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Oil ETFs Slide Again: More Pain In Store?

After smooth trading in May and June, oil resumed its decline and trapped in the nastiest downward spiral in July joining the broader selloff in commodities amid the growing global glut and the China slowdown. In fact, U.S. crude oil lost nearly 21% in July, which was the worst month since October 2008. The rout worsened in the first session of August with crude plunging as much as 5% on Monday to around $45.17 per barrel. On the other hand, Brent oil dropped to below $50 per barrel for the first time since January. Inside the Recent Slump The brutal trading on Monday can be attributed to the increase in the number of rig counts, weak China manufacturing data, and downbeat U.S. economic data on manufacturing and construction spending that suggests tepid oil demand growth around the world. China manufacturing activity unexpectedly fell to a two-year low in July, adding to worries on the world’s second-largest economy. Meanwhile, U.S. manufacturing also slipped in July and consumer spending advanced at its slowest pace in four months in June, indicating that the world’s largest economy is losing momentum yet again. Coming to the supply side, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is pumping up maximum oil in the recent past buoyed up by higher output from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It is currently producing about 32 million barrels a day against its target of 30 million barrels a day. Additionally, Iran, the world’s fourth-largest reserve holder with 158 billion barrels of crude oil, is gearing up to boost its production immediately after sanctions are lifted, which is expected in late November. As per Iran’s oil minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, production will likely increase by 500,000 barrels a day within a week after relaxation in sanctions and by 1 million barrels a day within a month. Further, oil production in the U.S. has been on the rise and is hovering around its record level. ETF Impact Terrible trading has been felt in the ETF world as well, sending oil ETFs tracking the futures contract in deep red from a one-month look. In particular, the iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Index ETN (NYSEARCA: OIL ) stole the show tumbling 19.6%, followed by over 17% declines in the United States Oil Fund (NYSEARCA: USO ) ), the iPath Pure Beta Crude Oil ETN (NYSEARCA: OLEM ) and the United States Brent Oil Fund (NYSEARCA: BNO ) . Two of the most popular leveraged oil ETFs – the ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: UCO ) and the VelocityShares 3x Long Crude Oil ETN (NYSEARCA: UWTI ) – dropped 46.4% and 33%, respectively, in the same time frame. The former provides twice the return of the daily performance of the Bloomberg WTI Crude Oil Subindex while the latter delivers thrice the returns of the S&P GSCI Crude Oil Index Excess Return. Both indices consist of WTI crude oil futures contracts. What Lies Ahead? With deteriorating demand/supply dynamics, the prospect of an oil price rebound in the second half looks faded. In fact, there is a clear sign that oil price might revisit its previous low of the year, pushing the oil ETFs further down. This is especially true as speculators betting on rising oil prices have fallen sharply in recent weeks. Hedge funds reduced their net-long position in WTI to the lowest level in five years for the week ended July 28, according to the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission data. Further, money managers also cut their bullish bets on Brent by 37,527 contracts for the same week, representing the biggest decline since July 2014, as per data from the ICE Futures Europe exchange. That being said, inverse ETFs have been on the tear over the past one month with the VelocityShares 3x Inverse Crude ETN (NYSEARCA: DWTI ) , the ProShares UltraShort Bloomberg Crude Oil ETF (NYSEARCA: SCO ) and the PowerShares DB Crude Oil Double Short ETN (NYSEARCA: DTO ) gaining 68.4%, 42.2% and 30.9%, respectively. As a result, investors bearish on oil could make a short-term play on these ETFs for big gains in a short span, especially if the “trend remains a friend” in this corner of the investing world. Link to the original article on Zacks.com

