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Thematic ETFs: Smarter Than Regular Smart Beta ETFs?

It’s been a true transformation for the ETF industry over the last few years. With a size of $3.137 trillion , the global ETF industry hit a record at the end of April 2016. The U.S. market alone boasts a size of over $2.2 trillion, derived from over 1,890 exchange traded products. While this joy-ride is something to delight in, crinkles of worries must be there on the foreheads of issuers. After all, with such gigantic and successful progress, ideas of new issuances are likely to fall short. There is always pressure for beating the benchmark, navigating tough trading times and last but not the least, peer pressure. Simply put, the days of plain vanilla ETFs or market-cap weighted ETFs are gone and products with several wining attributes, like low volatility or high dividend, are coming on-stream. Commonly, these next generation ETFs are called smart-beta ETFs. But it seems that the lure for smart beta investing is also diminishing these days. Beating the benchmark on a sustainable basis is tough in the present global backdrop that is fraught with issues. Plus, first-time craze also ebbs when a new investing theme turns older. Probably, this is why issuers are fine tuning the smart beta concepts to make them smarter. For example, Goldman Sachs introduced the ActiveBeta Index concept, Global X has a suite of scientific beta ETFs and so on. In fact, to make things more competitive and take them a few notches higher, Global X got itself busy in promoting the Thematic investing and launching more products based on it. Inside Thematic Investing As per Global X, its family of thematic ETFs looks to track companies that reap returns from ” structural changes in people and demographics , technology and innovation, and natural resources, along with companies that exhibit a particular set of desirable values.” As we can see that the above-mentioned criteria is long-term in nature and less susceptible to sudden changes in economic policies of various countries or a sudden jerk in the market emanating from some geo-political crisis. Instead, these factors look to cash in on some emerging trend in the global economy. As an investor, if you have faith in a particular segment over the long term, only then you should go ahead with that product. As of now, Global X has four categories in its thematic investment, namely technology, resources, values and people. Not that these ideas are fool-proof as products in technology and resources segments piled up losses previously; but new entrees in people and values segments seem striking at the current level. We’ll tell you why. People Products Global X Millennials Thematic ETF (NASDAQ: MILN ) This recently launched ETF looks to track companies targeted at the U.S. millennials generation (birth years ranging from 1980-2000). Since millennials seem to be the growth driver of the U.S. economy, outpacing baby boomers in 2015 as the largest generation and has the prospect of comprising 75% of the workforce by 2025, this surely emerges as a long-term bet. Per Global X , millennials now earn about $2 trillion, with income projected to grow to $8 trillion by 2025. Since millennials have a tendency of splurging on tech-savvy products and eating out, several tech or consumer discretionary ETFs can give MILN little competition. Global X Health & Wellness Thematic ETF ( OTC:BFIT ) There is a visible shift in consumers’ taste and preference for health and wellness products which give people a better quality of life. It is already a $3.4 trillion industry . As global life expectancy is projected to surge by 18% by 2100, contribution of health and wellness companies ought to be higher. This explains why investors can have a look at BFIT which revolves around stocks like Whitewave Foods Co, Adidas AG, Herbal Life Ltd, etc. Global X Longevity Thematic ETF (LNGR) This new fund tracks companies which depend on people across the globe living longer lives. Now, since older people invest more in health care related products and services, health care will rule this fund. Boston Scientific, AbbVie and Medtronic are the top three firms of this ETF. As a matter of fact, this fund may face tough competition from other health care and biotech ETFs like iShares Global Healthcare ETF (NYSEARCA: IXJ ) , iShares U.S. Healthcare ETF and Guggenheim S&P 500 Equal Weight Health Care ETF (NYSEARCA: RYH ) . Values Product There is only one fund as yet, namely Global X S&P 500 Catholic Values ETF (NASDAQ: CATH ) . The fund gives exposure to the companies within the S&P 500 whose business practices follow Catholic values and leave out those that do not. Companies involved in weapons, military products and child labor do not get an entry card into this ETF. The theme falls in the category of socially responsible ETFs, though CATH is quite unique in nature. Bottom Line Maybe defined in a different way, thematic ETFs seem quite similar to smart beta ETFs. It’s just that the ideas are innovative and thus the issuer can expect success ahead. Original post Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.

