Tag Archives: marketplace

What Is Liquidity? (Part VIII)

Here are some simple propositions on liquidity: Liquidity is positively influenced by the quality of an asset. Liquidity is positively influenced by the simplicity of an asset. Liquidity is negatively influenced by the price momentum of an asset. Liquidity is negatively influenced by the level of fear (or overall market price volatility). Liquidity is negatively influenced by the length of an asset’s cash flow stream. Liquidity is negatively influenced by concentration of the holders of an asset. Liquidity is negatively influenced by the length of the time horizon of the holders of an asset. Liquidity is positively influenced by the amount of information available about an asset, but negatively affected by changes in the information about an asset. Liquidity is negatively influenced by the level of indebtedness of owners and potential buyers of an asset Liquidity is negatively influenced by similarity of trading strategies of owners and potential buyers of an asset. Presently, we have a lot of commentary about how the bond market is supposedly illiquid. One particular example is the so-called flash crash in the Treasury market that took place on October 15th, 2014 . Question: does a moment of illiquidity imply that the US Treasury market is somehow illiquid? My answer is no. Treasuries are high quality assets that are simple. So why did the market become illiquid for a few minutes? One reason is that the base of holders and buyers is more concentrated. Part of this is the Fed holding large amounts of virtually every issue of US Treasury debt from their QE strategy. Another part is increasing concentration on the buyside. Concentration among banks, asset managers, and insurance companies has risen over the last decade. Exchange-traded products have further added to concentration. Other factors include that 10-year Treasuries are long assets. The option of holding to maturity means you will have to wait longer than most can wait, and most institutional investors don’t even have an average 10-year holding period. Also, presumably, at least for a short period of time, investors had similar strategies for trading 10-year Treasuries. So, when the market had a large influx of buyers, aided by computer algorithms, the prices of the bonds rose rapidly. When prices do move rapidly, those that make their money off of brokering trades take some quick losses, and back away. They may still technically be willing to buy or sell, but the transaction sizes drop and the bid/ask spread widens. This is true regardless of the market that is panicking. It takes a while for market players to catch up with a fast market. Who wants to catch a falling (or rising) knife? Given the interconnectedness of many fixed income markets who could be certain who was driving the move, and when the buyers would be sated? For the crisis to end, real money sellers had to show up and sell 10-year Treasuries, and sit on cash. Stuff the buyers full until they can’t bear to buy any more. The real money sellers had to have a longer time horizon, and say, “We know that over the next 10 years, we will be easily able to beat a sub-2% return, and we can live with the mark-to-market risk.” So, though they sold, they were likely expressing a long-term view that interest rates have some logical minimum level. Once the market started moving the other way, it moved back quickly. If anything, traders learning there was no significant new information were willing to sell all the way to levels near the market opening levels. Post-crisis, things returned to “normal.” I wouldn’t make all that much out of this incident. Complex markets can occasionally burp. That is another aspect of a normal market, because it teaches investors not to be complacent. Don’t leave the computer untended. Don’t use market orders, particularly on large trades. Be sure you will be happy getting executed on your limit order, even if the market blows far past that. Graspy regulators and politicians see incidents like this as an opportunity for more regulations. That’s not needed. It wasn’t needed in October 1987, nor in May 2009. It is not needed now. Losses from errors are a great teacher. I’ve suffered my own losses on misplaced market orders and learned from them. Instability in markets is a good thing, even if a lot of price movement is just due to “noise traders.” As for the Treasury market – the yield on the securities will always serve as an aid to mean reversion, and if there is no fundamental change, it will happen quickly. There was no liquidity problem on October 15th. There was a problem of a few players mistrading a fast market with no significant news. By its nature, for a brief amount of time, that will look illiquid. But it is proper for those conditions, and gave way to a normal market, with normal liquidity rapidly. That’s market resilience in the face of some foolish market players. That the foolish players took losses was a good thing. Fundamentals always take over, and businesslike investors profit then. What could be better? One final aside: other articles in this irregular series can be found here .

