Tag Archives: outlook

Activist Investors Cannot Generate Significant, Long-Term Gains

Originally posted in TheStreet on May 18, 2016. Can activist investors deliver the outsized returns that their actions and rhetoric seem to promise? TheStreet recently published an interesting article about the potential impact of activist hedge fund managers and the failure of mega mergers – sometimes potentially good deals. But the article only touches on part of the dilemma of the whole activist strategy and mania. While activism becomes popular at specific times, particularly in bull markets, the strategy probably cannot generate long term alpha or outperformance. The central problem is that an activist has to have a large position in a stock to have an impact. This is fine in a bull market as stock prices rise. Indeed, it is probable that a large amount of the stock uplift in a position held by an activist has nothing to do with the activism; rather, it stems from buying into a rising market. Naturally, an activist’s buying helps with demand for the stock. But if the wider market declines, the activists’ ‘activism’ tends to become increasingly irrelevant to the direction of the stock (if it ever really was in the first place). In a sudden bear market, activists tend to find they have large concentrated positions that often become highly illiquid – or at least can only be sold down at a significant discount to their then market price. This phenomena wiped out various activists with limited experience in the last credit crisis. They included Aticus Capital , the fund of Timothy Barakett and Nathan Rothschild. Curiously enough, these types of financial models are not uncommon. There are numerous industries that make a significant ROIC during good times, only systematically to wipe out years of historic retained profits in bad times. It is true, for example, of many aviation lessors . These companies are betting not just on aircraft lease rentals, but more importantly on the residual value of aircraft at the end of say a typical 5-year lease. If aircraft values have gone up during that lease period (usually because of benign economic conditions) the lessors make out like bandits. However in an economic downturn, there are fewer passengers, aircraft sit in deserts unused, their rentals collapse, and critically, so do their values. The result is aircraft lessors usually make a nice ROE for a few years and then wipe out most of the last few years’ retained earnings in downturns . For many such companies their long term ROE may even be negative. An honest aircraft leasing executive in presenting his budget would show gradually rising returns for a few years and then suddenly profits falling off a cliff during an expected market downfall. Unsurprisingly, you rarely see such budgets in the industry, as the leasing executive would be unlikely to keep his job for long. Other industries have similar features, including the investment banking industry. Significantly, it seems activist hedge fund managers fit into the same category. They experience a solid and easy run as the equity markets rise and then often a wipe-out of numerous years of return when the market collapses. Large, illiquid positions make orderly disposals, and avoiding such losses, in a downturn extremely difficult. Like the leasing executive, I’ve yet to see an activist investment prospectus that says: “we forecast to make solid returns for a number of years, and then in the next market downturn can be expected to lose our shirt….” There are also now so many managers dabbling in activism that like many hedge fund strategies it has just become ubiquitous. There is the odd activist like Carl Icahn who seems to make it always work, but then in reality he has unique market influence and uses other methods, aside from pure activism to influence management decisions and share price. There are also maneuvers (e.g., taking profits when a merger is announced even if it doesn’t happen, partial hedging of long positions before it’s too late, etc.) that good activists regularly use to mitigate downside risk. But the central long-term flaw in the strategy remains. Approach activism with great caution and do your research. Consider what costs it is worth paying for this type of strategy? The activist may be just a heavily concentrated, long only bull market investor. Probe how he will manage the inevitable downturns? Jeremy Josse is the author of Dinosaur Derivatives and Other Trades , an alternative take on financial philosophy and theory (published by Wiley & Co). He is also a Managing Director and Head of the Financial Institutions Group at Sterne Agee CRT in New York. Josse is a visiting researcher in finance at Sy Syms business school in New York. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRT Capital Group LLC, its affiliates, or its employees. Josse has no position in the stocks mentioned in this article.

