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Oil, Markets, Volatility

Editor’s note: Originally published on January 6, 2015 Sharply lower oil prices have occasioned a huge discussion about their impact. We see it play out daily in newspapers, on TV and radio, at websites, on blogs, and in market letters. The range of forecasts runs from one extreme to another. On one side, pundits predict a recession resulting from a U.S. energy sector meltdown that leads to credit defaults in energy-related high-yield debt. They predict trouble in those states which have had high growth from the U.S. energy renaissance. These bearish views also note the failures of Russian businesses to pay foreign-denominated debt held by European banks. And they point to sovereign debt risks like Venezuela. These experts then envision the geopolitical risk to extend to cross-border wars and other ugly outcomes. Geopolitical high-oil-price risk has morphed to geopolitical low-oil-price risk. That’s the negative extreme case. The positive forecasts regarding oil are also abundant. American’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) drops robustly due to energy-price ripple effects of $50 oil. We are still in the early stages of seeing these results in U.S. inflation indicators. There is a lot more to come as the lower energy price impacts a broad array of products and service-sector costs. A big change in the U.S. trade balance reflects the reduced imported oil price. We are also seeing that appear in the current account deficit plunge. In fact, both of those formerly strongly negative indicators are reaching new lows. They are the smallest deficits we have seen in 15 years. Action Economics expects that the current account deficit in the first quarter of 2015 will be below $80 billion. That is an incredible number when we think about gross flows history. Remember that the current account deficit is an accounting identity with the capital account surplus. Net $80 billion goes out of the U.S. and turns around and comes back. These are very small numbers in an economy of $18 trillion in size. Think about what it means to have a capital account surplus of $80 billion, driven by a current account deficit of $80 billion. That means that the neutral balancing flows into the United States because of transactional and investment activity are now small. Therefore the momentum of U.S. financial markets is driven by the foreign choices that are directing additional money flows into the U.S. In the end the equations must balance. When there is an imbalance, it affects asset prices. In the present case, those asset prices are denominated in U.S. dollars. They are desired by the rest of the world. They are real estate, bonds, stocks, or any other asset that is priced in dollars and that the world wants to accumulate. In the U.S., where the size of our economy is approaching $18 trillion, the once-feared current account deficit has become a rounding error. How bad can the energy-price hit be to the United States? There are all kinds of estimates. Capital Economics says that the decline in the oil price (they used a $40 price change, from $110 to $70 per barrel) will “reduce overall spending on petroleum-related liquids by non-oil-producing businesses and households by a total of $280 billion per year (from $770 billion to $490 billion).” Note that the present oil price is $20 a barrel lower than their estimated run rate. That is a massive change and very stimulative to the U.S. non-energy sector. The amount involved is more than double the 2% payroll-tax-cut amount of recent years. In fact it adds up to about 3/4 of the revised U.S. federal budget deficit estimate in the fiscal year ending in 2015. Let me repeat. That estimate from Capital Economics is based on an average price of $70 a barrel in the U.S. for all of 2015. The current price of oil is lower. Some forecasts estimate that the oil price is going much lower. We doubt that but the level of the oil price is no longer the key issue. It is the duration of the lower price level that matters. We do not know how long the price will fall, but there is some thought developing that it will hover around $55 to $60 for a while (average for 2015). There is certainly a negative impact to the oil sector. Capital spending slows when the oil price falls. We already see that process unfolding. It is apparent in the anecdotes as a drilling rig gets canceled or postponed, a project gets delayed, or something else goes on hold. How big is the negative