The Facts On China’s June Correction

Summary China’s onshore markets experienced a pullback in June. The underlying factors that caused the onshore markets to rise are still intact. The government has met the pullback with a powerful intervention. July 16, 2015 – A strong stock market benefits China’s key policy goals: Renminbi, RMB, internationalization, increased domestic consumption, and unlocking shareholder value in state owned enterprises. The markets’ more prominent role in helping China achieve these goals is one explanation for the rise in the onshore markets, which are up 110% over the past year1. Due to this increased emphasis, China met the recent pullback with a powerful intervention. The cause of the pullback and the Chinese government’s actions to contain it can be confusing to investors outside of China. In this piece we provide an up to date overview of the onshore markets and outline why we believe China is still an attractive investment opportunity. Recent Events Stock investing in China is still a new concept and the majority of Chinese households have less money in the markets than those in the United States. Market exposure on a household basis has yet to be institutionalized in China like it is in the U.S., for instance there are no 401k plans in onshore China, thus the market’s drop adversely effects a smaller subset of the population in China than it would in the United States. In the U.S. the savings rate is 5.1%2 with 25% of net worth going into the markets3. In China the savings rate is an impressive 50%4, however, according to China economic research firm PRC Macro, the average household only has 4.4% of their net worth5 invested in the stock market. Based on this comparison, China’s household participation in the stock market compared to its savings rate is relatively low. China’s leadership understands this disparity and has encouraged its people to invest in the capital markets to bring their participation rates up to par with developed nations and to institutionalize the market. This trend is apt to continue in the years to come, which could act as tailwind for investors. Reasons for the June pullback With such a massive influx of investors into the markets as China is currently experiencing, there is bound to be some measure of volatility. The adoption of margin by investors with little stock market experience struck us as imprudent. We believe overextension of margin was the primary cause of the June pullback. Individual retail investors, who represent 85%7 of the market in onshore China, invested heavily in small cap stocks. These individuals bought on margin, leveraging their capital to cover the costs. Before the decrease in Chinese stock prices in June, brokerage margin increased as the onshore market performed well over the last year. In addition, as the markets continued to grow, the use of over the counter, OTC, margin increased. OTC margin is money leant by non-brokerage firms outside of the regulated markets and, in the case of China, allowed leverage upwards of three to five times the money deposited. While it is difficult to gauge exactly how much OTC margin was in the markets at their peak, between the months of March and May of 2015, it is estimated to have been between 1.5 and 2 trillion RMB8. When a large number of Initial Public Offerings,IPOs, and secondary offerings took place in June, Chinese investors started selling their small cap shares in order to invest in the IPOs. As a result, supply overwhelmed demand and triggered a cascade of selling that led to a significant amount of margin calls. A margin call occurs when a broker asks for more capital from an investor to cover a decrease in value of a stock. Halted and Suspended Securities In order to prevent large numbers of investors from being forced to sell due to compounding margin calls, regulators took the unprecedented measure of allowing companies, particularly small cap companies, to voluntarily halt trading in their stocks. The regulators realized that OTC margin, which is outside the scope of their regulatory purview, had the potential to be a systematic threat to the stock market. While stocks halted, regulators could deleverage both brokerage and OTC margin accounts. OTC margin has fallen 66% in the last several weeks alone due to this effort.9 Our partners in onshore China have reported that the OTC margin business has been largely shut down. While many press reports highlighted the number of stocks halted they failed to show the size of these companies. According to Bloomberg, As of July 15’s close in China the number was 10. 75% (2,211 stocks) are trading, which is 88% of the 6.5 trillion total market cap for the 2951 stocks listed in the onshore exchanges. 