75% When using SDS or SPXU for hedging, the hedging position represents 1/3 of the total portfolio (stocks + hedge) in the first case, and 1/4 in the second one. So the real drag on the portfolio was respectively 1.96% and 2.75% compared with shorting SPY. This is the additional cost of hedging the whole portfolio during the whole period (setting it in market neutral mode), which is not the best tactic proposed in my previous article (and service ). The cost of using leveraged ETFs with any of the proposed variable hedging tactics was much lower. Rebalancing the hedge weekly also lowers the decay due to beta-slippage (but not tracking errors). Finally, the cost is lower than losing all dividends when going out of the market in a classic market-timing approach, and it is likely to provide a better long-term risk-adjusted performance. SSO and UPRO also look like decent alternatives: SSO had the lowest portfolio drag. But short selling always incurs additional risks and borrowing costs. SDS and SPXU allow to hedge without borrowing cost and with less or no margin cost. These costs depend on the broker, so the best choice for hedging with an ETF may depend on your broker. If you have the skills and possibility to manage other instruments like futures, options, CFDs, they may be more cost-effective. Keep also in mind that the hedge and the stock portfolio can be in different accounts. If you like this article, you might be interested in the next ones. Click the “Follow” tab at the top if you want to stay informed of my free-access publications on Seeking Alpha. You can even choose the “real-time” option if you want to be instantly notified.

Why There Will Never Be Another Warren Buffett

Summary Increasing numbers of highly intelligent people have been drawn to the stock market over the past several decades. As a result, it has become extremely difficult for individual investors to gain an “edge” over the competition. This explains why it’s so hard to produce the kind of “outlier” returns investing legends like Warren Buffett achieved. In an interview in the late 1990s, Warren Buffett famously said that he could “guarantee” 50% annual returns if he was managing less money. He explained that compounding large sums of money at high rates becomes increasingly difficult over time, because it limits the investable universe to only the largest companies. A smaller portfolio would allow him to invest in smaller companies, which have historically produced slightly better returns than their larger counterparts. He further pointed out that today’s easy access to information makes it easier than ever to find such companies selling cheaply. Unfortunately, Buffett’s argument has a major flaw. It’s certainly possible that his performance would improve (marginally) if he was managing millions, rather than billions, of dollars; but to claim that faster access to more information makes it easier to find attractive investment opportunities is illogical. In reality, this actually makes the stock market more efficient (not less), which makes it harder (not easier) to find and exploit pricing inefficiencies. But there’s another equally important factor driving market efficiency: skill. Today’s investors are much better than those of earlier decades, and the difference between the best and the average investor is less pronounced. This is often called the “paradox of skill.” This phenomenon was famously observed by evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould. He wanted to know why no hitter in Major League Baseball has had a batting average over .400 since Ted Williams hit .406 in 1941. He discovered that, while the league batting average has remained roughly the same throughout baseball’s history, the variation around that average has declined steadily. To put that in plain English, it means that skill of modern baseball players is better than ever, which makes outliers like Ted Williams less likely to occur. The paradox of skill is evident in other competitive sports as well. Today’s elite athletes have superior coaching, training, nutrition, and drugs/supplements. Which is why they’re running faster, jumping higher, throwing farther, and lifting heavier than ever before. But as athletes approach the biological limits of human performance, it makes it harder and harder for individuals to stand out from the competition. A perfect example of this is the men’s Olympic marathon. The winning time has dropped by more than 23 minutes from 1932 to 2012; however, the difference between the time for the winner and the man who came in 20th shrunk from 39 minutes to 7.5 minutes over the same period. In other words, the overall skill of Olympic marathoners is improving on an absolute basis but shrinking on a relative basis. We can see the same thing happening in the game of investing. Growing numbers of today’s investors (both retail and institutional) are far more sophisticated and knowledgeable than their predecessors. As a result, just as we’ve seen the disappearance of .400 hitters in baseball, we’re also seeing the disappearance of superstar investors who were once able to persistently outperform the market by large margins. The table below shows that the standard deviation of excess returns (a proxy for investment skill) has trended lower for U.S. large-cap mutual funds over the past several decades. This means that the variation in stock-picking skill has narrowed as everyone got better and the market became more efficient. Decline in Standard Deviation of Excess Returns (Mutual Funds) Note: The table shows the five-year, rolling standard deviation of excess returns for all U.S. large-cap mutual funds. The benchmark index is the S&P 500 (NYSEARCA: SPY ). Source: A North Investments, Credit Suisse (Dan Callahan, CFA and Michael J. Mauboussin) Now consider Buffett’s track record. What do we see? The same exact story as above! During the early part of his career, when the market was underdeveloped and there was less competition, Buffett was the Ted Williams of investing. He had a huge edge over the less-skilled competition. But as more and more intelligent people were drawn to the market over the years, the variation in skill narrowed, shrinking his margin of outperformance. Ironically, even Buffett’s own teacher and mentor, Benjamin Graham, realized that outperforming the market was becoming increasingly difficult over time. In one of his last interviews before he died, he recommended passive (index fund-style) investing and said that it may no longer be possible to identify individual stocks that will outperform. In recent years, Buffett has also become a fan of index funds – not surprising, considering that he’s underperformed the market four out of the last five years. Decline in Standard Deviation of Excess Returns (Warren Buffett) Note: The table shows the five-year, rolling standard deviation of excess returns for Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A ) (NYSE: BRK.B ). The benchmark index is the S&P 500. Source: A North Investments, Berkshire Hathaway 2014 Annual Report The bottom line is that beating the market is becoming tougher, even for the best of the best. If Buffett started investing today with a smaller portfolio, it’s highly unlikely that he would come anywhere near the 50% annualized returns he claims he could get. In fact, over the course of his entire professional career, Buffett only accomplished this amazing feat twice (in 1968 and 1976). It should also be pointed out that even Renaissance Technologies’ legendary Medallion Fund, the most successful hedge fund ever, only managed to deliver annualized returns of 35% (that’s after a 5% management fee and a 44% performance fee). Renaissance employs scores of top PhDs who build elaborate algorithms that identify and profit from various market anomalies. If there really was a simple way to consistently earn 50% annualized returns, they would have found it by now. The reality is, as in baseball, the best hitters in money management can no longer bat .400. It’s extremely difficult to outsmart a market in which so many people have become just as smart as you are.

