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Solid Income Company With A Dividend Increase Coming Soon: American Electric Power

Summary American Electric Power has an excellent total return over the last 33-month test period. American Electric Power’s dividend is 3.9% and has been increased nine of the last ten years. American Electric Power can continue its steady upward trend of approximately 4% as it focuses on its $12.2 billion plan for regulated transmission and distribution assets. This article is about American electric Power (NYSE: AEP ) and why it’s an income company that’s being looked at in The Good Business Portfolio. American Electric Power Company is a utility holding company. The Good Business Portfolio Guidelines, total return, earnings and company business will be looked at. Good Business Portfolio Guidelines. American electric Power passes 10 of 10 Good Business Portfolio Guidelines. These guidelines are only used to filter companies to be considered in the portfolio. There are many good business companies that don’t break many of these guidelines but will still not be considered for the portfolio at this time. For a complete set of the guidelines, please see my article ” The Good Business Portfolio: All 24 Positions .” These guidelines provide me with a balanced portfolio of income, defensive and growing companies that keeps me ahead of the Dow average. American Electric Power is a large-cap company with a capitalization of $26.4 billion. AEP provides electric utility services to about 5.348 million customers in 11 states over a total area of 197,500 square miles. The company derived 25% of its consolidated system retail revenues in 2014 from its utilities in Ohio, 14% from Texas, 13% from Virginia, 11% from West Virginia, 11% from Oklahoma, 10% from Indiana, 5% from Louisiana, 5% from Kentucky and the remainder from other states. American Electric Power has a dividend yield of 3.9% and its dividend has been increased for nine of the last ten years. The payout ratio is moderate at 60%. American Electric Power therefore is not a growth story at this time but may be as the steady growth of the company continues. The dividend is expected to be increased at the end of October and is estimated to be increased $0.02/quarter or a 4% increase. American Electric Power income is good at $3.54/share which leaves AEP plenty of cash flow, allowing it to pay its high dividend and have a enough left over for its capital campaign I also require the CAGR going forward to be able to cover my yearly expenses. My dividends provide 2.8% of the portfolio as income and I need 2.2% more for a yearly distribution of 5%. American Electric Power has a three-year CAGR of 5% just meeting my requirement. Looking back five years $10,000 invested five years ago would now be worth over $18,255 today (from S&P IQ). This makes AEP a good investment for the income investor with its steady 4% dividend and earnings growth. American Electric Power’s S&P Capital IQ has a three-star rating or Hold with a price target of $55.0. This makes AEP fairly priced at present and a good choice for the income investor. Total Return and Yearly Dividend The Good Business Portfolio Guidelines are just a screen to start with and not absolute rules. When I look at a company, the total return is a key parameter to see if it fits the objective of the Good Business Portfolio. American Electric Power did better than the Dow baseline in my 33.0 month test compared to the Dow average. I chose the 33.0 month test period (starting January 1, 2013) because it includes the great year of 2013, the moderate year of 2014 and the losing year of 2015 YTD. I have had comments about why I do not compare the total return to the S&P 500 average. I use the Dow average because the Good Business Portfolio has six Dow companies in it and is weighted more to the Dow average than the S&P 500. Modeling the Dow average is not an objective of the portfolio but just happened by using the 10 guidelines as a filter for company selection. The total return makes American Electric Power appropriate for the growth investor with the 4% dividend good for the income investor. The dividend is lower than average and covered and has been paid and increased each year for eight years of the last ten years. DOW’s 32.5-month total return baseline is 25.71% Company Name 33.0 Month total return Difference from DOW baseline Yearly Dividend percentage American Electric Power 42.15% 16.44% 3.9% Last Quarter’s Earnings For the last quarter (July 2015) American Electric Power reported earnings that beat expected at $0.88 compared to last year at $0.80 and expected at $0.80 and revenue missed by $180 million. This was a good report. Earnings for the next quarter are expected to be at $0.95 compared to last year at $1.01. The steady growth in AEP should provide a company that will continue to have slightly above average total return and provide steady income for the income investor. Business Overview American Electric Power Company, Inc. is a utility holding company. It operates in five segments. The vertically integrated utilities segment generates, transmits and distributes electricity through AEP Generating Company, Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Southwestern Electric Power Company and Wheeling Power Company. The Transmission and Distribution Utilities segment transmits and distributes electricity through Ohio Power Company, AEP Texas Central Company and AEP Texas North Company. The Generation and Marketing segment’s subsidiaries consist of non-utility generating assets, a wholesale energy trading and marketing business and a retail supply and energy management business. AEP Transmission Holdco is a holding company for AEP’s transmission joint ventures and AEP Transmission Company, LLC. The AEP River Operations segment transports liquid, coal and dry bulk commodities. With electric usage increasing in the United States the diversity of American Electric Power assets should allow the company to continue its growth and safely pay a moderately increasing dividend. Takeaways and Recent Portfolio Changes American Electric Power is a income company. Considering AEP’s steady slow growth and its total return better than the Dow average, AEP is a buy for the income investor. The only negative for AEP is when the Fed starts raising interest rates that will cause rising interest expense, giving AEP a headwind for a couple of years. AEP is not being added to The Good Business Portfolio right now since there are no open slots in the portfolio the Good business Portfolio is limited to 25 positions and AEP will be considered when there is an open slot. Of course this is not a recommendation to buy or sell and you should always do your own research and talk to your financial advisor before any purchase or sale. This is how I manage my IRA retirement account and the opinions on the companies are my own.