4% (132) are suspended, representing 4% of market cap. 18% (540) are halted, representing 8% of the market cap 2% (68) are inactive, representing 0% of the market cap; these companies were scheduled to have initial public offerings but had their IPOs suspended due to a moratorium on new IPOs. Our portfolios hold predominantly large cap stocks and some mid-cap stocks. Media reports on halted stocks were correct in the number of stocks halted, however, they failed to note the majority of these halts were small or micro cap stocks. Valuations We previously stated that we believe investors should avoid small cap stocks due to high valuations. Even today the ChiNext stocks, a segment of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange that represents small cap growth companies, are two standard deviations11 above their average price-to-equity,P/E12 of 55 at 86, though down from their June 3 high of 14713. The MSCI China A International Index currently have a forward P/E of 15 while the combined Shanghai and Shenzhen Composite has a P/E of 17 versus its ten-year average of 1915. Where do we go from here? While not of the same magnitude as 2008, there are parallels between China’s recent correction and the U.S. housing crisis. In both cases, standards amongst lenders varied and in many cases decreased over time. Just as no document home mortgages in the U.S. were allowed despite rational thinking, retail investors in onshore China were able to obtain questionable amounts of leverage. Ultimately the U.S. housing market fell and regulators instituted new standards. In China regulators are instituting new policies prohibiting OTC margin. We hope means based testing for the use of margin at brokerage houses is also instituted. Much like how the U.S. housing crisis and subsequent recovery affected certain geographic areas more than other areas, China’s stock market is not apt to see a uniform rise. We believe investors should continue to underweight small cap securities due to high valuations and instead favor large cap stocks, which have returned to their historical average valuations15. We believe China will continue to pursue policies that aid its ascent as a global economic power. China is focused on increasing global competitiveness of State Owned Enterprises, we believe these stocks have potential to continue to perform well. Between China’s continued development policies and MSCI’s forthcoming inclusion of onshore equities, we believe investors should seek greater exposure to onshore China. As China evolves from being a retail market dominated by individual investors to an institutional oriented market like that of the United States we believe its markets may continue to grow and perform well. 1 Data based on MSCI China A International Index as of 7/14/15. 2 Data from World Bank as of 2013. Savings rate: The amount of money, expressed as a percentage or ratio, that one deducts from his/her disposable personal income to set aside as a nest egg or for retirement. 3 U.S. Federal Reserve. “Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts” June 11, 2015. 4 Data from World Bank as of 2013. 5 Data from PRC Macro as of 4/28/2015. 6 Margin: The purchase of an asset by paying the margin and borrowing the balance from a bank or broker. Buying on margin refers to the initial or down payment made to the broker for the asset being purchased. The collateral for the funds being borrowed is the marginable securities in the investor’s account. Before buying on margin, an investor needs to open a margin account with the broker. 7 Data from the Shanghai Stock Exchange as of 2012 8 Ai Jingwei. “OTC how to raise capital with the stock market”, Sina Finance, 7/14/2015. 9 Percent change calculated from data reported by Sina Finance (source 7) and People’s Daily, “From The CSRC: The Amount of Off-Balance Sheet Lending is Close to 500 Billion, 15 Billion Forced to Close Shop”, People’s Daily, 6/30/2015. Previous amount of margin was approximately 1.5 trillion RMB between March to May 2015 according to Sina Finance. The current amount of margin is now 0.5 trillion RMB as of 6/30/2015 according to People’s Daily. 10 Data from Bloomberg as of 7/15/2015. 11 Standard Deviation: A measure of the dispersion of a set of data from its mean. The more spread apart the data, the higher the deviation. Standard deviation is calculated as the square root of variance. 12 Price-to-equity: A ratio used to compare a stock’s market value to its book value. It is calculated by dividing the current closing price of the stock by the latest quarter’s book value per share. 13 Data from Bloomberg as of 7/14/2015. 14 Data from Bloomberg as of 7/14/2015. 15 Data from Bloomberg as of 7/14/2015. Disclosure: I am/we are long KBA, KEMP, KWEB, KFYP. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: ©2015 KraneShares Carefully consider the Funds’ investment objectives, risk factors, charges and expenses before investing. This and additional information can be found in the Funds’ prospectus, which may be obtained here: KBA, KFYP, KWEB, KCNY, KEMP Read the prospectus carefully before investing. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. There can be no assurance that a Fund will achieve its stated objectives. The Funds focus their investments primarily with Chinese issuers and issuers with economic ties to China. The Funds are subject to political, social or economic instability within China which may cause decline in value. Fluctuations in currency of foreign countries may have an adverse effect to domestic currency values. Emerging markets involve heightened risk related to the same factors as well as increase volatility and lower trading volume. Current and future holdings are subject to risk. Narrowly focused investments and investments in smaller companies typically exhibit higher volatility. Internet companies are subject to rapid changes in technology, worldwide competition, rapid obsolescence of products and services, loss of patent protections, evolving industry standards and frequent new product productions. Such changes may have an adverse impact on performance. The ability of the KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A ETF to achieve its investment objective is dependent on the continuous availability of A Shares and the ability to obtain, if necessary, additional A Shares quota. If the Fund is unable to obtain sufficient exposure due to the limited availability of A Share quota, the Fund could seek exposure to the component securities of the Underlying Index by investing in depositary receipts. The Fund may, in some cases, also invest in Hong Kong listed versions of the component securities and B Shares issued by the same companies that issue A Shares in the Underlying Index. The Fund may also use derivatives or invest in ETFs that provide comparable exposures. The ability of the KraneShares FTSE Emerging Markets Plus ETF to achieve its investment objective is dependent, in part, on the continuous availability of A Shares through the Fund’s investment in the KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A Share ETF and that fund’s continued access to the China A Shares market. If such access is lost or becomes inadequate to meet its investment needs, it may have a material adverse effect on the ability of the Fund to achieve its investment objective because shares of the KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A Share ETF may no longer be available for investment by the Fund, may trade at a premium to NAV, or may no longer be a suitable investment for the Fund. The KraneShares FTSE Emerging Markets Plus ETF and KraneShares Bosera MSCI China A Share ETF may be concentrated in the financial services sector. Those companies may be adversely impacted by many factors, including, government regulations, economic conditions, credit rating downgrades, changes in interest rates, and decreased liquidity in credit markets. This sector has experienced significant losses in the recent past, and the impact of more stringent capital requirements and of recent or future regulation on any individual financial company or on the sector as a whole cannot be predicted. These ETFs may also invest in derivatives. Investments in derivatives, including swap contracts and index futures in particular, may pose risks in addition to those associated with investing directly in securities or other investments, including illiquidity of the derivatives, imperfect correlations with underlying investments, lack of availability and counterparty risk. The use of swap agreements entails certain risks, which may be different from, and possibly greater than, the risks associated with investing directly in the underlying asset. The KraneShares E Fund China Commercial Paper ETF is subject to interest rate risk, which is the chance that bonds will decline in value as interest rates rise. It is also subject to income risk, call risk, credit risk, and Chinese credit rating risks. The components of the securities held by the Fund will be rated by Chinese credit rating agencies, which may use different criteria and methodology than U.S. entities or international credit rating agencies. The Fund may invest in high yield and unrated securities, whose prices are generally more sensitive to adverse economic changes. As such, their prices may be more volatile. The Fund is subject to industry concentration risk and is nondiversified. The KraneShares E Fund China Commercial paper ETF invests in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt. Investments in sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt securities involve special risks, including the availability of sufficient foreign exchange on the date a payment is due, the relative size of the debt service burden to the economy as a whole, and the government debtor’s policy towards the International Monetary Fund and the political constraints to which a government debtor may be subject. In order to qualify for the favorable tax treatment generally available to regulated investment companies, the Fund must satisfy certain income and asset diversification requirements each year. If the Fund were to fail to qualify as a regulated investment company, it would be taxed in the same manner as an ordinary corporation, and distributions to its shareholders would not be deductible by the Fund in computing its taxable income. Narrowly focused investments typically exhibit higher volatility. Internet companies are subject to rapid changes in technology, worldwide competition, rapid obsolescence of products and services, loss of patent protections, evolving industry standards and frequent new product productions. Such changes may have an adverse impact on performance. The KraneShares ETFs are distributed by SEI Investments Distribution Company, 1 Freedom Valley Drive, Oaks, PA 19456, which is not affiliated with Krane Funds Advisors, LLC, the Investment Adviser for the Fund.