Lipper Fund Flows: Muni Bonds Continue To Shine

For the fund-flows week ended October 7, the benchmark Dow Jones Industrial Average gained 628 points to settle at 16,912. Equity mutual fund investors made net redemptions of $3.9 billion this past week (of which $2.0 billion was from large-cap funds), while equity exchange-traded funds (ETFs) saw net outflows of $4.1 billion as investors backed out of SPDR S&P 500 ((NYSEARCA: SPY ), -$2.0 billion), iShares Russell 2000 ((NYSEARCA: IWM ), -$1.6 billion), and iShares MSCI Germany ((NYSEARCA: EWG ), -$375 million). The $1.8-billion Select Sector Oil & Gas SPDR ((NYSEARCA: XOP ), +$303 million) led the weekly net inflows list. Bond mutual fund investors, like their equity counterparts, took a risk-off attitude as they redeemed shares. Overall, taxable bond mutual funds saw net outflows of $2.3 billion for the week, which marked the eleventh consecutive week of outflows for the group. Also marking 11 weeks of net outflows, Lipper’s Loan Participation Funds classification (-$354 million) saw no end in sight to the bleeding. High Yield Funds suffered outflows (-$675 million) among mutual fund investors but managed to take in net inflows on the ETF side (+$1.4 billion). Overall, bond ETFs saw $4.6 billion of net inflows. The week’s biggest bond ETF net inflows went to SPDR Barclays High Yield ((NYSEARCA: JNK ) , +$1.2 billion ) , while iShares 1-3 Credit ((NYSEARCA: CSJ ) , -$137 million ) led the net outflows list. Municipal bond mutual fund investors added $528 million net to their accounts, and the funds now have had inflows for two of the past three weeks-their best showing since April. Money market funds saw net inflows of $16.8 billion, of which institutional investors added $10.2 billion and retail investors added $6.6 billion. Share this article with a colleague