Tag Archives: marketplace

The Unreliability Of Human Judgment

Human decision-making is greatly influenced by individualistic preferences, making it very unreliable in most situations. We tend to foolishly project our own biased opinions onto other people, which can adversely affect the quality of our judgment. A statistical approach to decision-making, which requires little, if any, subjectivity, is a lot more robust and reliable. Back in the late 1990s, a struggling author and divorced mother on welfare was trying to publish her first book — a story about an orphan boy wizard. It was rejected by 12 publishers, and her agent warned her that she would “Never make money writing children’s books.” This prediction would prove to be spectacularly wrong. As it ironically turned out, 13 was her lucky number when a small London publishing house reluctantly took a chance and agreed to print it. That book, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (or Sorcerer’s Stone for the American version) , went on to sell over 100 million copies, making it one of the best-selling books in history. And that author, J.K. Rowling, would eventually write six more books in the Harry Potter series, which collectively sold over 450 million copies and were adapted into a blockbuster film franchise. Not only did J.K. Rowling make money writing children’s books, it in fact made her rich. Stories like this are not uncommon. A publisher turned down George Orwell’s legendary novel, Animal Farm , explaining it was “Impossible to sell animal stories in the U.S.A.” Decca Records turned down a contract with the Beatles, saying “We don’t like their sound, and guitar music is on the way out.” Walt Disney was fired by a newspaper editor because he “lacked imagination and had no good ideas.” Oprah Winfrey got fired from a job as a news reporter because “she couldn’t separate her emotions from her stories.” Arnold Schwarzenegger was told he’d never be a movie star because “his body, name, and accent were all too weird.” These success stories should really make us question the reliability of human judgment. How could a dozen experienced publishers deem the manuscript for the first Harry Potter book unworthy of publication? Why is it that a large recording company, whose job it was to seek out talented musicians, couldn’t recognize the potential of the Beatles? What took Hollywood so long to recognize the star potential of Arnold Schwarzenegger? The answer is simple — human judgment is influenced by individualistic preferences, making it an unreliable predictor of future outcomes. Let’s say a publishers reviewing the original Harry Potter manuscript happened to dislike stories about magic for some reason, this bias against magic would largely determine whether the book gets published or not. But just because one individual, or even a small group of individuals, dislike a book, that doesn’t mean the book won’t become a best-seller. We should never project our own subjective opinions onto others, because it can adversely affect our judgment and decision making. This is something I learned in high school, when my friend and I once turned in identical essays. Luckily for us, not only did our overworked teacher not notice, she gave my essay a 95 (an A) and my friend’s essay an 82 (a B). Perhaps she just liked me more which subconsciously influenced her grading decision (that’s what I told my friend anyway). Or maybe she was in an unusually good mood at the time she was grading my paper. As crazy as it sounds, the second explanation could in fact be true. It’s been shown that even judges, who are trained to be objective, rule more favorably after lunch breaks (because food puts them in a good mood). The inherent subjectivity involved in grading can be quite problematic since a student’s future depends on such imprecise measurements. In one study , for example, researchers collected 120 term papers and had each paper scored independently by eight faculty members. The resulting grades sometimes varied by two or more letter grades. On average they differed by nearly one letter grade. Given that the average opinion is typically more accurate than most of the individual estimates (i.e., “wisdom of crowds”), the best solution here would be to average the eight independent scores for each paper to derive a more objective overall grade. I once recommend that Seeking Alpha implement something similar. The current editing process is highly subjective. It’s unrealistic to think that an editor, who’s as naturally biased as the publishers that rejected Harry Potter , can distinguish so finely between articles to tag one as, say, an “Editors’ Pick” and another as standard (“Regular” or “Premium”). But by having multiple editors independently reviewing and grading the quality of each article, and then averaging their individual opinions, it would eliminate much of the subjectivity inherent in the editing process. Another subjective measurement that receives more credence than it deserves is the rating of wines. My favorite example is the rating of the 1999 vintage of the Mitchelton Blackwood Park Riesling. One wine rating publication gave it five stars out of five and named it “The Wine of the Year,” while another rated it at the bottom of all wines it reviewed, deeming it “the worst vintage of the decade.” This discrepancy is to be expected, of course, given that wine ratings are based on unreliable, subjective taste perceptions of wine tasters. In