Why The Law Of Large Numbers Dictates Effective Risk Management

Summary It is effective risk management that determines profitability rather than the incidence of wins to losses. The law of large numbers suggests that a larger number of trades with a positive reward to risk ratio will be more effective than a smaller number of trades. In this regard, it is possible for a trader to be “wrong” a majority of the time while continuing to remain profitable. “It’s not whether you’re right or wrong that’s important, but how much money you make when you’re right and how much you lose when you’re wrong.” – George Soros The entire dynamic of successful trading could probably be summed up in the above sentence. When I started out trading forex, I was overly concerned with getting the trades right. However, I have come to learn that the most successful traders are not the ones who are right all the time; rather they are the ones who know how to manage their risk most effectively . For instance, the odds that a plane will crash somewhere in the world are 1 in 11 million. Indeed, this is a very low probability. However, when one considers the vast number of flights that take off and land every day, it is sadly almost inevitable that there will be a plane crash at some point in the future. The odds of a golfer getting a hole in one are 5,000 to 1. However, across the world there are far more than 5,000 games of golf being played in a single day; it is therefore almost inevitable that a player somewhere in the world will manage to score a hole in one today. The above phenomenon is known as the law of large numbers ; where an event with a low probability of occurring on its own has a higher probability of occurring when subjected to a large number of trials. This has important implications for risk management, and moreover it demonstrates how a trader can still be wrong the majority of the time while continuing to be profitable. Let us take this as an example. Suppose that we have eight forex trades in a particular month, with a 1:3 risk-reward ratio, or a stop loss of 50 pips and a take profit of 150 pips. For each trade (discounting technical or fundamental factors), the odds are greater that we will make a loss rather than a profit. However, the profit on each trade far outweighs the potential loss. With a 1:3 risk-reward ratio, we have a 75 percent chance of the price hitting our stop loss with a 25 percent chance of it hitting our take profit ratio. However, this also means that only two of the eight trades need to be profitable for us to breakeven. Moreover, the law of large numbers dictates that at least two of our trades are indeed likely to be profitable. 1-(1-p)^number of trials where p is the probability of an event occurring In the above instance, we need at least three of our trades to hit the take profit point in order to be profitable. Given that we have a 0.25 probability of this happening, our probabilities are as follows: 1-(0.25)^1 = 0.25 1-(0.25)^2 = 0.4375 1-(0.25)^3 = 0.5781 1-(0.25)^4 = 0.6835 1-(0.25)^5 = 0.7626 1-(0.25)^6 = 0.8220 1-(0.25)^7 = 0.8665 1-(0.25)^8 = 0.8998 We see that with eight trades being placed, we have an 89 percent probability that at least one trade will hit our take profit point. Given that we need three trades to be profitable: 0.8998^3 = 72.85 percent probability of three trades being profitable In this regard, we see that the law of large numbers provides us with an attractive risk-reward set up in that it limits our downside while maximizing our upside. Moreover, we can be wrong more often than we are right and still remain profitable. One of the big reasons why most new traders fail is the inability to manage risk effectively. For instance, if we decided to set up trades with a high risk and low return, e.g. 150-pip stop loss and 50-pip profit, then even if we were right a majority of the time it would only take a couple of losing trades to wipe out our winnings. Ultimately, being a successful trader is not always about being right. It is about managing your risk effectively. As we can see, the law of large numbers plays a key role in doing so. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.