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Frustrated Yet?

The last year has been a tough one for investors. There are a few places one could have booked a double-digit gain in the last 12 months but not many and certainly not in assets that are in the standard portfolio. Currency hedged ETFs for European and Japanese stocks produced big gains, but a lot of the gain was from nothing but currency movements. And most investors shouldn’t be trying to make their yearly return punting on currencies. Stocks for the most part have been disappointing with Nasdaq as a notable exception. Notable because a lot of the action there is reminiscent of the last time that index was leading the market back in 1999/2000. The recent big moves in Google (NASDAQ: GOOG ) (NASDAQ: GOOGL ), Netflix (NASDAQ: NFLX ) and Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ) – based on not much – provided a eerie sense of deja vu for anyone who lived through that giddy time. The S&P 500 over the last six months is barely positive, up about 2% (or it is as I write this Friday afternoon; but if things keep going in the current direction, that could be a lot closer to 0 by the close). The average doesn’t do justice to what is really going on though. Only about half the stocks in the S&P 500 are trading above their 200-day moving average right now. Even for an index like the Nasdaq that has performed pretty well this year, less than half the stocks in the index are still in uptrends, trading above their 200-day MA. These are capitalization weighted indexes and at least right now, size does seem to matter. A similar message is sent by the advance/decline stats which show the decliners winning by a pretty wide margin. New highs/new lows also looks less than healthy with new highs increasingly scarce. So the internals of the stock market are deteriorating notably, something that doesn’t generally bode well for the immediate future for stock prices. There are other signs of stress as well. Junk bonds essentially peaked almost a year ago in price and have been trading sideways with a downward bias which has recently accelerated. With Treasuries generally well bid all week, the spread between junk and Treasury yields widened on the week, continuing the longer-term trend that started last summer and reversing the shorter-term narrowing trend that started at the beginning of this year. Credit spreads are highly correlated with the stock market, so ignore the junk market at your portfolio’s peril. Other signs of stress have emerged over the last couple of weeks. Commodities have resumed their downtrend and unlike some other recent periods, it isn’t just a function of a rising dollar. The dollar has been fairly steady but was down last week even as gold and other commodities plumbed new lows for the move. Oil is breaking toward its lows and that is undoubtedly the source of at least some of the selling in the junk bond market. The fracking companies are still struggling and lower prices aren’t going to help them make their interest payments now that their hedges are expiring. The Treasury market also is pointing to some stress with inflation and growth expectations both falling a bit recently. The frustration of the diversified investor actually goes back quite a bit further than the last 6 months or last year. If you have been following an investment plan that includes international stocks and bonds, a smattering of commodities and/or anything else that isn’t US stocks, your personal pain is now running into more like two years and maybe a bit more. I track a long list of passive portfolios and many of the globally diversified ones are working on their third consecutive year of low-to-mid single-digit returns – assuming this year turns out to have a positive number. It isn’t just the US stock indexes that have been narrowing; it is the entire investment universe. This winnowing of the investment universe to a few winners, turning diversification into a risk factor, is just one more example of the negative consequences of the modern form of economics in which common sense has been relegated to quaint notion and nonsense elevated to learned discourse. It is an Orwellian discipline where borrowing and spending have replaced thrift and investment as the drivers of economic growth, prudence is punished, speculation celebrated and rewarded. Is it any wonder that our economy continues to struggle when we’ve spent decades urging the population to be irresponsible, to ignore the future so that our present can be more comfortable? Monetary policy is a cudgel, a blunt tool used for more than a mere nudge, to make investors feel obliged to chase returns, to take excessive risks to achieve even their mundane goals. If you can’t achieve those goals with safe investments – and economic policy has made that nigh on impossible – you move out on the risk scale until you can because the alternative – spending less, saving more – has been deemed un-American, economically unpatriotic. The unspoken agreement – unspoken by the Fed certainly but widely accepted and believed – is that the monetary powers that be will maintain risky assets at the high prices that have, according to the Fed, produced or at least enhanced whatever meager recovery we’ve had since 2009. A permanently high plateau , if you will. The problem is that this unspoken agreement, this economic wink and a nod, has produced moral hazard on an epic scale. People do stupid things when they think their rewards are deserved and any losses will be absorbed or prevented by others. If you doubt that, just take a few moments to remember the structure of the mortgage system that produced the last crisis. It was a system where government policy didn’t just implicitly relieve lenders of the risks of their loans, they did it explicitly by either guaranteeing the loans or buying them outright. Now we apply that lesson to all investors, the Fed equally concerned about the stock index and the price index. It has “worked” so far in that risky asset prices are high but the economic payoff is less clear. It may be that the US and global economy is better off today than it would have been without the exertions of the world’s central bankers, but you’d be hard pressed to prove it. Considering the moral lessons being taught by these policies one can’t help but wonder if the gains are worth the potential losses. Markets, individuals, will eventually see through the Fed’s illusion of control and mark assets to a real market. The list of winning investments – risky investments – has been pared down to just a few over the last two years and the list gets shorter every day. Most recently the junk bond market has been quietly deleted or at least partially erased from the winners list. With oil prices falling again, the fracking companies bankers are balking of course, but it isn’t just energy companies that are being denied financing. Several deals have been canceled recently that had nothing to do with fracking. And it isn’t just junk bonds that are getting marked down; the high grade corporate bond ETF (NYSEARCA: LQD ) has actually performed worse than its junk bond cousin over the last six months. You certainly can’t call it a credit crunch yet but the new normal economy may not need a full blown crunch to fall into recession. It is a frustrating time for investors and one that is fraught with danger. The risk isn’t from without, from some unknown black swan, but rather from within, from ourselves, the self-inflicted financial wound caused by greed and the very American desire to win, to do better than the next guy. It is tempting to discard the investment methods that have withstood the test of time in favor of the fad of the moment, the church of what’s working now. But in every investment cycle there comes a time when winning is accomplished by not losing, by ignoring the sirens of risk and lashing oneself to the mast of safety. Now would seem a good time to at least find the rope.

