Tag Archives: nature

Jack Bogle Was Right – You Could Be Leaving 80% On The Table

The typical investor should accumulate $3.7 million at an 8% annual rate. But the cost of intermediation – 2.5% – reduces that return from 8% to 5.5%. Due to the “tyranny of compounding costs”, the investor surrenders 80% of final wealth. You’ve heard it before – the key to building long-term wealth is to tap into the power of compounding returns. It’s a concept that’s universally accepted by savers, investors, finance professors, and math geeks. But for most of us it still requires a leap of faith because the math can be a little tricky. Anyone willing to devote 5 minutes to this topic will understand just how powerful compounding is. Why is this important? Because the power of compounding is a double-edged sword. Compounding growth (especially in a tax-deferred account like an IRA or 401K) will turbo-charge your wealth, compounding costs are a real drag. It’s important to understand how both of these forces work, and how they impact your portfolio. If you are an experienced investor, or someone who is good at math, you might think you don’t need to go through this exercise. But when it comes to the compounding cost part, you might be surprised to learn just how much of a drag it really is. In his book, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, Vanguard founder Jack Bogle made a bold statement. He said that thanks to the “tyranny of compounding costs,” investors leave 80% of their wealth on the table. I was more than a little skeptical – not about the nature of Bogle’s claim, but about the magnitude. Could it be true that investors leave 80% on the table? How does that happen? More importantly, why would any investor allow it to happen? Everyone knows that brokers charge commissions and advisers charge fees, but how much can those costs come to? Maybe 1% or 2% per year? How can that end up taking 80% of an investor’s wealth? Although I have always had great respect for Mr. Bogle, I wondered whether he might have overstated the case. So I set about the task of trying to debunk this astonishing claim. Much to my surprise, the claim holds up to scrutiny. To arrive at the 80% figure, Bogle used a very long investment horizon – 65 years. At first I thought, a-ha! Nobody stays in the market for 65 years! But after thinking about it I realized that it’s not only possible, it’s actually very plausible. Here’s how he arrived at the 65-year time horizon: A 20-year-old investor, just starting out on a long career Works and contributes to savings for the next 45 years, until age 65 Then lives another 20 years in retirement (actuarial tables say this is realistic) And doesn’t liquidate his holdings during retirement, but lives off of the interest on his principal At 85, leaves his nest egg to his children, after a 65-year investing career. Although this timeline is unusual, it’s not unrealistic. When making an argument, it’s completely legit to use best-case and worst-case scenarios in order to illustrate your point. So let’s stipulate that a 65-year horizon is acceptable for illustrative purposes. As you go through the charts and tables below, you can substitute your own likely time horizon for the 65 years that Bogle used. In constructing his argument in the book, Bogle states the following: “$1,000 invested at the outset of the period, earning an assumed annual return of, say, 8 percent would have a final value of $148,780 – the magic of compounding returns.” Here’s what that looks like in chart form. (You’ve undoubtedly seen this graph before, but bear with me – I’m establishing a baseline here.) (click to enlarge) Bogle then warns that this outcome is unlikely to be achieved. Why? Because the graph above excludes what he calls “intermediation costs.” And these costs also compound over time. Bogle’s argument is that the power of compounding returns is eventually overwhelmed by the tyranny of compounding costs – a concept that many investors fail to fully appreciate. Bogle continues… “Assuming an annual intermediation cost of only 2.5 percent, the 8 percent return would be reduced to 5.5 percent. At that rate, the same initial $1,000 would have a final value of only $32,465 – the tyranny of compounding costs. The triumph of tyranny over magic, then, is reflected in a stunning reduction of almost 80 percent in accumulated wealth for the investor… consumed… by our financial system.” Here’s what the tyranny of compounding costs looks like in chart form: (click to enlarge) As Bogle points out, financial intermediaries – the money managers, sellers of investment products and financial advisers – “put up zero percent of the capital and assume zero percent of the risk yet receive almost 80 percent of the return.” And it’s true – I ran the numbers six ways to Sunday and I came up with the same results every time. Now let’s take a look at the numbers from a different angle. Instead of using a static $1,000 deposit at the beginning of the period, I devised a more realistic scenario. The median household income in the U.S. today is $55,000. If we assume that this household sets aside 5% of that income each year, they will end up with a nest egg of roughly $800,000 when they retire after 45 years. And if they leave that money in their account for the next 20 years, only spending the interest on their principal, it will continue to grow, and their final account value will be roughly $3.7 million, using an 8% annual rate of return. That’s the power of compounding returns. Now let’s assume that the total cost of investing – what Bogle describes as financial intermediation – comes to 2.5% per year. This is a reasonable figure, based on many studies from academia and from the financial industry itself. When you combine the visible costs like mutual fund expense ratios, management fees, and account servicing charges, you get to 1.5%. When you add in the hidden costs, like the commissions that mutual funds pay to the brokers who execute their trades, trading impact costs, bid/ask spreads, capital gains taxes, and payment for order flow – you get to 2.5%. Now let’s see how much this typical household gives away to financial intermediaries – after 45 years, and after 65 years. (click to enlarge) After investing for 45 years, this household would – in theory – have accumulated a $798,000 nest egg. And if they kept their principal intact for the next 20 years of retirement, their nest egg would grow to $3.7 million. However, due to the tyranny of compounding costs, the financial intermediaries who “helped” them build this wealth would take 65% of their nest egg after 45 years, leaving them with just $278,000. At the end of the full 65 years, the financial intermediaries will have taken 78% of our household’s wealth, leaving them with $811,615. The true cost of financial intermediation is outrageous and unjustified. But most of these costs are hidden, which explains why so many investors aren’t aware of the destructive impact these costs have on their future wealth. In my next article on this topic, I’ll dig into the details of the costs to show you how they sneak up on us and overwhelm the power of compounding returns. In the meantime, I’ll leave you with a set of low-cost, high-quality mutual funds and ETFs that will help you cut down on the high cost of financial intermediation. I created this list using Morningstar’s fund screening tool. I screened for a combination of low expenses and high analyst ratings. It’s not a perfect list, and it doesn’t cover every asset class – but it’s a good place to start. If you own some funds that have high expenses, it might be worth your time to compare what you own to the funds shown below. Every dime you save on expenses gets moved from the intermediation side of the ledger to the wealth side. Think about it. (click to enlarge)

