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A Portfolio For The Next Market Crash – Revisited

Summary In February 2013, I published my thoughts on portfolio allocation and construction, assuming a negative market event in the next five years. That event has not yet occurred. In the interim, how has my portfolio held up? My relative conservatism has had its costs, but the portfolio still has performed pretty well, except for bad a call to include some exposure to oil. Going forward, what to do? I conclude this article with some thoughts on that. Two-and-half years ago, I published an article called “A Portfolio For The Next Market Crash”. The premise was that sometime in the next five years, there will be a significant negative market event, that a prudent investor should be prepared for such an event, but that in the meantime, equity returns were going to beat other investments. Halfway through the five years, the market event has not occurred and the equity market has provided good returns. The market, as represented by the S&P 500 plus dividends (Pending: GSPC ), is up about 30% in the two-and-a-half years, a return that would (or at least should) delight long-term investors for the long term. (click to enlarge) Therefore, we have to conclude that I left money on the table by suggesting that about a 50% allocation to equities was prudent. Had I said 70%, that would have been better with hindsight. But if and when the negative market event occurs, the 50% allocation will look better. I made two serious mistakes, however. One, I said an investment in non-leveraged oil companies should be part of the portfolio, basically as a hedge against inflation. I got the non-leveraged part right, but the oil part was dead wrong. And my portfolio has suffered from that. (On the bright side, my portfolio would have suffered far more had I invested in leveraged oil companies – or a leveraged shale play). Two, I shied away from longer-term debt on the ground that the downside was greater than the upside. In practice, the upside has come to pass. Again, I was too cautious, but for the right reasons, I think. Perhaps these errors of caution come from being over 70 years of age, when it is harder to recover from losses because one has less time. I did get the general theme right however: Invest in companies with low leverage and strong market positions. In general, those companies have performed well, with less risk. Companies I mentioned were Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ), Cisco (NASDAQ: CSCO ), Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A ) (NYSE: BRK.B ), Bio-Reference Laboratories (NASDAQ: BRLI ), and Healthcare Services Group (NASDAQ: HCSG ). All have performed pretty well, with most performing better than the market. Berkshire is the laggard, with approximately market performance. BRLI’s performance depends on what you did with your shares after the merger with OPKO Health (NYSE: OPK ) was announced on June 4 of this year. That merger changed the nature of the investment, as I wrote at the time. If you sold about half of your BRLI holding soon after the announcement, as I suggested I would do (and did at $41.90), then for that part of your holding, you did just fine. Unfortunately, for the other half that you held, you have not done well so far, with the losses on OPKO Health destroying a lot of value. OPKO Health may pan out over the long term, but I wish I had sold all my BRLI instead of just half. As a consequence, I am sitting with a long-term investment that I did not really choose. I still hope it will pan out. That’s the basic two-and-a-half-year scorecard. Not bad. But where do we go from here? Is the negative market event still to come? Or did this past summer’s fake-out substitute for it? I think this summer’s mini-correction was indeed a fake-out. A few weeks ago, I wrote that: Interest rates and spreads have been kept low in recent years not only by central banks, but also by high global savings. Global savings rates appear to be declining, with the result that there is less money chasing yield. Just as pro-cyclical forces reinforced the narrowing of spreads in the recent past, such forces now will go into reverse and will make life hard for weak credits. Corporate bonds and emerging market debt will suffer. And I think I see a knock-on effect on the U.S. stock markets. I am sticking by that medium-term assessment despite the market having reacted otherwise in the last few weeks. The market is driven by sentiment, the lack of good alternatives, and the shilly-shallying Fed. Eventually, fundamentals come to the fore. And too much credit for companies and states that cannot afford to service it, much less repay it, is a fundamental that is hard to run away from for very long. It already is catching up with leveraged oil companies and leveraged companies that have depended on oil exploration and development or Chinese consumption of natural resources. That has an influence on their lenders as their own futures. Other non-U.S. borrowers in dollars also are likely to become victims, as will their lenders. Market Drivers I think we are seeing a market that is increasingly divided between the newer-style companies that have relatively few employees and comparatively little invested in hard assets, which are doing very well, and the older-style companies that have many employees and higher levels of hard asset investments that are not doing as well. I think this bifurcation is going to continue. Here are a couple of graphs that I think