The MFS "Active Advantage"… Really?

For those of you who like to peruse CNBC every once in a while, there is a very high chance that you have seen commercials from an outfit called MFS Investment Management. They are very well scripted and highlight some of the typical selling points active managers like to make when speaking to investors about topics such as risk management, downside protection, alpha, and a globally informed perspective through a network of analysts that have boots on the ground at different locations around the world. It is a very compelling story that speaks to a lot of the fears investors have when broaching the topic of investing for the future. The biggest selling point and overall message from these commercials is the fact that MFS Investments are being active in the sense they are not just sitting back and letting things happen. This is often one of the issues we have as advisors when talking about the difference between an active and passive approach to investing in that passive insinuates this idea of not taking action and letting things like large market swings or problems in China just happen. In other words, we are not being proactive in controlling the outcomes these events have on the wealth of our clients. And it is completely understandable. How many times in our daily life do we just sit back idly and wait? It is not the American way or the American spirit. We are supposed to take control of our day and our future. Our outcomes at work and other personal goals such as fitness or relationships are a direct reflection of the actions we take or do not take. Therefore, the same should apply when it comes to investment outcomes, right? This is the unfortunate paradox that traps many investors into believing that the same active approach we take in other areas of our life also applies to that of the financial markets. The reality is that an individual investor has very little control over the day-to-day fluctuations of the market. Furthermore, nobody has enough foresight to know what is going to happen to the markets that somebody else doesn’t already know; at least not with a high degree of certainty. What an investor does have control over is the long-term growth of wealth, which is dependent upon their individual savings rate and amount of risk taken within their portfolio. Legendary investor and mentor to Warren Buffett, Benjamin Graham, famously stated in Security Analysis , “in the short run the stock market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine.” Now, even though we have laid out a line of thinking that seems reasonable, it still wouldn’t be a robust argument without empirical support. Let’s take a look at the individual claims that MFS Investment Management makes in their commercial and the corresponding peer-reviewed academic support for their statements. This is not intended to highlight the merits of MFS Investment Management individually since their claims are very common amongst the active investment community. Claim #1: Active management tends to perform well during market transitions, particularly more difficult markets, providing value in risk management and reducing downside volatility. This is a classic argument active management proponents like to use. It assumes that based on current information they know exactly where we are at in a market cycle. In terms of the academic literature, there has been no conclusive evidence that demonstrates that this claim is true. Active management tends to perform similarly during down markets and up markets. We have already written articles before on the topic of active management providing protection during down markets here . We referenced a paper from the Fall 2012 edition of the Journal of Investing called Modern Fool’s Gold: Alpha in Recessions , which concluded that there is very weak persistence in a manager’s ability to provide superior outperformance during subsequent recessions or expansions. So while it sounds very comforting to say we reduce downside volatility but fully embrace upside volatility, managers usually do not know when each is going to occur, and by the time they act on their premonitions, the market has already moved on. Claim #2: Focus on security selection is such that no systematic component of risk drives performance and offsets everything we are trying to do. Let’s dissect this sentence since there is a lot of fluff. No systematic component of risk refers to either overall market risk, size risk, or relative-price risk. These are more formally known as the different dimensions of risk, which were comprehensively introduced in 1992 in Eugene Fama and Ken French’s seminal paper, The Cross Section of Expected Returns . So if we don’t want one single component of these risk factors driving the performance of the overall strategy, then what we are really saying is that we want to be very well diversified. We want large stocks, small stocks, growth stocks, and value stocks across all different sectors and regions. The problem with this approach is the more and more diversified you get, the more and more you look like the overall market (i.e., index fund). As we will show later, this seems to be an issue MFS Investment Management is running into with a lot of their seasoned strategies. From a security selection standpoint, most active managers have a really tough time distinguishing the next winners from the next losers. In Fama and