Connecticut Water Service – A Stable Business With A Twist

Summary The company is primarily a water utility business. While the utility business is highly profitable, the return on equity is capped at around 10%. The Services and Rentals could generate significant value in the future. Connecticut Water Service (NASDAQ: CTWS ) is a utility company that focuses on water distribution. As a water utility company, the company does not have to worry about commodity fluctuations, unlike a natural gas utility company . Unfortunately, the company was not able to escape the pessimism in the market. Despite on the way to post another year of growth, the stock barely budged in 2015, fluctuating around $36. In the chart above, we can see that over the long-term, the stock tracks the company’s top-line growth. This makes a lot of sense because the company primarily runs a regulated business, so margins will be fairly consistent from year to year. More recently, the company seems to have benefited from economy of scale, as the operating margin climbed along with the growth in revenue. For any other company, this track record would suggest an extremely well-run business with the potential to generate a lot of profit. Unfortunately for investors (and fortunately for citizens), the utility business is regulated for this exact reason. The company’s two main water subsidiaries in Connecticut and Maine have a rate cap (return on equity) of 9.75% and 9.5%, respectively As you can see, ROE has fluctuated around the 10%, reflecting this cap. What this means is that the maximum growth equity investors can expect from the company’s regulated business over the long-run is around 10%. Because the company provides a critical service, I have no doubt that the company will achieve this rate of return over the long term. Of course, the company can try to apply for rate increases, but I wouldn’t count them since there is no way to know in advance whether they will be approved. While most of the revenue comes from the regulated water utility business (~90%), the company does have some non-regulated operations. On the non-regulated side, the main segment is Services and Rentals. The segment’s operation is quite diverse, ranging from typical repairs to providing emergency drinking water. While small, the company is highly profitable. Year to date, the segment’s net profit margin was 24%. This is pretty much on par with the margin of the water business (25%)! However, it would seem that the management has trouble growing it. Quarter on quarter, revenue only increased by 5%. That being said, the segment could generate significant value if the management figures out a way to scale it. While I am not seeing any promises right now, it nevertheless has good option value, after all, the segment’s services do go hand in hand with the water business. Conclusion If you are satisfied with the rate of return (~10%) over the long-term, then I think Connecticut Water Service represents a good opportunity. Due to the nature of water utility (a critical service), the company should be able to reach the rate cap over the long-run. While the non-regulated side of the business is still small, I believe that once the management finds a way to convince more water business customers to use the company’s maintenance services, there could be significant upside. Overall, I believe that the company will continue to deliver stable profits from its water business, and the non-regulated activities are an added bonus for investors.