indicate the change that has been occurring over the last 40-plus years and that is continuing. Comparison between income per employee of the Top 50 U.S. public companies by market capitalization with the Top 20 U.S. public companies by number of employees 1970-2013, in dollars deflated to 1970 using the GDP deflator (data from S&P Capital IQ, computations and graph by Martin Lowy) (click to enlarge) Net Income as a percentage of revenue for the Top 50 public U.S. companies by market cap versus the Top 20 ranked by number of employees, 1970-2013, in dollars deflated to 1970 using the GDP deflator (data from S&P Capital IQ, computations and graph by Martin Lowy) (click to enlarge) As you can see, the top 20 companies by number of employees have had a relatively static income per employee compared with the top 50 companies by market cap. (It has increased, but little by comparison). That is because the types of companies in the top 20 by number of employees have remained fairly constant while the types of companies in the top 50 by market cap have changed dramatically, as the likes of Apple, Google (NASDAQ: GOOG ) (NASDAQ: GOOGL ), Microsoft (NASDAQ: MSFT ), Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ) and Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ) have replaced more employee-heavy and resource-rich (mostly oil) companies. It is the employee-light companies that have provided the big returns over the last 20 years. At the current point in the business cycle, this disparity in investment returns is likely to grow even further, as less slack in the labor market (weekly initial unemployment claims are the lowest since 1973, according to Calculated Risk , for example) leads to higher wages and governmental policies are evolving toward requiring employers to pay more for employees in a variety of ways (healthcare, overtime, minimum wage, to name a few). The employee-heavy companies have nowhere to turn to increase their profits because most of them are under pricing pressure from the employee-light companies. We saw that recently as Wal-Mart (NYSE: WMT ) announced depressed results due to increased employee costs and its response to that result as being to invest in competing with Amazon. Some think Wal-Mart will not succeed at this. See New York Times on the subject here . The gig economy is moving in the same direction. Competition from the likes of Uber (Pending: UBER ) and Airbnb (Pending: AIRB ) affects high-employee and high-fixed investment companies more than it does the opposite. Therefore, even though I may not be able to anticipate where the gig economy will strike next, I do anticipate that it will be in sectors that require high fixed investments or high levels of employees relative to revenue. Based on these considerations, I am configuring my portfolio to reduce exposure to employee-heavy companies as well as highly leveraged companies. There are still plenty of investments to choose from without those. Of course, I am not the only person in the world who has noticed these trends, and they are reflected in stock prices. Therefore, in many cases, one has to go up the p.e. scale in order to buy in. What to do going forward? Where does this leave us regarding a going-forward investment posture? (1) I am sticking to my basic asset allocation – 50% stocks. People I respect (e.g., Cam Hui) are saying the remainder of 2015 will be good for stocks. But I still fear a reversal of some consequence in 2016. There are just too many things that can go wrong for a market that still seems priced for perfection. And if something could go wrong in 2016, it could go wrong earlier. (2) I am reviewing my portfolio to make sure that on balance it reflects my investment thesis. Though there will be exceptions, I do not see the high-employee-count style of a company as the engine of future growth. (An exception in my portfolio is Berkshire, which now ranks among the nation’s largest employers. Its net income per employee remains respectable, and its large number of employees is accounted for by the sheer size of its portfolio of companies). One of the questions that a few readers asked two-and-a-half years ago was why I am not recommending international exposure. I replied at the time that (1) where a company manufactures and sells matters more than where it is headquartered or its stock is listed, and (2) most large U.S. companies offer significant international exposure. For example, look at Apple’s recent financial results, which were driven by sales and profit increases in China, according to the WSJ . Despite many U.S.-based frauds etc., I place more trust in the financial information from companies subject to U.S. accounting conventions and securities laws than I do in companies subject to other rules. The kind of company that I wish I could find more of is MarketAxess Holdings (NASDAQ: MKTX ), which operates a leading bond trading platform. It has a high return on capital, few employees, and operates in a space that is ripe for automated takeover because the costs of traditional bond trading have been astronomical. The stock is up five-fold over five years, but there still should be plenty of room for growth unless some other similar platform steals market share or undercuts the pricing. Perhaps some readers will give me good ideas. Please remember, I am not a securities analyst. I am just a guy who reads a lot and tries to reflect the panoply of things going on in the world in his investment decisions. I also enjoy my interaction with the Seeking Alpha community.