French’s paper, Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns , they looked at the performance of 819 different mutual funds over the 22 years ending in 2006. They found that the vast majority (97%) didn’t beat their respective benchmark (produce positive alpha), and the small amount that did is indistinguishable from just choosing stocks at random. Click to enlarge Claim #3: From a philosophical standpoint we look to take risk where we think we will be compensated and budget risk for where we have the most skill and ability to consistently deliver alpha. This claim is very similar to that of Claim #2. We already know where investors should be expected to earn a return for risk taken; that would be in stocks that are smaller in size and value-oriented. Anything beyond these factors is assuming the pricing mechanism inherent in the market is not functioning properly. In other words, current stock prices do not properly reflect future expectations of a particular company, which is just complete nonsense. To look at a price and say it is currently mispriced means that your ability to estimate the fundamentals of a particular company or your ability to predict the future are superior to that of the other few million professionals in the world. It’s their collective estimate of a company versus yours. That is quite a claim to say you know something they do not. And the law of large numbers is stacking the odds against you. We can once again cite the paper by Eugene Fama and Ken French on Luck versus Skill . The vast majority cannot consistently deliver alpha across multiple asset classes and time horizons. What is so special about MFS Investment Management that they believe they can deliver it? To say they have a global operation that believes in collaboration and sharing of information is nothing special. Most of the big asset managers have global operations and are promoting the exact same thing. Claim #4: We like to tell clients to arbitrage the time horizon and have a long-term view. This is just fancy speak for staying diversified and having a long-term focus, which is something we also promote. Because nobody can accurately predict what is going to happen in the future, it is best to “arbitrage the time horizon” by buying low-cost index funds and rebalancing when necessary. The market, not one particular individual, knows best. Cold, Hard Facts Let’s look at the cold, hard facts. We examined the performance of all 87 different mutual funds that MFS Investment manages to see if their integrated research platform around the world that promotes the sharing of information, protecting investors from downside volatility, taking risk where they expect to be compensated, and budgeting risk for where they think they can provide alpha has worked out well for them. We first looked at all of their US-based strategies that had at least 10 years of performance history to see if they were able to deliver outperformance over a medium time horizon. Of the 14 funds that were US-based strategies and had at least 10 years of data, not a single one produced a positive alpha that was statistically significant to a high degree of certainty (95% confidence level) once we adjusted for the known dimensions of expected return using the Fama/French 3 Factor Model . See chart below. Click to enlarge As you can see, most of the funds hug the dashed line that represents zero annualized alpha. This is what we would expect to see not only in an efficient market , but also for someone who is tracking the overall market, which is the point we made under Claim #2. The second thing we looked at was the performance of all 87 mutual funds against their Morningstar assigned benchmark, since inception, to see if there were any funds that produced a statistically significant alpha. Here is what we found: 53 (61% of all funds) displayed a NEGATIVE alpha compared to their Morningstar assigned benchmark since inception Only 1 fund (1.15% of all funds) displayed a POSITIVE alpha that was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level compared to its Morningstar assigned benchmark 27 (31%) displayed a POSITIVE alpha compared to their Morningstar assigned benchmark 7 (8%) of the funds had no alpha to report since they had been around for less than 1 year. It is important to note that these performance figures do not take into account the front-load fees that are associated with these funds. The average maximum front load-fee as of 10/31/2015 across all MFS Investment strategies is 5.16%. These fees may or may not be paid by investors based on broker recommendation or custodial and/or broker platforms. The table below lists the fees for all MFS funds. Readers can find a more in-depth analysis and illustration of the costs associated with strategies from MFS Global Management here . So the vast majority (61%) of their funds displayed negative alpha and only 1 strategy had a positive alpha that was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level . Which was the only fund whose performance may have been attributable to skill? It is the MFS International New Discovery A (MUTF: MIDAX ) coming in with an annualized alpha of 4.96% and a t-statistic of 2.02. Below is its alpha chart showing the performance comparison against the MSCI All Country World ex US Index. Click to enlarge Does this necessarily mean that we would concede that investors should reliably expect to be better off