Best And Worst Q2’16: Utilities ETFs, Mutual Funds And Key Holdings

The Utilities sector ranks ninth out of the ten sectors as detailed in our Q2’16 Sector Ratings for ETFs and Mutual Funds report. Last quarter , the Utilities sector ranked last. It gets our Very Dangerous rating, which is based on aggregation of ratings of nine ETFs and 35 mutual funds in the Utilities sector as of April 20, 2016. See a recap of our Q1’16 Sector Ratings here . Figure 1 ranks from best to worst the eight Utilities ETFs that meet our liquidity standards and Figure 2 shows the five best and worst rated Utilities mutual funds. Not all Utilities sector ETFs and mutual funds are created the same. The number of holdings varies widely (from 19 to 253). This variation creates drastically different investment implications and, therefore, ratings. Investors should not buy any Utilities ETFs or mutual funds because none get an Attractive-or-better rating. If you must have exposure to this sector, you should buy a basket of Attractive-or-better rated stocks and avoid paying undeserved fund fees. Active management has a long history of not paying off. Figure 1: ETFs with the Best & Worst Ratings – Top 5 Click to enlarge * Best ETFs exclude ETFs with TNAs less than $100 million for inadequate liquidity. Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings Reaves Utilities ETF (NASDAQ: UTES ) is excluded from Figure 1 because its total net assets are below $100 million and do not meet our liquidity minimums. Figure 2: Mutual Funds with the Best & Worst Ratings – Top 5 Click to enlarge * Best mutual funds exclude funds with TNAs less than $100 million for inadequate liquidity. Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings PowerShares DWA Utilities Momentum Portfolio (NYSEARCA: PUI ) s the top-rated Utilities ETF and Wells Fargo Utility & Telecommunications Fund (MUTF: EVUYX ) is the top-rated Utilities mutual fund. Both earn a Dangerous rating. PowerShares S&P SmallCap Utilities Portfolio (NASDAQ: PSCU ) is the worst rated Utilities ETF and Rydex Series Utilities Fund (MUTF: RYUTX ) is the worst rated Utilities mutual fund. Both earn a Very Dangerous rating. 76 stocks of the 3000+ we cover are classified as Utilities stocks, but due to style drift, Utilities ETFs and mutual funds hold 253 stocks. UGI Corporation (NYSE: UGI ) is one of our favorite stocks held by Utilities ETFs and mutual funds and earns an Attractive rating. UGI is the only Utilities stock that receives an Attractive-or-better rating out of the 76 Utilities stocks under coverage. Over the past decade, UGI has grown after-tax profit ( NOPAT ) by 7% compounded annually. The company’s return on invested capital ( ROIC ) is currently 8%, which is up from 4% earned in 2012. UGI is undervalued given the company’s consistent profit growth and increasing profitability. At its current price of $41/share, UGI has a price-to-economic book value ( PEBV ) ratio of 0.9. This ratio means that the market expects UGI’s NOPAT to permanently decline by 10%. If UGI can grow NOPAT by just 6% compounded annually for the next decade , the stock is worth $55/share today – a 34% upside. Southwest Gas Corp (NYSE: SWX ) is one of our least favorite stocks held by PSCU and earns a Dangerous rating. The company has failed to generate positive economic earnings in any year of our model, which dates back to 1998. In fact, over the past four years, economic earnings have declined from -$5 million in 2012 to -$39 million in 2015. Southwest Gas Corp earns a bottom-quintile ROIC of 4% and has consistently earned a bottom-quintile ROIC since 1998. Given the poor fundamentals, SWX is significantly overvalued. To justify its current price of $66/share, SWX must grow NOPAT by 8% compounded annually for the next 11 years . The expectations embedded into the current stock price offer little upside but rather large downside risk. Figures 3 and 4 show the rating landscape of all Utilities ETFs and mutual funds. Figure 3: Separating the Best ETFs From the Worst ETFs Click to enlarge Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings Figure 4: Separating the Best Mutual Funds From the Worst Mutual Funds Click to enlarge Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings D isclosure: David Trainer and Kyle Guske II receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, sector or theme. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

‘Go For Growth’ Still A Sound Strategy In Today’s Market

Stocks perceived as mitigating the effects of market volatility were popular among investors in the first quarter. Big swings in equity markets drove a flight to quality that benefitted dividend-paying sectors such as Utilities and Telecommunication Services (which were the two best-performing sectors in both ACWI and the Russell 3000). We largely have avoided those sectors due to their elevated valuations and the fact that we don’t believe they offer the growth possibilities that are necessary to generate long-term returns. While some high-profile growth stocks trade at triple-digit P/E valuations today, the reality is that the vast majority of growth stocks do not, and we do not believe it is worthwhile to examine what is happening with the growth story. The case for growth stocks in a low-growth world is relatively straightforward. All else being equal, companies that are capable of delivering above-average growth in a low-growth world should be rewarded by investors over time. However, in investing, all else is rarely equal. A high-growth stock at an unsustainably high valuation can be just as risky as – or even more risky than – a company that is in secular decline. 2015 was the best year since 2009 for major U.S. growth indices (e.g., Russell 1000 Growth, S&P 500 Growth) versus their value counterparts (e.g., Russell 1000 Value, S&P 500 Value), so it makes sense to take a deeper dive. The median growth stock trades at a similar valuation (on both an absolute and relative basis versus non-growth stocks) to where it started 2015. For example, the median P/E of Russell 1000 Growth stocks that have no weight assigned to the Russell 1000 Value traded at a next 12-month P/E of 19.4 at the start of 2015. This group of stocks entered 2016 with a very similar next 12-month P/E of 19.5, and ended the first quarter at 19.7. Absolute valuations for this group as a whole are not cheap, and therefore, risks associated with coming up short of investor expectations can be high. However, the premium for these high-growth businesses versus the rest of the Russell 1000 is well within historical norms (see chart below). Against this backdrop, we continue to seek opportunities to own well-positioned, growth-oriented businesses with valuations that offer attractive compensation for the risks taken. The number of such opportunities might be fewer than earlier in the current market cycle, but we believe a selective and active approach to investing can maximize the likelihood of finding such companies today. Click to enlarge Investing in companies that can grow their earnings at rates above the trend in broad economic growth is particularly important in today’s slow-growth economy. As an illustration, we’ve taken returns in the U.S. equity market on a rolling 10-year basis and broken them down into how much came from earnings growth and how much came from changes in the P/E multiple (i.e., multiple expansion or contraction). Beginning in 1970, it has been earnings growth that has been more consistent and stable most of the time (see chart below). Historically, earnings growth has been a more reliable contributor to the returns we get as investors than multiple expansion. Click to enlarge While there certainly are periods in which multiple expansion drove or provided a boost to returns, changes in multiples have been quite volatile. In the 1980s and 1990s – when multiple growth helped returns – the market was coming off some attractive starting valuations and had a backdrop that was favorable for rising valuations. As a result, there was solid multiple expansion. But before that – and, more importantly, recently – not only could investors not rely on multiple expansion, they also had to deal with multiple contraction. This is one illustration of why we believe it is particularly important right now to focus on companies that are capable of growing their earnings on an individual basis, which, in our view, puts investors in a much better position to generate positive returns. Past performance does not guarantee future results.