A Bond-Free Portfolio: Why Cash Should Replace Bonds To Reduce Risk And Improve Returns

Summary Most conservative investors think that bonds should hold the largest position in their investment portfolio. Cash or “near cash” has become a major investment medium that is included in the majority of individuals’ portfolios. Can replacing bonds with the current near cash alternatives provide better long-term results and reduce overall portfolio risk? In a recent interview, Howard Marks, the great investor and co-chairman of Oaktree Capital, quoted the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman, who once said “There are two kinds of people who lose money: those who know nothing and those who know everything.” Those of us who are selling investment services, whether portfolio management or investment products, have a tremendous ability to locate or create research that rationalizes our approach to building and maintaining a portfolio. Because we spend so much time and effort in this process we can become one of “those” who think they know everything, and as a result, disregard our primary purpose, which is to help people preserve and grow their wealth. This month, I want to share with you some thoughts on asset allocation. These views are contrary to the conventional approach that has been used quite successfully for decades; the basic stock, bond, and cash mix. The question we will try to answer is why cash is held in lesser amounts and only used to meet current needs or as an opportunistic buying reserve for stocks and bonds. Welcome New Members Before we begin, I want to take a moment to welcome all the new and returning members into the largest investment club in the world, the “Buy High, Sell Low Club.” Given the horrendous market returns beginning in August and running wild through the end of September, the club’s membership has grown so much that it can only hold meetings in cyberspace, as there is no location in the world that could accommodate all of the members. In my early years, I was a card carrying member of the club. I first joined in the seventies and rejoined again early in the eighties. I am happy to say that since I have again let my membership expire, I have been able to resist the urge to renew. I am just as happy to say that you have also been able to resist this club’s temptations. And if you haven’t noticed, since the end of September the markets have been recovering quite nicely. Some of you may think that resisting the club’s pull is easy. However, regret and the ever-present destructive forces of “should’ve, would’ve, could’ve” can be more agonizing than watching your portfolio value decline. For me, even though I have been rewarded with a very attractive long-term return on my capital, during those times when markets acted badly, I did not know when or if my portfolio would recover its value. I had to rely on my training, experience, and yes, faith that the businesses we own would find a way to grow their profits and dividends. If you feel at any time that the sirens’ call of the club is hard to resist, please let us know. We will do all we can to help, and together we will work towards finding a solution that we hope will be best for you. Asset Allocation I would venture to say that the majority of financial professionals believe asset allocation, not security selection, is the primary driver of portfolio returns. There are also just as many who think stocks are risky, bonds are safe, and cash has little use in a portfolio. Because of this, the majority of conservative investors think that bonds should hold the largest position in their investment portfolio. This belief is reinforced through the use of target date funds, which are held by so many individual investors in their 401K plans. Most target date fund investors take the time to read the literature, which says the fund will be less risky as they get closer to their retirement date. This is accomplished by holding less stocks and more bonds. This belief is also reinforced by Jack Bogle, the well-known founder of the Vanguard Funds, who has over the years told individuals that their basic allocation to bonds should be equal to their age. If you are 50 years old, your portfolio should be invested 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds. At age 70, it should be 30% in stocks and 70% in bonds. At age 25, you should have 75% of your money in common stocks and just 25% in bonds. This belief has also been reinforced by academics whose financial research influences the asset allocation of large pension plans, endowments, foundations and trusts. For a majority of institutional investors, a portfolio with 60% in common stocks and 40% in bonds is the norm. Variations from this norm are not taken lightly, and most are done