A Closer Look At Suburban Propane Partners’ Results And Cash Flows As Of 6/30/15

SPH benefited from lower oil prices; it did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs thus increasing gross margin to 57% in 3QFY15 . Distributions coverage at 1.09x in the TTM ended 6/30/15; sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the prior TTM period. SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months. SPH may not provide substantial distribution growth and may underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels. But the ~10% yield appears secure, the valuation multiple is lower, and it is less leveraged. This article focuses on some of the key facts and trends revealed by results recently reported by Suburban Propane Partners LP (NYSE: SPH ). The quarters are noted with an FY designation because SPH’s fiscal year ends in September. Its third quarter of fiscal 2015 ended on 6/30/15 and is designated as 3QFY15. The article evaluates the sustainability of the partnership’s Distributable Cash Flow (“DCF”) and assesses whether SPH is financing its distributions via issuance of new units or debt. SPH is organized into 3 principal business segments. The propane segment, which generates the bulk of SPH’s revenues and cash flows, is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of propane to residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural customers and, to a lesser extent, wholesale distribution to large industrial end users. The fuel oil and refined fuels segment is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of fuel oil, diesel, kerosene and gasoline to residential and commercial customers for use primarily as a source of heat in homes and buildings. The natural gas and electricity segment is engaged in the marketing of natural gas and electricity to residential and commercial customers in the deregulated energy markets of New York and Pennsylvania. SPH is also engaged in other activities, primarily the sale, installation and servicing of a wide variety of home comfort equipment, particularly in the areas of heating and ventilation. SPH’s business is highly seasonal. It typically sells ~ 2/3 of its retail propane volume and ~ 3/4 of its retail fuel oil volume during the peak heating season of October through March. Consequently, the bulk of sales and operating profits are concentrated in the quarters ending December and March (the first and second quarters of the fiscal year). In the quarters ended June and September SPH typically reports losses. Cash flows and DCF coverage ratios are typically highest during the quarters ending March and June; this is when customers pay for product purchased during the winter heating season. SPH’s profitability is largely dependent on volumes generated by its retail propane operations and on the gross margin it achieves on propane sales – the difference between retail sales price and product cost. Table 1 shows volumes and gross margins for the 8 most recent quarters: (click to enlarge) Table 1: Figures in $ Millions, except gallons and percentages. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Volumes and earnings for 3QFY15 were adversely affected by unseasonably warm weather during much of 3QFY15 (16% warmer than normal and 6% warmer than 3QFY14 in areas served by SPH). In addition, the timing of the much colder than normal temperatures in March 2015 led to additional deliveries during 2QFY15, obviating the need for further deliveries in 3QFY15 to many customers. Propane prices in 3QFY15 fluctuated between $0.32-$0.57 per gallon and, on average, declined by 55.9% vs. 2QFY15, in line with the dramatic declines in crude oil and natural gas prices as prices. Lower propane prices benefit SPH’s customers and affect SPH by decreasing both its revenues and cost of goods sold. The impact on gross margin may vary; in 3QFY15 gross margin increased to 57% of revenues compared to 46% in 3QFY14 because SPH did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs. However, gross margin declined in absolute dollar terms ($126 million vs. $136 million) due to lower volumes. DCF and adjusted earnings before interest, depreciation & amortization and income tax expenses (“Adjusted EBITDA”) are the primary measures typically used master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) to evaluate their operating results. Making comparisons between MLPs is difficult because of lack of standard definitions these terms (a recent article discusses some examples). It is even more so in the case of SPH because it does not measure its results in terms of DCF and does not provide DCF data. However, SPH does provide Adjusted EBITDA figures: (click to enlarge) Table 2: Figures in $ Millions except per unit amounts, percent change and gallons sold. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Net income included expenses of $1.1 million and $4.3 million in 3QFY15 and 3QFY14, respectively, related to integration of the retail propane business acquired from Inergy L.P for ~$1.9 billion in August 2012. For 3QFY14, net income also included an $11.6 million loss on debt extinguishment. Adjusted EBITDA excludes the effects of these charges, as well as the unrealized (non-cash) mark-to-market adjustments on derivative instruments. SPH was able to decrease its investment in working capital in the trailing twelve months (“TTM”) ended 6/30/15, with lower commodity prices significantly reducing both inventories and accounts receivable. This resulted in a sharp increase in net cash from operations, as shown in Table 3: Table 3: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. To enable comparison of DCF, investors must generate their own estimates because, as previously noted, SPH does not utilize this metric. Table 4 below provides my estimate of sustainable DCF generated by SPH in the periods under review, as well as my estimate of what SPH’s reported DCF would have been had it adopted a methodology similar to that used by some other MLPs (see article titled ” Distributable Cash Flow” ). Most of the MLPs I follow exclude working capital changes, whether positive or negative, when deriving their reported DCF numbers. This is one of the differences between DCF as is typically reported by MLPs and sustainable DCF. The relevant numbers for SPH are as follows: Table 4: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. The two corresponding coverage ratios are as follows: Table 5: Figures in $ Millions except coverage ratio. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. For the TTM ended 6/30/15 there were no material differences between DCF (excluding the impact of working capital changes and risk management activities, as it is generally reported by MLPs) and what I call sustainable DCF. Coverage of distributions ratio was positive (above 1x). Sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the TTM ended 6/30/14, primarily due to $82 million that was required for working capital in that earlier period. Table 6 presents a simplified cash flow statement that nets certain items (e.g., acquisitions against dispositions, debt incurred vs. repaid) and separates cash generation from cash consumption in order to get a clear picture of how distributions have been funded. It provides further insights on changes in coverage ratios. (click to enlarge) Table 6: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Table 6 indicates that net cash from operations, less maintenance capital expenditures, exceeded distributions by $104 million in the TTM ended 6/30/15, but fell short of covering distributions by $63 million in the TTM ended 6/30/14. Cash reserves were used to fund the shortfall. Table 7 provides selected metrics comparing the MLPs I follow based on the latest available TTM results. Of course, investment decisions should be take into consideration other parameters as well as qualitative factors. Though not structured as an MLP, I include KMI as its business and operations make it comparable to midstream energy MLPs. As of 08/26/15: Price Current Yield TTM Adjusted EBITDA EV / TTM Adj. EBITDA IDR- Adjusted EV/Adj. EBITDA Long-term debt (net of cash) to TTM Adj. EBITDA Buckeye Partners (NYSE: BPL ) $69.00 6.74% 844 14.7 14.7 4.2 Boardwalk Pipeline Partners (NYSE: BWP ) $12.89 3.10% 672 10.0 10.1 5.2 Enterprise Products Partners (NYSE: EPD ) $27.29 5.57% 5,239 14.6 14.6 4.1 Energy Transfer Partners (NYSE: ETP ) $46.86 8.83% 5,308 9.0 10.4 5.2 Kinder Morgan Inc. (NYSE: KMI ) $30.80 6.36% 7,373 15.2 15.2 6.0 Magellan Midstream Partners (NYSE: MMP ) $68.29 4.33% 1,102 17.1 17.1 3.0 Targa Resources Partners (NYSE: NGLS ) $27.38 12.05% 1,065 9.5 10.7 4.8 Plains All American Pipeline (NYSE: PAA ) $33.23 8.37% 2,229 10.3 12.8 4.3 Suburban Propane Partners $35.74 9.93% 332 9.8 9.8 3.3 Williams Partners (NYSE: WPZ ) $37.52 9.06% 3,681 10.6 12.3 4.6 Table 7: Enterprise Value (“EV”) and TTM EBITDA figures are in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Note that BPL, EPD, KMI, MMP and SPH are not burdened by general partner incentive IDRs that siphon off a significant portion of cash available for distribution to limited partners (typically 48%). Hence multiples of MLPs without IDRs can be expected to be much higher (see Table 4, column 5). In order to make the multiples somewhat more comparable, I added column 6, a second EV/EBITDA column. I derived this column by subtracting IDR payments from EBITDA for the TTM period. Other approaches can also be used to adjust for the IDRs of the relevant MLPs. In prior articles I expressed concerns regarding the susceptibility of SPH to weather conditions, volatile commodity costs, customer migration to natural gas or electricity, difficulties encountered by SPH in passing on higher propane costs to its customers, flat distributions since February 