Is Elevated Volatility On Modest Losses Normal?

By Ronald Delegge Stock market volatility creeps up when most investors least expect it. But even more intriguing about the latest upward explosion in equity volatility is that it occurred on small percentage losses in major stock index benchmarks like the S&P 500 and Russell Small Cap 2000. From June 14 to July 9, the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) posted a modest decline of just -1.96%. Meanwhile, the VIX soared +44.92% on the S&P’s relatively modest losses over that period. (See chart below) For perspective on how huge of a jump in S&P 500 volatility that represents, the Russell 2000 volatility index increased just +34.72% on a decline of -2.37% in U.S. small cap stocks over the same time frame. Although small caps are riskier than large caps, volatility readings were substantially higher for large caps despite their relative safety. (click to enlarge) Just ahead of the double digit spike in the S&P 500 Volatility Index, we wrote to our Technical Forecast to readers on June 14: The recent May low in the VIX (on May 21 @ $12.11) occurred on the exact same day the S&P 500 reached a new all time high (also May 21 @ $2131). That is no coincidence. The relationship between the VIX and the S&P is extremely intertwined, especially on a daily basis. As the VIX falls, the S&P rises and vice versa. If there is a floor in the VIX, and the relationship is expected to hold, then that means there is a ceiling for the S&P. We are seeing that floor in the VIX and ceiling in the S&P play out in 2015. Although the latest pop in volatility on modest losses could be a prelude of future swings of similar or even larger magnitude, the best way to capitalize is always the same: Be ready. For ETF investors, there are multiple ways to trade short-term volatility. The ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF ( SVXY) aims for -1x daily opposite exposure to the VIX while the ProShares VIX Short-Term Futures ETF ( VIXY) aims for exposure to an index of VIX futures contracts with short-term expirations. Disclosure: No positions Link to the original piece on ETFguide.com Share this article with a colleague

The SEC Is Going Too Far On ‘Clawback’