only under the guidance of professional advisors who place bets on multiple alternative investments in hopes of earning superior returns. The greatest reinforcement of all has been bonds themselves. For the past 35 years, they have performed admirably, producing results that reassure investors they are safe. They have not lost money, and depending on when they were purchased could have increased capital, all while providing a respectable rate of return as readily spendable interest payments. With all of the good things bonds have done for investors, how could I have the audacity to suggest that a bond-free portfolio for individuals is appropriate, and that cash should replace bonds to reduce portfolio risk and increase returns? My thoughts on asset allocation were highly influenced by two individuals. The first I have written about many times, the great Benjamin Graham. Through his work I learned that the safety of capital is directly related to the price paid relative to the intrinsic value of both stocks and bonds. The second was Peter L. Bernstein, whose writings gave me some basic training in understanding the nature of risk and the primary place it holds in asset allocation. Benjamin Graham and Portfolio Policy Prior to reading Benjamin Graham’s Intelligent Investor , I thought very little about asset allocation, as I was far more concerned with the problem of feeding my family. This conflict caused me to do what many in our industry continue to do today: “sell what you can.” Armed with little training and having faith in the wisdom of the firm, I sold whatever product they happened to recommend at the time. I think all of you will agree that this is not the most intellectual approach to financial advice. In Chapter 4 of The Intelligent Investor , titled “General Portfolio Policy: The Defensive Investor” Graham writes this: We have already outlined in briefest form the portfolio policy of the defensive investor. He should divide his funds between high-grade bonds and high-grade common stocks. We have suggested as a fundamental guiding rule that the investor should never have less than 25% or more than 75% of his funds in common stocks, with a consequent inverse range of between 75% and 25% in bonds. There is an implication here that the standard division should be an equal one, or 50-50, between the two major investment mediums. According to tradition the sound reason for increasing the percentage in common stocks would be the appearance of the “bargain price” levels created in a protracted bear market. Conversely, sound procedure would call for reducing the common-stock component below 50% when in the judgment of the investor the market level has become dangerously high. At the time of Graham’s writing, the options for the average investor were almost limited to individual common stocks, with only a few opportunities in high-quality bonds. Of course the world has changed, and the explosion of new product introductions from the financial engineers on Wall Street allow almost everyone, even those with limited savings, to participate in hundreds of other assets beyond stocks and bonds. However, the majority of individuals today still use the basic stock/bond portfolio. And with the popularity of target date funds, I believe this will continue far into the future. The greatest change since Graham is the ability to earn a competitive interest rate on cash. Beginning with FDIC Insured deposits, including certificates and money market mutual funds, cash or “near cash” has become a major investment medium that is included in the majority of individuals’ portfolios. Peter L. Bernstein, Risk, and Diversification On just a few occasions I have shared the wisdom of Peter L. Bernstein with you. Even though I have some ideas contrary to his thoughts, there is no question of his influence on my understanding of risk, which shows in how we manage your portfolio. He is best known for his book, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, which sold over 500,000 copies worldwide and is still widely available. It should be required reading for all investment professionals. Bernstein was an investment manager, teacher, author, economist, and financial historian. In addition to 10 books, he authored countless articles in professional journals. One of these, titled How True Are the Tried Principles? , appeared in the March/April 1989 edition of Investment Management Review. This short article had a significant influence on my investment approach to building and maintaining balanced portfolios for conservative investors. I want to highlight a few portions of this article. Mr. Bernstein states, without reservations, that “bonds should trade places with cash as the “residual stepchild” of asset allocation to reduce portfolio risk