investing in MIDAX versus a comparable index fund or mix of index funds? Absolutely not! There are key reasons why, although MIDAX has historically produced a statistically significant alpha, that investors should still stick with a passively managed index fund instead: First has to do with the Morningstar assigned benchmark, which happens to be the MSCI All Country World ex US Index. The Index has a 99% developed and 1% emerging market makeup, while MIDAX has consistently had 10-15% allocated to emerging markets, which we know has experienced a higher historical return than that of its developed counterpart. We cannot control for the overall size and value tilts in this particular strategy like we can with US-based companies since we do not have independent size and value factors for a global ex US portfolio of stocks. As we showed with the 14 US-based strategies, the alpha is diminished down to nothing once we have controlled for known dimensions of expected return. A lot of the alpha seems to have happened during the first 4 years (very tall green bars) of the fund’s history, but since then, results have been mixed. This means the statistical significance might be subject to in-sample bias. As we have mentioned before in this article , the best way to control for in-sample bias is to look at two independent time periods to see if the statistically significant alpha persists. Although the alpha for the strategy is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, there is still a 5% chance that the outperformance was due to random luck. Our opinion that it’s random luck is bolstered by the very weak performance for the remaining 79 funds in the MFS Investment lineup. The policies, procedures, and systems in place in terms of hiring professional staff, gathering and analyzing information, and implementing investment strategies would seem consistent across the business. Unfortunately, this has not translated into an overwhelming success story across all of their strategies. Unless they applied a process, which was unique to MIDAX, it may seem reasonable to believe that just by random chance 1 out of their 87 strategies would have success. There is nothing distinguishing about MFS Investment Management’s process that would give us confidence they could deliver future outperformance. As we have said before in other articles that examine the performance of major mutual fund lineups (see Fidelity Funds Part 1 , and Part 2 , American Funds , Lord Abbett Funds , JP Morgan Funds , Hedge Funds , Olstein All-Cap ), this in no way is supposed to critique the level of intelligence and competence of the individuals in these organizations. They are the very brightest and most knowledgeable in our industry. Their reason for their lackluster performance has to do with the environment in which they operate. The free market that allows for the continuous sharing of information and exchanges that have the ability to aggregate that information are the ultimate culprits for the existence of the manager who can consistently deliver “alpha.” No single individual is more powerful than the overall market and no single individual will ever have all the information at their finger-tips about a particular company and its future earnings potential. All individuals are subject to estimation error when it comes to analyzing financial information and future growth prospects, and the aggregating of these estimation errors by the markets allows the price to be the single best estimation at any given time. Some active managers may be right at times at the expense of other active managers, but that is what we would expect. Unfortunately, the persistence of any manager’s outperformance comes down to either better estimation faculties, quicker access to information, or illegal insider information. In today’s overwhelmingly competitive markets, the latter or blind luck seems to be the biggest reason why most managers have experienced long-term success. Below are a few examples of the alpha charts we do in our analysis based on Morningstar assigned benchmarks. Click to enlarge Click to enlarge Click to enlarge You can find alpha comparisons across all 87 MFS strategies in the original article here . Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Fear Of A ‘Black Swan’ Event Is Worse Than The Actual Event Itself, Study Shows

Originally posted on May 3, 2016 Are investors more frightened of freak market crashes than the reality of such crises? Sometimes fear of a freak, outlier event can be a lot worse than the event itself, at least when it comes to the markets. Most of us are aware of the now famous credit crisis book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb , “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.” The central thesis of the book is of course that black swans , or freak market events, are more common than we expect in life, and in particular, in complex systems such as economics. The credit crisis was, therefore, no great surprise, and such crises can be expected to occur in one form or another on a fairly regular basis. Well, that was Taleb’s thesis. But it was also a thesis written at the height of negative market sentiment. Subsequent serious academic work reported by Bloomberg by William Goetzmann, Dasol Kim and Robert Shiller looked at 26 years of survey data to test Taleb’s thesis. They found that people consistently expect things such as stock market crashes