one series of experiments , judges at wine competitions were given the same wine at different times throughout the day; the results showed that judges are wildly inconsistent in their evaluation. A wine rated 90 out of 100 on one tasting would often be rated 85 or 95 on the next. This inconsistency explains why the probability that a wine which won a gold medal in one competition would win nothing in others was high; in fact, the medals seemed to be spread around at random. This should make you think twice before purchasing an expensive bottle of wine next time. So far we’ve seen that all subjective measurements are flawed and unreliable. The best way to fix this problem is to take a more objective, statistical approach to measurement. A well-known example of this is Moneyball , a true story about a low-budget baseball team that leveraged statistics, rather than the subjective beliefs of baseball insiders, to identify players whose skills were being undervalued by other teams. This statistical approach to player selection revolutionized the game, and has since been implemented in other sports as well. Credit card companies have also learned to appreciate the power of simple statistical measurements. In the past, human judgment was the primary factor used to evaluate a borrower’s credit worthiness. Not only was this a slow process, it was also very subjective and created a lot of variability in the results. But then a statistical formula known as a “credit score” came along and put a solid number on how risky you were to lend to. The investment business is another area where statistics has gained a strong foothold over the past couple of decades. Investors who employ statistical trading methods are usually called “quants.” The world’s most successful quantitative hedge fund is Renaissance Technologies, which uses elaborate algorithms to identify and profit from inefficiencies in various highly liquid instruments around the world. But investors don’t need to be as sophisticated as Renaissance in order to reap benefits from quantitative investing — even very simple statistical models can work quite well. One of the most well-known is the “Magic Formula,” a model that ranks stocks based on just two variables: return on capital (measures quality) and earnings yield (measures cheapness). Researchers have conducted a number of studies on the Magic Formula and found it to be a market beater, both domestically and abroad. But even a simpler one-variable model, which only uses the cheapness metric, has also been shown to beat the market over the long run. The reason quant-style value investing works is because, unlike a more traditional approach to stock selection, it doesn’t attempt to calculate a company’s “intrinsic value” by foolishly attempting to forecast its long-term financial performance. Instead, it systematically buys the cheapest — and often most hated — stocks based purely on historical data (a very contrarian approach). Another problem with the concept of intrinsic value is that there’s absolutely nothing “intrinsic” about it. It’s not an objective measure at all. It depends entirely on the person doing the valuation, just like the quality of wine depends on the person doing the tasting. This is largely because risk preferences vary from person to person, and even in the same person from time to time. This was discovered by neuroscientists studying professional traders. They found that fluctuating hormone levels — like testosterone and cortisol — can wildly alter a trader’s risk taking or risk aversion. And since these shifting risk preferences directly affect discount rates, which determine the present (or intrinsic) value of stocks, it means that intrinsic value isn’t static — it’s actually in constant flux. Traditional stock picking is flawed in other ways as well. Even the mere act of owning a stock, particularly one you’ve spent considerable time researching, can create emotional attachment, leading you to value it more than you would if you didn’t own it. Inheriting a stock can also create a similar emotional attachment. A friend of mine once inherited a large number of shares in General Motors (NYSE: GM ). When I advised him to sell some shares and diversify the proceeds, he said he “Can’t bring himself to part with his grandfather’s gift.” Unfortunately for him, this “gift” became worthless a year later when the company filed for bankruptcy. This irrational tendency to overvalue something just because we own it is called the “endowment effect.” In residential real estate sales, for instance, there is, on average, a 12% gap between what the owner asks and what the average buyer is willing to pay (in a bad market the gap exceeds 30%!). This is because owners truly believe their homes are worth more. Perhaps they’ve lived there for a long time and have many happy memories associated with that house. The buyer, on the other hand, is more likely to care about things like the black mold growing on the ceiling. It’s just difficult for us to see that the person on the other side of the transaction, buyer or seller, isn’t seeing the world as we see it — value is largely subjective. As explained throughout this article, most of our decisions, both big and small, are guided by our subjective emotions and perspectives. This is usually an automatic cognitive process. Psychologists call it “System 1” thinking, which is fast, instinctive, and nearly effortless. The opposite of this is “System 