and improve returns.” This is controversial, as there is almost universal belief that bonds are “safer” than stocks and by default will reduce risk. Risk as defined by most academics is not a permanent loss of capital, but the volatility of the market value of a portfolio. To minimize risk, we therefore just have to reduce the volatility of the portfolio’s market value. The preferred approach to accomplish this is through diversification. Mr. Bernstein’s words about diversification: Let us consider for a moment how diversification actually works. Although diversification helps us avoid the chance that all of our assets will go down together, it also means that we will avoid the chance that all assets will go up together. Seen from this standpoint, diversification is a mixed blessing. In order to keep the mixture of the blessings of diversification as favorable as possible, effective diversification has two necessary conditions: (1) The covariance in returns among the assets must be negative; if it is positive, we will still run the risk that all assets will go down together; and (2) The expected returns in all the assets should be high; no one wants to hold assets with significant probabilities of loss. Here’s a little reminder about covariance and your portfolio. If the market value of your stocks and bonds go up or down at the same time, then the stocks and bonds’ covariance is positive. If the value of your stocks goes down and the value of your bonds goes up at the same time, then the covariance is negative. To limit the volatility in your portfolio, you would want your bonds to produce positive returns when the market value of your stocks goes down. Mr. Bernstein’s words about covariance: Consider covariance first. We know that the correlation between bond and stock returns is variable, but we also know that it is positive most of the time…Stock returns correlate even more weakly with cash, but such as it is, the correlation between stocks and cash is negative. Bonds and cash also correlate weakly, but the correlation here tends to be positive. Monthly and quarterly bond and stock returns are simultaneously positive over 70% of the time. This ratio increases as we lengthen the holding period, as all assets have a higher probability of positive results over the long run. The meaning is clear: most of the time that bonds are going up, the stock market is also going up. Unless bonds tend to provide higher returns on those occasions, they will be making a reliable contribution to the overall performance of the portfolio only during the relatively infrequent time periods when the bond market is going up and the stock market is going down. Even though many of us believe when stocks go down, bonds go up, and vice versa, this has not been the case. Given that bonds fail as a diversifier to reduce risk, why do so many people hold bonds? The only reasons are that bonds, in most occasions, pay a higher current income than both stocks and cash, and historically have been less volatile than common stocks. Today is one of those few occasions when dividend yields on common stocks exceed those of bonds. The current dividend yield of the S&P 500 is 2.12%. Compare that to the yields on US Treasury Obligations: 1-Year Maturity 2-Year Maturity 3-Year Maturity 5-Year Maturity 10-Year Maturity 0.23% 0.61% 0.91% 1.36% 2.04% Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury as of 10-16-2015 If bonds provide less income than common stocks, and the benefits from diversification are limited to only a few occasions that happen infrequently, can replacing bonds with the current near cash alternatives provide better long-term results and reduce overall portfolio risk? Mr. Bernstein’s words about cash: Although cash tends to have a lower expected return than bonds, we have seen that cash can hold its own against bonds 30% of the time or more when bond returns are positive. Cash will always win out over bonds when bond returns are negative. The logical step, therefore, is to try a portfolio mix that offsets the lower expected return on cash by increasing the share devoted to equities. As cash has no negative returns, the volatility might not be any higher than it would be in a portfolio that includes bonds. …The results of a portfolio consisting of 60% stocks, 40% bonds, and no cash (are compared) with a portfolio of 75% stocks, no bonds, and 25% cash….The results are clearly in favor of the bond-free portfolio, which provides higher returns with almost identical levels of risk. As each of you are aware, we have let our bond holdings mature without reinvesting the proceeds, deferring to allocate our fixed income holdings in short-term bank deposits, CDs and, if available, stable value funds. The rationale has far more to do with our expected