number? Capital Economics says, “The impact on the wider economy will be modest. Investment in mining structures is $146 billion, with investment in mining equipment an additional $26 billion. Altogether investment in mining accounts for 7.7% of total business investment, but only 1% of GDP.” At Cumberland we agree. The projections are obvious: energy capital expenditures will decline; the U.S. renaissance in oil will slow, and development and exploration will be curtailed. But the scale of the negative is far outweighed by the scale of the positive. Let’s go farther. Fundstrat Global Advisors, a global advisory source with good data, suggests that lower oil will add about $350 billion in developing-nation purchasing power. That estimate was based on a 28% oil price decline starting with a $110 base. The final number is unknown. But today’s numbers reveal declines of almost 50%. Think about a $350 billion to $500 billion boost to the developing countries in North America, Europe, and Asia. Note these are not emerging-market estimates but developing-country estimates. It seems to us that another focal point is what is happening to the oil-producing countries. In this case Wells Fargo Securities has developed some fiscal breakeven oil prices for countries that are prominent oil producers. Essentially, Kuwait is the only one with a positive fiscal breakeven if the oil price is under $60 per barrel. Let’s take a look at Wells Fargo’s list. The most damaged country in fiscal breakeven is Iran. They need a price well over $100 in order to get to some budgetary stability. Next is Nigeria. Venezuela is next. Under $100 but over $60 are Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Let’s think about this oil battle in a geopolitical context. BCA Research defines it as a “regional proxy war.” They identify the antagonists as Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is that simple when it comes to oil. Saudis use oil as a weapon, and they intend to weaken their most significant enemy on the other side of the water in their neighborhood. But the outcome also pressures a bunch of other bad guys, including Russia, to achieve some resolution of the situation in Ukraine. There are victims in the oil patch: energy stocks, exploration and production, and related energy construction and engineering. Anything that is tied to oil price in the energy patch is subject to economic weakness because of the downward price pressure. On the other hand, volumes are enhanced and remain intact. If anything, one can expect consumption to rise because the prices have fallen. Favoring volume-oriented energy consumption investment rather than price-sensitive energy investment is a transition that investing agents need to consider. At Cumberland, we are underweight energy stock ETFs. We sold last autumn and have not bought back. We favor volume oriented exposures, including certain MLPs. We believe that the U.S. economic growth rate is going to improve. In 2015, it will record GDP rate of change levels above 3.5%. Evidence suggests that the U.S. economy will finally resume classic longer term trend rates above 3%. It will do so in the context of very low interest and inflation rates, a gradual but ongoing improvement in labor markets, and the powerful influences of a strengthening U.S. dollar and a tightening U.S. budget deficit. The American fiscal condition is good and improving rapidly. The American monetary condition is stabilizing. The American banking system has already been through a crisis and now seems to be adequately protected and reserved. Our view is bullish for the U.S. economy and stock market. We have held to that position through volatility, and we expect more volatility. When interest rates, growth rates, and trends are normalized, volatilities are normalized. They are now more normal than those that were distorted and dampened by the ongoing zero interest rate policy of the last six years. Volatility restoration is not a negative market item. It is a normalizing item. We may wind up seeing the VIX and the stock market rise at the same time. Volatility is bidirectional. We remain nearly fully invested in our U.S. ETF portfolios. We expect more volatility in conjunction with an upward trend in the U.S. stock market. High volatility means adjustments must be made, and sometimes they require fast action. This positive outlook could change at any time. So Cumberland clients can expect to see changes in their accounts when information and analysis suggest that we move quickly.