RSX: OPEC, Sanctions On Turkey And The Stubborn Ruble

Summary OPEC fails to provide support to oil prices, posing a significant risk for RSX. The story with Turkey is evolving as I predicted, and does not add much to the bear thesis. The ruble remains relatively overvalued. Market Vectors Russia ETF (NYSE: RSX ) had an interesting November. The ETF moved up and down, fueled by implications of Paris attacks, the shooting of the Russian jet by Turkey and the fluctuations of oil prices. In this article, I’ll focus on two major developments – the Russian sanctions on Turkey and OPEC’s decision to leave things as they are. Turkey In my article on RSX that was published right after the jet incident I stated that Russia’s response won’t be harmful for RSX components. This what exactly happened. In essence, Russia banned tourism and food from Turkey. The food ban comes into power on January 1, 2016, but multiple reports from Russian media show that it is already next to impossible to bring food from Turkey in reasonable time due to customs’ intense checks. Short-term, this will increase inflation, as Russia imports most fruits and vegetables that it consumes in winter because of obvious geographical reasons. As for RSX holdings , this might hurt the retailer Magnit, but I don’t think that it will have a big impact on Magnit’s bottom line. Russian president promised more sanctions on Turkey, but so far there was more harsh talk than real actions. Given the nature of the incident, tourism and food bans are a very light response. I anticipate more words (like the recent mutual accusations of involvement in the ISIS oil trade) from both sides as politicians want to score some points, but I expect little action. Among RSX holdings, the biggest risk is on Sberbank (OTCPK: OTCPK:SBRCY ), which is the fund’s biggest holding. Sberbank owns DenizBank, which is a notable player in the Turkish market. In the latest interview to the Russian media, Sberbank’s head German Gref stated that he saw no significant risks for Sberbank in Turkey, and I agree with his assessment. OPEC OPEC’s decision to live things as they were was predictable, but, nevertheless, was bad for Russia. I think that OPEC’s inability to function as an organization will put more pressure on the oil market. I recently argued that a perfect storm could push oil to $25 per barrel. Such a drop will push RSX way past the lows of December 2014. However, even current prices present an enormous threat to the Russian economy as the country eats through its emergency funds. The ruble The ruble (which is an important factor for the dollar-denominated RSX) stays relatively strong given the current oil price. The ruble-denominated oil price stubbornly stays around 2900 per barrel, while the Russian budget for 2016 needs at least 3150 per barrel. Sanctions on Turkey limit the Central Bank’s ability to decrease the rate, which is currently at 11% . However, if oil stays weak in the beginning of 2016, I expect that the Central Bank will have to cut the rate to provide some help to the Russian budget. Bottom line I remain bearish. RSX was clearly not the easiest short trade in the last few months. There was some optimism about Russia and buying activity was real. However, I question the Russian economy’s ability to successfully operate at current oil price levels. Also, as I think that the next leg down in oil is around the corner, I expect further weakness in RSX.