2013 and lack of a clear path to achieving distribution growth. These concerns are still valid, although some are mitigated by lower oil prices. But while the midstream MLP universe has been violently shaken by the decline in the price of oil, SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months (19.5% decrease in unit price vs. a 35.5% decline in the index). Furthermore, the outperformance has been consistent whether measured on a 12-months, year-to-date, 6-months, 3-months or 1-month basis. Although SPH may not offer distribution growth and will probably underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels, its ~10% yield appears secure, its valuation multiple is lower and it is less leveraged (3.3x long terms debt, net of cash, over TTM EBITDA). Investors brave enough to broaden their exposure to midstream energy MLPs should consider initiating, or adding to, positions in SPH. Disclosure: I am/we are long EPD, ETP, MMP, NGLS, PAA. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

MORL: Twice The Risk For Not A Lot Of Fun

Summary MORL is an exchange traded note offered by UBS benchmarked to 2x the Market Vectors Global Mortgage REITs Index. The Market Vectors® Global Mortgage REITs Index is a float-adjusted, market capitalization weighted index designed to measure the performance of publicly-traded mortgage REITs. The index covers 90% the of mortgage REITs. Even though the MORL currently yields an attractive 26% distribution, it has lost significant value since inception, and last year in particular. When we meet with prospective clients, one of the questions we ask is how they have chosen their existing investments, in particular for their retirement accounts. Quite often, especially with do-it-yourself type investors, we will get two answers that make our ears cringe; 1. choosing the funds that have gained the most in the prior year, and 2. choosing the investments that yield the highest dividend or distribution. For anyone who was looking for distributable yield in the past few years, they have most likely come across many leveraged products, including the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN (NYSEARCA: MORL ) which is currently yielding a mind-blowing 26%. Anyone who had invested in this ETN experienced a noticeable disappointment, and absolutely not the under-promise, over-deliver Starbucks (NASDAQ: SBUX ) experience many learned about and love. Let’s dig in. What is the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2x Leveraged Mortgage REIT ETN? MORL is an ETN issued by UBS linked to the monthly compounded 2x leveraged performance of the Market Vectors ® Global Mortgage REITs Index (the “Index”), reduced by the accrued fees. It pays a variable monthly coupon linked to two times the cash distributions, if any, on the index constituents. About the Underlying Index The Market Vectors ® Global Mortgage REITs Index (the “Index”) is a float-adjusted, market capitalization-weighted index designed to measure the performance of publicly traded mortgage REITs. The Index provides 90% coverage of the investable mortgage REIT universe based on strict size and liquidity requirements. The Index is a price return index (i.e., the reinvestment of dividends is not reflected in the Index; rather, any cash distributions on the Index constituents, less any withholding taxes, are reflected in the variable monthly coupon that may be paid to investors of the ETN). The Index was created on August 4, 2011 and has no performance history prior to that date. The UBS ETN was launched on 10/16/2012 with an initial $25.00 per share price. The ETN has an annual expense ratio of .40%. Note: VanEck, the creator of the index also sponsors their own ETF ( Market Vectors Mortgage REIT Income ETF) following this index, trading under the ticker symbol (NYSEARCA: MORT ). It is an ETF that does not employ any leverage. Performance The premise of this product is certainly intriguing, with twice the income of an asset class that is supposed to be safer than typical equities. During times of financial stability, this works out quite well. Unfortunately, mortgage REITs like BDCs and closed-end funds get thrown out with the bathwater during sell-offs and market corrections, without regards that the underlying assets may be sound and stable. Let me explain. The problem with any pooled, daily tradable investment is liquidity. That liquidity is a benefit when you know you are able to redeem your investments any time during market hours. Unfortunately, that very same liquidity and mark-to-market accounting create issues where the underlying assets may be less liquid, such as REITs and BDCs. Liquidity is what creates the need to look at both, the market price, as well as the underlying NAV of the investment. During times of financial instability, the market price per share may be significantly below the actual underlying assets. So