Crude Oil Price Prospects As Seen By Market-Makers

Summary Oil-price ETFs provide a quick look at expectations for change prospects in Crude Oil commodity prices. Market-maker hedging in these ETFs provide an overlay in terms of their impressions of likely big-money client influences on Oil-based ETF prices. But is there a broader story in price expectations for natural gas? And for ETFs in NatGas, following the same line of reasoning? Change is coming, so is Christmas But in what year? Expert oil industry analyst Richard Zeits in his recent article points out how long prior crude oil price recovery cycles have taken, with knowledgeable perspectives as to why. Still, there is also a suggestion that differences could exist in the present situation. Past cruise-ship price experiences of Crude Oil investors on their VLCC-type vessels have marveled at how long it takes to “change course and speed” in an industry so huge, complex, and geographically pervasive. To expect the navigating agility of an America’s Cup racer is wholly unrealistic. Yet some large part of the industry’s present supply-demand imbalance is being laid at the well-pad of new technology and aggressive new players in the game. In an effort to explore the daisy chain of anticipations that may ultimately be reflected by a persistent directional change in the obvious scorecard of COMEX/ICE market quotes, let’s step back a few paces from the supply~demand balance of commercial spot-market commodity transactions to the futures markets on which are based ETF securities whose prospects for price change attract investors in such volume that ETF markets require help from professional market-makers to commit firm capital to temporary at-risk positions that provide the buyer~seller balance permitting those transactions to take place. But that happens only after the market pros protect their risked capital with hedges in the derivative markets of futures and options, which doing so, quite likely provide some much lesser fine-tuning back into the price contemplations back up the ladder that brought us down to this level of minutia. So where to start? Mr. Zeits regularly asserts that his analyses are not investment recommendations, so securities prices are typically unmentioned, and left to the reader’s cogitation. We will start at the other end, where you can be assured that our thinking is in strong agreement with Mr.Z at his end. We convert (by unchanging, logical systemic means, established well over a decade ago) the market-makers [MMs] hedging actions into explicit price ranges that reflect their willingness to buy price protection than to have their perpetual adversaries in (and of) the marketplace take their capital (perhaps more brutally) from them. Using Richard Z’s list of Oil ETFs, here is a current picture of what the MM’s hedging actions now indicate are the upside price changes possible in the next few (3-4) months that could hurt them if their capital was in short positions. The complement to that, price change possibilities to the downside, could be a yin to the upside move’s yang, but we have found better guidance for the long-position investor’s concern in the actual worst-case price drawdowns during subsequent comparable holding periods to the upside prospects. So this map presents the upside gain potentials on the horizontal scale in the green area at the bottom, with the typical actual downside risk exposure experiences on the vertical red risk scale on the left. The intersection of the two locates the numbered ETFs listed in the blue field. (used with permission) Here’s the cast of characters: [1] is United States Brent Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: BNO ) and PowerShares DB Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: DBO ); [2] is ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: UCO ); [3] is United States Short Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: DNO ); [4] is United States 12 month Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: USL ); [5] is ProShares Ultra Short Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: SCO ); and [6] is the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Price Index ETN (NYSEARCA: OIL ). Here is how they differ from one another: All are ETFs except for OIL, an ET Note with trivially higher credit risk and possible slight ultimate transaction problems. All except BNO are based on West Texas Intermediate [wti] crude oil availability and product specs, BNO is based on Brent (North Sea oil) quotes, directly influenced by ex-USA supply and demand balances. Most prices are at spot or most immediate futures price quotes, but USL is an average of the nearest-in-time 12 months futures quotes. All are long-posture investments except for SCO and DNO which are of inverse [short] structure. Both UCO and SCO are structured to have ETF movements daily of 2x the long or short equivalent unleveraged ETFs. What is the Reward~Risk map telling us? For conventional long-position investors, items down and to the right in the green area are attractive, to the extent that their 5 to 1 or better tradeoffs of upside potentials to bad experiences (after similar forecasts) are competitive to alternative choices. The closer any subject is to the lower-left home-plate of zero risk, zero return, the less attractive it is to those not traumatized by bunker mentality. SCO, the 2x leveraged short of WTI crude has a +20% upside with a -16% price drawdown average experience with similar forecasts in the past 5 years. It is a slightly better reward than a bet on a long position in Brent Crude and DNO, whose +18% upside is coupled with only -2% drawdowns. SCO’s minor return advantage over DNO comes largely from its leverage which is responsible for its large risk exposure. The same is true for UCO. USL’s trade-off risk advantage over OIL comes largely from smaller volatility in the 12-month average of futures prices that it tracks, rather than only the “front” or near expiration month. Here are the historical details and the current forecasts behind the map. The layout is in the format used daily in our topTen analysis of our 2,000+ ranked population of stocks and ETFs. For further explanation, check blockdesk.com . (click to enlarge) Conclusion In general, this map suggests that we still have ahead of us some further price declines as crude oil equity investors (via ETFs) see advantages in short structures. The spread between WTI crude price and Brent crude may be as narrow now as is likely in the next few months, given BNO’s relative attractiveness here. This analysis will be followed shortly by a parallel on those ETFs focused on Natural Gas and alternative energy fuels.