and earthquakes to happen more frequently than they really do. In other words, there may be black swans out there, but more important perhaps than their occurrence is our exaggerated fear of their occurrence. There are indeed periods of irrational exuberance when we forget about the possibility of black swans. But certainly since the credit crisis , it seems that there has indeed been an exaggerated angst that has gripped the global investing community. It is as if the crisis was sufficiently intense that it set off a type of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among investors, leading to everyone seeing specters around every corner. This overarching sense of angst has had very significant effects since the credit crisis. Although there has been modest growth in gross domestic product in the United States ever since 2009, the recovery hasn’t felt like a recovery. We continue to suffer what economist Joseph Stiglitz calls the “great malaise,” a lack of those animal commercial spirits. Shiller himself sees this anxiety as driving this very low rate environment as most investors and banks keep the bulk of their assets in low-return fixed-income assets, which itself further lowers the yield on said assets. This has also driven excess regulation. No one can say that the credit crisis didn’t merit a significant re-think of various parts of the U.S. financial regulatory architecture. But it is now becoming equally clear that the Dodd-Frank Act was a behemoth of a piece of legislation, 848 pages long, most of it with half-baked concepts that were left to be developed over time by sub-legislation. Many now expect the very framework of large chunks of Dodd-Frank to require major re-engineering, given its excessively controlling and complex features. The idea, for example, of bank living wills was probably a non-starter from day one. The concept was that banks must put in place plans for their orderly wind down in the event of financial failure, ones that didn’t rely on government support. But this was immediately a bizarre exercise for all financial institutions because it involved making up totally theoretical failure scenarios, some concatenation of events that is unlikely to have any bearing on the actual features of any next crisis. After all how on Earth could we predict what that crisis will really entail? The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Federal Reserve made all the banks write their living wills twice, on the basis that they were too loosely drafted the first time, but more granularity here doesn’t solve the conceptual problem. The situations conceived are so hypothetical that these living will models are often the case of garbage in garbage out. In addition, for those institutions that matter – the systemically important financial institutions – living wills are a particularly absurd exercise because, by definition, these large financial institutions are simply not sustainable during periods of acute illiquidity without government support. It seems, in other words, that Dodd-Frank itself was premised on their being black swans everywhere. And the capital requirements it imposes on banks, the compliance burden, the business line restrictions and high levels of liquidity buffers all mean that banks simply haven’t been meeting much of even the legitimate credit demand in the United States. The result, of course, has been huge growth since the crisis of the shadow lending market, which is legitimate lending done by non-depositary institutions. The shadow lending market has gone through a total re-birth since the crisis, as multiple research papers demonstrate. There can be dangers of an excessively large non-bank lending sector, but again Dodd-Frank has embedded within it another mechanism for seeing black swans in this sector also. That is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau . The role of the CFPB in supposedly protecting borrowers from predatory lending is only just being defined now by the regulator. But there is already considerable confusion about the CFPB’s ambit, and, indeed, even a recent court hearing indicated that the bureau may be acting outside the scope of the Constitution. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy struggles to get above 2% GDP per annum, consumer inflation is negligible and growth is so anemic that the Fed’s attempt to raise short rates and normalize monetary policy is materially struggling. So it is back to Shiller and Stiglitz, just too much fear in the system to allow growth really to ignite. And so what does such economic neurosis really amount to? It isn’t necessarily the product of there being too many black swans but the product of an irrational belief that there may be too many black swans. And the big question then is when will it all end? When does the anxiety end, when is the neurosis cured and how? Disclosure: Jeremy Josse is the author of Dinosaur Derivatives and Other Trades , an alternative take on financial philosophy and theory (published by Wiley & Co). He is also a managing director and head of the financial institutions group at Sterne Agee CRT in New York. Josse is a visiting researcher in finance at Sy Syms business school in New York. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and don’t necessarily reflect the views of CRT Capital Group, its affiliates or its employees. Josse has no position in the stocks mentioned in this article.