rates of returns of common stocks relative to bonds, and the increased risk of bonds in a period of low interest rates. Given the current rates paid, bonds are very vulnerable to negative returns. If interest rates are higher in the near future, then the market value of the bond principal could easily fall well beyond the amount of interest income received. Cash, on the other hand, will not suffer at all. In fact if rates increase, cash will add positive returns to your portfolio. As for common stocks, the income received in dividends is likely to be much higher over the next ten years than it is today. If dividends do increase, as we expect, the market value of common stocks should produce positive returns at least equal to that growth in dividends. Bonds, however, will be limited to the interest rates paid today with no increase in income at all. _______________________________________________________ Anderson Griggs & Company, Inc., doing business as Anderson Griggs Investments, is a registered investment adviser. Anderson Griggs only conducts business in states and locations where it is properly registered or meets state requirement for advisors. This commentary is for informational purposes only and is not an offer of investment advice. We will only render advice after we deliver our Form ADV Part 2 to a client in an authorized jurisdiction and receive a properly executed Investment Supervisory Services Agreement. Any reference to performance is historical in nature and no assumption about future performance should be made based on the past performance of any Anderson Griggs’ Investment Objectives, individual account, individual security or index. Upon request, Anderson Griggs Investments will provide to you a list of all trade recommendations made by us for the immediately preceding 12 months. The authors of publications are expressing general opinions and commentary. They are not attempting to provide legal, accounting, or specific advice to any individual concerning their personal situation. Anderson Griggs Investments’ office is located at 113 E. Main St., Suite 310, Rock Hill, SC 29730. The local phone number is 803-324-5044 and nationally can be reached via its toll-free number 800-254-0874.

Consolidated Edison’s Place In A Dividend Growth Portfolio

Consolidated Edison is known as a slow growing utility. Yet this alone has not precluded the security from providing reasonable returns. This article illustrates what an investor ought to require in order for the company to have a place in your dividend growth portfolio. Tracing its roots back over 180 years, Consolidated Edison (NYSE: ED ) provides electricity for 3.3 million customers and gas to 1.1 million customers in and around New York City. You might imagine that this business is fairly stable. Indeed, the company has not only paid but also increased its dividend for 41 consecutive years . That’s an investing lifetime for many, each and every year waking up to more and more Consolidated Edison dividends. The way the company operates is a slightly different from your typical dividend growth firm. That’s to be expected: it’s a regulated utility. Yet this alone does not preclude it from providing reasonable returns. I’ll demonstrate both points below. Here’s a look at both the business and investment growth of Consolidated Edison during the 2005 through 2014 period:   ED Revenue Growth 1.1% Start Profit Margin 6.2% End Profit Margin 8.3% Earnings Growth 4.5% Yearly Share Count 2.0% EPS Growth 2.1% Start P/E 15 End P/E 18 Share Price Growth 4.0% % Of Divs Collected 46% Start Payout % 76% End Payout % 70% Dividend Growth 1.1% Total Return 7.3% The top line growth certainly isn’t impressive. As a point of comparison, companies like Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ), Boeing (NYSE: BA ) and Procter & Gamble (NYSE: PG ) were able to grow revenues by 8%, 6% and 4% respectively over the same time period. Of course this is easily anticipated: utilities by their nature tend to be slow growing. The demand for their product is fairly consistent and doesn’t suddenly accelerate with the advent of a new higher efficiency light bulb. So 1% annual revenue growth sets the stage. From there the company has been able to increase its net profit margin, resulting in total earnings growth that outpaces total revenue growth. If the number of common shares outstanding remains the same, total earnings growth will be equal to earnings-per-share growth. Yet this situation rarely holds. With you typical dividend growth company you see shares being retired over the years due to share repurchases. As a point of reference, about three-fourths of the current Dow Jones (NYSEARCA: DIA ) components have reduced their share count in the last decade. Utilities tend to do the