how has it performed so far? An issue with looking at investments that have recently launched is that unless the strategy is simply bad, or the active manager is an amateur, it was tough to lose money over the last 5 years in the market. Both MORL and MORT have launched in 2012 and 2011, respectively, so let’s start there to evaluate the performance. I first ran a Morningstar hypothetical test with a $10,000 investment in MORL and MORT, starting at their earliest common date, 10/16/2012, which is the launch date of MORL. As you can see below, if you have reinvested your distributions, a $10,000 MORL investment would be worth approximately $11,624 today. It underperformed the S&P 500 quite a bit, but at least you did not lose money. A $10,000 investment in MORT would be worth approximately $11,498. Wait… a minute. At this point you may be asking yourself… you took twice the risk for a mere $126 incremental return? Yes. Not so fun. (click to enlarge) Ok. What about if you are a typical income investor looking for income to live off of, and did not reinvest any of the distributions? That is what the second illustration is for. (click to enlarge) As you can see, a $10,000 MORL investment would now be worth approximately $6,430 on your statement. A $10,000 MORT investment would be worth a more tolerable $8,444. 2008-like account statements that you would have in 2015. Speaking of 2008, how would this portfolio have performed during that time frame? Unfortunately, none of the marketing materials from VanEck or UBS brings that up. Furthermore, many of the index constituents did not exist prior to 2009. What we do have are 3 mortgage REITs out of the index that do have a trading history. Fortunately, Annaly Capital Management (NYSE: NLY ) that makes up 17% or so of the index has a long trading history, along with MFA Financial (NYSE: MFA ) and Blackstone Mortgage Trust (NYSE: BXMT ). Together, these 3 REITs make up slightly over 25% of the index. You can see the performance of those 3 over the last 10 years below. MFA was the only one able to maintain a positive share price over a 10-year period. NLY is down approximately 32%, and BXMT imploded in 2008 and never recovered netting a 91% loss in share price. (click to enlarge) So how did they do during the peaks of the bear market? Below is a chart from Jan. 1, 2008, through November 1st, 2008: (click to enlarge) NLY suffered a 23% loss, followed by MFA with a 38.8% loss, and finally BXMT with a 72.9% fall in the share price. The thing to keep in mind is that the above are with no leverage. If you were exposed to those companies through the 2x levered UBS note, your losses would be far more severe. Bottom Line Is MORL right for you? Is it really a good product, or merely another idea thrown up in order to generate fees at the expense of foolish investors who are merely looking at yield? For an institution or an experienced professional investor, this article would likely add little that they don’t already know. Those people are also more likely to trade this product, and not invest in it. For a retail investor… listen up. MORL and perhaps even MORT are sophisticated, complex investments that cannot be just bought and forgotten about. They can hurt you very badly, very, very quickly. You must absolutely track them like a hawk with a defined exit strategy in case things go bad. A big thing to keep in mind with MORL is that it is not an exchange traded fund with underlying assets. As with other UBS ETRACS products, it is an exchange traded note, which are unsecured debt obligations of the issuer, in this case UBS AG (NYSE: UBS ). In case of default, your investment is not secured in any underlying mortgage REIT. You would be standing in line with other bondholders with a claim. Besides the zero leverage in MORT, this ETN structure is the other difference between the two products. In case VanEck has issues, your ETF is invested in the underlying mortgage REITs. I do applaud UBS as it clearly makes an attempt to point out that it is a UBS unsecured note and not an ETF on its quarterly fact sheets. The other big warning is… …Don’t Let the 2x Leverage Fool You. In reality, it is far higher. What the marketing material does not go over too well is that the underlying mortgage REITs are already heavily levered. For instance, at the end of Q4 2014, NLY was levered somewhere around 4.8x, and that was a decrease from 2013 when it was more than 6x. What this UBS ETN is doing is applying a 2x leverage multiple to an already levered asset. Remind me again, wasn’t this part of the financial collapse? Is this 2015 or are we reliving 2008 all over again here? Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: None of the information discussed should be considered investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any securities. Please consult your investment advisor for specific recommendations.