Low P/E Stock Of The Day No. 5: Calpine Corporation

Summary The company is trading at TTM P/E of 8.8x. Environmentally operations mean that the company will face less regulatory issues. Increase in EPS is the result of favorable macro-conditions, increasing the Commodity Margin. In this series I will select a low P/E stock to analyze. I define low P/E as anywhere from 5x to 10x, as any lower and we may be looking at special situations. Calpine Corporation (NYSE: CPN ) is a U.S. power producer. The company primarily operates natural gas-fired and geothermal power plants and sells wholesale energy to corporate customers. Natural gas-fired generators use gas as fuel to power turbines while geothermal powered generators harness energy from hot water below Earth’s surface. At the end of 2014, the company had 88 plants in total. After beating its second quarter earnings, share shot up 10%. But the company is still trading at a TTM P/E ratio of 8.8x, well within our selection criteria. Let’s explore further and see if there may be an opportunity. The Business While the company generates power from renewable sources (geothermal) as well as fossil fuel (natural gas), the two methods share the common characteristic of being environmentally friendly. How geothermal energy is good for the environment is self-explanatory, but it may surprise you that natural gas is actually one of the cleanest fossil fuel options for electricity generation, emissions are virtually zero. Why is this important? In an increasingly stringent regulatory environment, non-environmentally friendly power generating methods (e.g. coal) are facing some tough challenges . This means that Calpine will not face similar legal issues in the future, decreasing the risk for shareholders. Making Sense Of The Numbers As evident by the above chart, revenue has been increasing since FYE 2012. However, this is not attributed to a larger turnover (i.e. electricity generation), as power generated did not vary much from year to year. The company generated 112 MMWh of power in 2012, 102 MMWh in 2013, and 100 MMWh in 2014. As you can see, the amount of power generated actually decreased, yet revenue still went up. This is possible because the price that the company gets per MWh fluctuates. This is called the Commodity Margin and it is impacted by a plethora of factors such as price of natural gas, economic growth, and environmental regulation. In a sense, this risk can be compared to the commodity risk faced by all energy producing companies. For the last couple of years, the company has benefited from favorable macro-factors (e.g. falling natural gas prices) that allowed it to increase its Commodity Margin. What does this mean? This means that earnings can be quite volatile. From the chart below we can see that both the operating margin and the EPS swings wildly from year to year. Conclusion The company does not face imminent challenges from regulators and should be around for a long time, but its financial results do not share the same outlook. The surge in EPS that the company experienced over the past couple of years can be largely attributed to extrinsic factors. This is the risk that you must be willing to bear if you want to invest in a wholesale power company. While favorable macro-environment factors will benefit the company (as they have done so for the past three years), the company cannot generate predictable earnings in the future, meaning that the low P/E ratio today does not necessarily translate to a cheap stock. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