opposite – selling shares to raise capital. Consolidated Edison has been no exception, increasing its share count from about 245 million in 2005 to 293 million by 2014, or an average compound increase of about 2% per year. As such, EPS growth trailed overall company profitability, coming in at just over 2% per year. If the earnings multiple remains the same at the beginning and end of the observation period, the share price appreciation will be equal to EPS growth. In this case, investors were willing to pay about 15 times earnings at the start as compared to roughly 18 times at the end of 2014. As such, the share price increased by 4% per year. If you were to look at a stock chart, this is all that you would see. Yet an even larger component to the overall return was dividends received. Remember, investors were able to collect a rising stream of income over time. The magnitude of these increases has not been impressive in any sense: coming in at just over 1% annually. Yet the beginning payout ratio was above 75%. When coupled with a reasonable valuation, this equates to starting dividend yield of about 5%. So investors were able to collect nearly half of their beginning investment in this slow grower. All told capital appreciation would have accounted for about $20 worth of additional value while you would have also received about $21.50 in dividend payments. Your total return would have been roughly 7.3% per year. Now surely this isn’t overly impressive – it’s more or less in line with what I would deem “reasonable” returns. Yet it should be noted that the slow growth didn’t prevent you from increasing your wealth. Moreover, the annual return is in-line with or better than what Procter & Gamble, Caterpillar (NYSE: CAT ), UnitedHealth (NYSE: UNH ) or Intel (NASDAQ: INTC ) provided during the same time period. Its not always about the growth, the interaction of the value components also makes a difference. The reason that Consolidated Edison provided reasonable returns was related to two factors: investors were willing to pay a higher of a valuation and the dividend yield started near 5%. Moving forward, you likely want to think about the repeatability of those components. More than likely Consolidated Edison isn’t going to “wow” you with its upcoming growth. Analysts are presently expecting intermediate-term growth in the 2% to 3% range , much like the past decade. As such, the valuation that you require to invest should be paramount. You can pay a bit more for a company that grows by 8% or 10% and “grow out of” a slight premium paid. When you have a much lower growth rate, your margin of error is much lower. As a for instance, imagine company that grows earnings-per-share by 2% annually over the next five years. If you paid say 17 times earnings and it later trades at 15 times earnings, this results in negative capital appreciation. On the other hand, if you pay 17 times earnings for a company that grows by 8% per year and it later trades at 15 times earnings, this equates to 5.3% annual price appreciation. The penalty of “overpaying” is far less severe for faster growing companies. Thus in contemplating an investment in Consolidated Edison you should be especially mindful of the price paid. (Naturally this holds for any company, but even more so with slower expected growth.) Over the past decade shares have routinely traded in the 12 to 18 P/E range. While its possible to see a valuation outside of this range, you’d likely want to demand something on the lower end of the spectrum in order for the security to look comparatively compelling. The second important thing to note is that the dividend payment is apt to play a much larger role than your typical investment. You know the rate of dividend increases likely isn’t going to be substantial, so once more the focus is on demanding a reasonable starting yield. It’s the high starting yield that allows an investment in Consolidated Edison to rival that of the Procter & Gamble’s of the world. Without a reasonable yield premium the investment doesn’t have many more levers at its disposable. An investment in Consolidated Edison is an investment in the dividend, with the occasional revision in valuation. Alternatively, with a reasonable dividend yield and reinvestment, it’s a reliable way to see your income increase by 5% or 6% annually. In short, just because Consolidated Edison hasn’t grown very fast doesn’t mean that it can’t be a reasonable investment. As illustrated above, just 1% annual revenue growth turned into 7%+ yearly returns. Moving forward, the same drivers – valuation and dividends received – will continue to play an outsized role in future returns. As such, focusing on these components from a slow growing utility becomes central to a successful investing process.