2” thinking, which is slow, deliberate, and effortful. Our brains tend to be lazy, always looking for the easiest way out, so System 1 guides the majority of our day-to-day decisions. And most of the time it’s actually quite effective. For instance, ever drive home without remembering the exact details of the trip? That’s your System 1 at work. But sometimes this type of fast thinking can lead to poor decisions. Consider this famous example: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? The most common answer — and the one suggested by our System 1 — is 10¢. But the real answer is actually 5¢. It requires the slow, effortful thinking associated with System 2 to get it right. Most people simply don’t want to think that hard, so they give the first answer that comes to mind. These same mistakes occur in every domain. In sports, for instance, decisions worth millions of dollars are made on the basis of a coach’s hunch or a scout’s gut feeling. This explains why there’s a long history of so-called “promising” athletes that never realized their full potential. Moneyball showed us that traditional scouting often focused more on the so-called “eye test” (i.e., if someone “looked” like a major leaguer) than on a more objective, statistical analysis of player potential. I myself was twice offered a full athletic scholarship to play football in college. The funny thing is that I never even played the sport before. The recruiters and coaches — fooled by their quick-thinking System 1 — just assumed that I’d be a good football player because of my size and athleticism. I respectfully decline these generous offers (definitely not worth the injuries). In short, reducing subjectivity is a desirable goal for decision makers of all kinds — from entrepreneurs to investors to individuals dealing with their day-to-day personal problems. However, this isn’t to say that individualistic subjectivity is always a bad thing. There are some situations, mate selection being one of them, where it can be quite useful; beauty is, after all, in the eye of the beholder — it’s subjective and difficult to quantify. However, in most other situations, especially ones involving a financial component to them, subjectivity tends to cause more harm than good. In this particular case, the best way to minimize the probability of being wrong is to leverage the power of a more objective, statistical way of thinking. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Backtesting – A Cautionary Example

Independent research, long/short equity, dividend investing, ETF investing “}); $$(‘#article_top_info .info_content div’)[0].insert({bottom: $(‘mover’)}); } $(‘article_top_info’).addClassName(test_version); } SeekingAlpha.Initializer.onDOMLoad(function(){ setEvents();}); My previous article detailed backtest results for the ETFReplay.com portfolio. Aggregate, risk-adjusted results since 2004 were impressive when compared to a 60/40 Vanguard mutual fund. However, results over the past 2-3 years lagged the benchmark. The test below was conducted using Portfolio123 (“P123″). It uses a similar ranking system to the ETFReplay 6/3/3 system but has a few seemingly “minor” differences: The P123 begins with a similar basket of ETFs, the only difference is the P123 system ranks 15 ETFs instead of 14, with the PowerShares DB Agriculture ETF (NYSEARCA: DBA ) as the extra ETF. The starting date for the P123 test is 12/10/03, which differs from the ETFReplay start date of 1/1/2004. The P123 system rebalances every 4 weeks, instead of at the end of each month. The ETFReplay test assumes equal holdings each month (i.e. rebalancing back to equal weight each month at no cost) while P123 lets positions run so holdings may become unbalanced over time. The P123 test uses the next days closing price of each ETF for the transaction price, compared to the ETFReplay system which uses the same days closing price when each ETF is ranked. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the P123 test accounts for slippage with each transaction, which reduces returns. The slippage for each transaction is calculated based on the average trading volume for each ETF. This is a conservative method for calculating ETF slippage. After accounting for these differences, we see the P123 test shows significantly lower results (as an aside, the benchmark for this test was the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF ( SPY)): Tables and charts courtesy of Portfolio123 (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) However, if we assume zero slippage results improve dramatically. Total and annualized return are significantly higher yet we still see different returns and risk metrics than the ETFReplay test. This can be attributed to a slightly different pool of ETFs, and different rebalancing dates/methodology: (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) The point of this exercise is not to disparage backtests or historical results. Rather, it shows the importance of considering trading costs as well as how changes in test parameters can impact results. Focus on making your tests robust. Run them through multiple time frames with different assumptions and be mindful of data-mining. Finally, be conscious of trading costs and fees! Many brokers now offer commission free ETFs, but taxes and trading slippage can take a big bite out of returns. Disclosures: None Share this article with a colleague

Why Do Individual Investors Underperform?