Summary Andrew Ross Sorkin of DealBook reported that the new SEC proposal could obligate all publicly traded companies to recover incentive-based compensation from executives contingent on certain events. If the proposal is passed, it would result in widespread ramifications for Corporate America. In this piece, I detail the potential negative consequences that I believe are the most salient to the discussion at hand. Ramifications would revolve around the misalignment of interests between shareholders and management. Increased compliance costs and reduced market liquidity would be possible consequences as well. Investors should consider allocating capital to international corporations not subject to SEC regulation. “Clawbacks” are coming Recently, New York Times DealBook founder Andrew Ross Sorkin reported that the Dodd-Frank regulation, which aims to overhaul the financial system post-2008 requires the Securities & Exchange Commission to devise a rule relating to “clawbacks”. As a quick reminder to readers who are not familiar with the term, clawbacks are provisions that are included in employment contracts which allow the principal (i.e. the employer) to limit bonus compensation upon the occurrence of certain events specified in the employment contract. Moral hazard and measures taken to mitigate the problem The reason why clawbacks generate a great deal of discussion is largely as a result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Public and political commentators have opined that one major factor contributing to the crisis was that of moral hazard. Pre-2008, traders could take a lot of risks for a chance at an outsized payout. If it worked, the trader would be compensated heavily. If the trade failed, the trader would be fired. However, the downside risk was minimal as the trader could simply get employed at another firm. With the possibility of an outsized payout and minimal downside risk, incentives were highly asymmetric. Thus, to mitigate the problem of moral hazard, clawbacks were proposed by the SEC. However, I believe that the Commission is going too far as its current proposal would extend to all publicly-traded companies , instead of just financial institutions. Essentially, the new proposal would obligate public companies to recover incentive-based compensation from executives for up to three years if they ever have to restate their earnings. Due to the all-encompassing nature of the provision, I believe that this topic should be of great interest to investors who invest in corporate America (NYSEARCA: SPY ) – in other words, nearly every investor out there. The proposal is deceptively simple. Despite its simplicity, I believe that there are severe ramifications that may materialize if it is passed. These ramifications primarily revolve around the misalignment of interests between shareholders and management . In his piece, Mr. Sorkin explained briefly how base/incentive compensation may be affected. Due to his brevity, I believe that readers may not have grasped the essence of his article. Therefore, I will expand upon the points he made. Before I do that, I believe that some context is required. A brief history of compensation Historically, employers compensated employees with a fixed base salary that grows by a small amount (usually somewhat correlated with inflation) every year. However, employers soon realized that this model was not sufficient to motivate their employees. As they were being paid a fixed base salary, employees were not incentivized to strive for performance – they were happy to complete the minimum required of them. After all, there was no need to outperform; there were no financial rewards for outperformance. Lip service might be given as a courtesy, but we all know what that is worth. In a bid to motivate outperformance, employers soon started offering bonus compensation to employees that exceed what was required of them. This bonus compensation can come in many forms – restricted stock, stock options, etc. However, they all have one thing in common. They were tied to performance. Some may be tied to sales targets, others may be tied to profit targets. This compensation model worked well for a while. However, employees soon found that it was a better idea to take stratospheric levels of risk for a probability at an immense financial payout. This produced the rogue traders that I believe that many readers are familiar with (London Whale, Nick Leeson, etc). The new SEC proposal The Commission’s new proposal is intended to mitigate the problem of moral hazard that comes with the asymmetric compensation model discussed above. The idea is rather simple – an employee that takes projects with unusually high amounts of risk may manage to achieve success in the short-term, but in the long-term the proposition is likely to blow up. Said another way, profits in the short-term might be outsized, but may need to be restated in the future (after being marked-to-market, for example). Thus, the employee would be compensated on the basis of the restated profits (which are typically much lower). In theory, it seems like it would work out. However, the situation is likely to manifest very differently in practice. Faced with reduced bonus compensation, executives are likely to take one of two routes: increase base compensation substantially to offset the decrease in bonus compensation, or increase bonus compensation to such a height that would ensure bonus compensation remain at pre-proposal levels post-proposal. Both routes are equally dismal for shareholders of corporate America. Suppose base compensation was increased in order to offset the decrease in bonus compensation. In this case, the situation would simply revert back to what it was historically – where employees were compensated with a salary that was largely fixed. Incentives for outperformance would be minimal. Thus, management would not be motivated to strive for performance. It is likely that management would simply be concerned with keeping their jobs, thus reducing the likelihood of them taking on large projects that would allow their company to grow. After all, there is no incentive to. As a result, shareholders of corporate America like you and me would be paying more for management that is content with maintaining the status quo. Growth realized by the S&P 500 has been sluggish in recent years, and the new proposal would exacerbate the problem. Alternatively, suppose that bonus compensation was increased to such a height that would ensure bonus compensation remains at pre-proposal levels post-proposal. In this situation, the net effect on bonus compensation would be minimal. However, as this scenario implicitly requires bonus compensation to be tied to a larger percentage of performance, the incentive to take on extremely high-risk projects would be heightened even further. In a nutshell, the problem of moral hazard would be amplified. Shareholders would be footing the bill once again. Expect this to contribute to a repeat of the 2008 crisis. In addition to the above, I believe that there other ramifications to consider as well. Other possible consequences Due to the fact that restatements of earnings tend to be as a result of an honest accounting error for the most part, corporate America as a whole is likely to hire more compliance personnel in a bid to minimize the possibility of error. Although compliance personnel play an important role, they do not generate any revenue or profit for the company. They are a necessary cost, but a cost nonetheless. For particularly large organizations, the increase in hiring of compliance personnel is likely to be substantial, which will materially reduce their bottom line. Once again, shareholders end up picking the tab. Recent regulation that called for banks to hold more capital (per Basel standards) have greatly reduced market liquidity . I opine that if this new SEC proposal was passed, liquidity would decline even further. It is no secret that financial institutions such as Citigroup (NYSE: C ), Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS ) and Bank of America (NYSE: BAC ) are market-makers. Market-makers provide liquidity to the markets. They stand by willing to sell or purchase securities to and from willing market participants. Without a doubt, their role is a vital one. Recall that the new SEC proposal allows bonus compensation to be recovered in the event of a restatement of earnings. Mark-to-market gain/losses are one example of one such event. As bonus compensation is typically far greater than base compensation, executives of financial institutions are likely to cut back their presence in market-making in order to reduce the probability of the firm suffering from huge mark-to-market losses. Due to increased illiquidity, investors should expect increased volatility if the proposal is passed. Conclusion The new proposal proposed by the SEC aims to rein in outsized compensation. Despite its well-intended nature, the proposal is likely to result in widespread ramifications across corporate America if it is passed. No matter how you slice it, a misalignment of interests between shareholders and management are sure to occur. Increased compliance costs should follow as well. When all is said and then, public shareholders would be the one footing the bill. Additionally, the proposal could also result in a further diminishing in market liquidity, which would increase illiquidity. Although the proposal has not been passed yet, I believe that there is a high likelihood that it would be. The general public has always been inundated and resentful towards executives who command high levels of compensation. A proposal that aims to reduce compensation levels would likely be very popular. However, such proposals may have unintended consequences as detailed above. As these consequences are far-reaching, I believe that every investor should take note of the situation and perhaps consider investing abroad where public companies are not subject to SEC regulation. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.