To Rebalance Or Not To Rebalance

By Larry Cao, CFA Rebalancing is a topic that most professional money managers are familiar with and yet it is hardly clear to many whether this is a practice that actually adds value. I recently spoke with Jason Hsu , co-founder and vice chairman of Research Affiliates, on the subject while he was visiting in Hong Kong. If you follow our conversation, it seems like there is ample room for improvement. For example, are the people who have the most to gain from rebalancing actively engaged in the practice? Equally important, are those who are actively rebalancing actually benefiting from the exercise? These are questions to which all professional money managers should have crystal clear answers formulated in their minds. Enterprising Investor: Rebalancing is a somewhat mundane topic but it is extremely relevant for practitioners. You have done research on the subject and you are also an investor. Do you think investors should rebalance? Jason Hsu: Statistically, there is documented intermediate-horizon mean reversion in equity returns and long-term mean reversion in asset class returns. A naïve but effective way to benefit from mean reversion is to make sure that you regularly rebalance against past price movements. A lot of people call this contrarian trading. The magnitude of this rebalancing benefit is directly related to the magnitude of mean reversion. Where there might be potential disagreement about the benefit of rebalancing, it is due in part to language and definition. Some people define the benefit of rebalancing more narrowly. So there are two levels of rebalancing. One is at the asset class level for multi-asset strategies: you rebalance an asset class to its target weight. The other one is within each individual asset class: you rebalance each holding to its target weight. Which is generally more beneficial? In terms of the benefit from rebalancing, it is larger when applied within an asset class. Two features work in your favor when applying contrarian rebalancing within asset classes: (1) shorter mean-reversion horizon and (2) a larger cross-section. Mean reversion is a very noisy signal, thus you really need a lot of securities to make the effect work reliably. When you aggregate the effect across hundreds of securities within an asset class, the law of large numbers kicks in to wash out the noise and accentuate the mean-reversion effect. When applying contrarian rebalancing across asset classes, if you don’t have many distinct asset classes, the benefit would be more lumpy. Additionally, since the asset class mean-reversion horizon is a bit longer, you might have to wait a bit for the effect to really kick in and work for you. I think the number of securities plays an important role, correct? Quant models may do a terrific job at picking stocks – for example, a model’s top five picks does better than the top 10, the top 50 does better than the top 100, etc. But if you look at individual buy and sell transactions, it’s harder to show that they actually add value. This is also why investors often question whether rebalancing adds value. That’s a point oftentimes lost to more casual investors, in part because they are used to more traditional concentrated stock-picking managers, who supposedly have deep insights on every stock. But when it’s more quantitative in nature, the manager’s edge for each stock is actually relatively small. Most quant strategies attempt to exploit return patterns related to some assumed behavioral biases. However, these statistical patterns apply only on average; you are never quite sure how it will work for a particular stock at a particular point in time. This is why quant portfolios need a large number of securities. Rebalancing is a simple quant strategy aimed at taking advantage of price mean reversion; as such it needs a large cross-section of securities or as Richard C. Grinold and Ronald N. Kahn refer to – breadth . The classic argument of rebalancing to, say, a 60/40 portfolio, is more troublesome. You only have two asset classes, so you don’t have the law of large numbers on your side. The asset class mean reversion also takes place over a much longer horizon. We are talking about a minimum of five years. So at that level, if you try to measure the rebalancing benefit, I’m not surprised that most wouldn’t find satisfying evidence. This is also related to the empirical observation that the Shiller CAPE ratio, which is a popular quantitative signal for implementing contrarian rebalancing, has worked better for rebalancing among a number of equity indices than for timing rebalancing from stocks to bonds. The case for rebalancing, especially in the multi-asset context, is often made with the assumption that you have complete foresight. Obviously, these return (and risk) forecasts are often very far off. I think the average user grossly overestimates the benefit of estimating the optimal portfolio weight. What they don’t realize is the dispersion of expected returns for stocks and asset classes is very small. So we frankly couldn’t tell whether a 5% weight to Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ) is more optimal than a 1% weight with any degree of confidence. This enormous uncertainty suggests that the notion of “optimal portfolio weights” is not at all realistic and trading aggressively based on presumed optimal weights is probably not advisable. So you think investors can compensate for the fact that optimal weights are sensitive to return and risk facts by not taking these weights too seriously? How do investors rebalance in practice? I think a lot of investors employ the following approach: Every year or two, you reformulate your capital market assumptions to determine the right weights to rebalance to. Like we discussed before, the challenge is that if your expected returns are set incorrectly, you could be rebalancing to very bad target weights. It is almost worse than not rebalancing. This often involves using a portfolio optimizer to set the optimal weights. Case in point, if you thought the expected returns for equities and credits were going to be -10% for 2009 in response to the negative shocks from the global financial crisis, the portfolio optimizer would most certainly set 0% weights for these two asset classes. That wouldn’t have worked very well. Let me share with you a really interesting finding on naïve versus sophisticated asset allocation. Victor De Miguel, Lorenzo Garlappi, and Raman Uppal ran a horse race between naïve equal weighting and optimization-based investment strategies, where portfolio weights were optimized using a variety of models for expected returns. Note that the equally weighted portfolio essentially professes no understanding of expected returns and covariance for securities – it only captures mean-reversion. Surprisingly nothing beats equal weighting. So it really drives home the point that oftentimes people’s dissatisfaction with regularly rebalancing to target weights isn’t that somehow rebalancing your portfolio is a bad concept. The poor experience is largely driven by the fact that your desired target weights coming out of an optimizer were not very good to start with. In some ways, fear and greed (and perhaps hubris) can cause us to focus too much on shifting the portfolio weights (often counterproductively) and thus forgo or diminish the benefit of contrarian rebalancing to capture mean reversion. If most people can’t do it right, then isn’t rebalancing less interesting? There is another approach to rebalancing, what I like to call the lazy approach. It doesn’t really use advanced theory to forecast returns and then optimize. Essentially, investors start with a policy portfolio that isn’t concentrated in a handful of securities or asset classes. If you then regularly rebalance back to this starting static weight, you should do alright over time in terms of capturing the mean-reversion effect. I think for the average investor without special forecasting skill or who is more prone to overconfidence in her return estimates, this lazy approach to rebalancing probably works best. The lazy camp rules. Is there an optimal frequency for rebalancing? You really don’t want to overfit the data and say, “Okay, for large-cap US stocks, I rebalance every 11 months because it gives the best looking backtest.” Determining the optimal rebalancing frequency is most likely a data mining exercise that won’t produce useful out-of-sample performance. Heuristically, I think rebalancing once a year seems quite dependable; this helps you avoid a lot of the short-term momentum effect. Sounds like a good rule of thumb. After taking into account all these challenges investors face, what are some of the strategies that most benefited from rebalancing? I think it is useful to think of contrarian rebalancing as buying cheap after prices have fallen and then selling high after prices have rallied. In a way, it is a flavor of value investing. For markets where value investing has historically worked well, contrarian rebalancing also works well. For example, contrarian rebalancing works really well for Japanese stocks, small-cap stocks, and emerging market stocks, on average. Disclaimer: Please note that the content of this site should not be construed as investment advice, nor do the opinions expressed necessarily reflect the views of CFA Institute.