Bonds, dividend investing, ETF investing, currencies “}); $$(‘#article_top_info .info_content div’)[0].insert({bottom: $(‘mover’)}); } $(‘article_top_info’).addClassName(test_version); } SeekingAlpha.Initializer.onDOMLoad(function(){ setEvents();}); Barry Ritholtz posted a good video discussing whether mutual fund managers are skilled or not. I am not going to discuss the points made in that video, however, it did get me thinking about something. I have found that most mutual funds are closet index funds. That is, the vast majority of mutual funds are not engaged in any sort of strategic asset allocation that differentiates them sufficiently from highly correlated index funds. So, your average XYZ Large Cap fund will tend to have a 85%+ correlation to the S&P 500, but it will charge a much higher fee. Over time this will degrade performance since the mutual fund is basically picking 100-200 stocks inside of a highly correlated 500 stock index and charging you a recurring high fee over time. Vangaurd has shown on multuple occasions that it’s fees, not asset picking skill, that drives underperformance. But what’s interesting about these mutual funds is that even though they can’t beat their index they do tend to beat the average individual investor. This has been well documented in research pieces ( such as this one ), but we also know it’s true thanks to investor surveys like the AAII asset allocation survey. Over the last 30 years AAII has maintained a record of individual investor asset allocations and over this period the average allocation has been: Stock/Stock Funds: 60% Bonds/Bond Funds: 16% Cash: 24% What stands out there is the cash position. Of course, “cash” is a bit of a misnomer in a brokerage account because “cash” is usually just T-Bills. The kicker is, cash (or short-term bonds) has been a big drag on performance over the last 30 years. The AAII investor with an average 24% cash position generated just a 8.4% annualized return relative to a 9.1% return for the average investor who invested that 24% in a bond aggregate (your standard 60/40). And keep in mind that this is before accounting for all the inefficiencies documented in the aforementioned research. The interesting point here is that most professional money managers don’t hold a lot of cash at all times. The latest data from ICI showed that the average equity fund had just 3.5% cash. Since bonds and stocks just about always beat cash over a 30 year period we know that the average individual investor with a 24% cash position MUST, by definition, do worse than even the closet indexing professionals. This doesn’t mean the closet indexers are “skilled”. It just means they benefit from being in the game more. Basically, you can’t score if you aren’t even on the field and while closet indexing mutual funds are worse at scoring than their benchmark, they score more often than individuals because the individuals spend too much time out of the game. So, the question is, why do individual investors tend to hold so much cash? I have a few guesses: Individuals are inherently short-term in their thinking because they know, intuitively, that their financial lives are a series of short-terms inside of a long-term. This short-term perspective is a totally rational reaction to uncertain financial markets. A high cash balance provides the ultimate sense of certainty. This is a silly perspective, however, because informed market participants know that financial asset market returns tend to become more predictable over longer periods of time. This does not mean, however, that we should necessarily apply the textbook idea of the “long-term” to our portfolios as this isn’t always consistent with our actual financial lives. This short-term thinking leads most investors to churn their accounts, pay high fees and pay high taxes. Again, it’s an attempt to create certainty in an inherently uncertain financial world. But the attempt to take control in the short-term generally results in lots of detrimental activity that hurts performance. I tend to be prefer a cyclical timeframe because it captures the best of both worlds – it can be tax and fee efficient without taking the irrational textbook “long-term” perspective. This raises a more interesting question. Can this behavior be fixed? I’m not so certain. In a world where we’re prone to thinking in the short-term the idea of “long-term” and even medium term investing is very difficult for most people to maintain. But what it does show is that more investors need to be aware of their behavioral biases and understand the basic arithmetic of asset allocation . You might not become a global macro asset allocation expert, but you can avoid making many of the short-term mistakes that lead to this disparity in performance. Sources: Share this article with a colleague