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CenterPoint Energy: Be Sure To Understand What You Own

Summary CenterPoint currently yields nearly 5.35% and has $1.2B in cash reserves. Transmission and distribution income – nearly 50% of operating income – is geographically concentrated. It is largely considered to be a utility – however, a quarter of the income is derived from the MLP equity interest, which has been historically volatile. CenterPoint Energy (NYSE: CNP ) is a diversified pseudo-utility with a wide range of operations. The company operates a regulated natural gas utility business, a transmission and distribution arm, and retains ownership of substantial equity interest in Enable Midstream Partners (NYSE: ENBL ). CNP has been a favorite of investors chasing yield, but the shares have had trouble keeping up with the utility index over the past two years. Unfortunately for shareholders, the shares are down 20%, compared to a 20% gain for the broader utilities index. Contrary to what you might think, the dividend has actually been growing measurably the past two years, and the company now yields over 5.49%, well above historical averages. Is there an opportunity here for shareholders for both solid yield and capital appreciation? Business Operations CenterPoint’s strongest business unit in regards to operating income is its electric transmission and distribution business. This segment provides the infrastructure to connect power plants to substations which connect to the retail customer. This is a low-business risk, high-value business. Because the infrastructure is entirely pole/wire assets, there is significantly less regulatory and environmental risk compared to actual power generation. While this is a monopolistic business with very little risk, CenterPoint’s operations do have geographic risk in that the company only owns assets located in and around the House/Galveston metropolitan area. While this area has retained its strong growth even with the fallout of plummeting energy prices, there is no guarantee that this trend will continue. A reversal in the area’s fortune would result in a slowdown in demand for electricity, driving earnings down in this segment. The most stable and consistent business unit is CenterPoint’s intrastate natural gas distribution business. Compared to the transmission and distribution business that is concentrated in one area, this segment provides natural gas to more than three million customers in six states. Like other gas utilities, the company passes along the cost of the gas to customers, so there is little effect of gas price fluctuations on CenterPoint’s profitability aside from revenue numbers. Further cementing operating results, the company has weather normalization and decoupling mechanisms in place to limit the effects of seasonality and variations in customer demand in five of six states. This portion of CenterPoint is extremely well run, and earnings consistently bump up against the maximum allowed rate of return that the public utility commissions have set for the company (authorized return on equity in the 10% range). As mentioned, CenterPoint owns 55.4% of the limited partner units of Enable Midstream Partners, receiving 40% of the distribution rights. Operational control is split 50/50 between CenterPoint and OGE Energy (NYSE: OGE ). The reason for CenterPoint’s underperformance may largely lie with poor results from Enable. Enable’s first half of the year has been poor when compared to the 2014 results ($93M in operating income for Enable in 1H 2015, compared to $138M in 1H 2014). The downside action in Enable may have been overdone. Compared to many midstream companies like Kinder Morgan (NYSE: KMI ), the company is much less levered (2.6x net debt/EBITDA), making it better positioned to handle any long downturn in U.S. energy midstream operations. I think the weak recent share price performance is primarily related to the company’s short public history and heavy insider ownership. With very little track record and such a small percentage of the float open for trading, the shares have been volatile, scaring many retail and institutional investors away. Operating Results (click to enlarge) Revenue can vary widely year to year, especially within the natural gas distribution segment. As an example, revenue grew 40% from 2012 to 2014 ($959M), but operating income only grew 26% ($60M). This can cause operating margin decreases through no fault of the company as these operating margins decrease as the fixed cost of the natural gas being provided rises. Meanwhile, further putting pressure on operating margins has been a steady increase in operations and maintenance costs within the electric transmission and distribution segment. Between 2012 and 2014, revenue grew 12%. Regrettably, operations and maintenance costs grew 32%. While its maintenance capital expenditures will be recovered as part of capital plans eventually, these recoveries may not be as timely as investors might expect. (click to enlarge) 2014 was a concerning time for the company from a cash flow perspective. Cash from operations had fallen nearly $500M from 2012 levels, and capital expenditures were up tremendously. CenterPoint had to plug the hole with the $600M in proceeds from long-term debt it had raised late in the year prior. With $6.4B in net debt, the company is only moderately leveraged at 3.2x net debt/EBITDA. However, with CenterPoint keeping $1.2B in cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet, it is prepared to weather any mild operational issues quite well. Conclusion When investing in CenterPoint, investors need to be aware they aren’t buying a company with 100% regulated utility operations. The higher dividend yield here is likely justified, given the volatility present in the Enable ownership. On the plus side, the natural gas operations are very well run, and the electric transmission business, while experiencing headwinds currently, is also solid. In my opinion, the shares likely trade around their fair value. Investors looking for yield can likely comfortably add some exposure to the company in the $17-18/share range.

Avista Corporation: This Utility Is A Buy

Summary Power generation mix is nearly all clean energy. Dividend history is solid, management guidance for 4-6% growth going forward. Only moderate leverage; Avista hasn’t been on a borrowing spree like most utilities. Shares are just simply one of the top picks in the utility sector. Set it and forget it. Avista Corporation (NYSE: AVA ) primarily operates as a regulated utility business, with the majority of revenue derived from providing electric and natural gas services to customers in Washington, Idaho, and Oregon. While the company does serve some customers in Montana and Alaska (via the AERC acquisition), these operations, along with the non-utility businesses, are fairly immaterial to company earnings. Despite favorable generation capacity, healthy dividend growth, and favorable rate case filings, shares have largely tracked broader utility sector results. Are shares poised to outperform in the future? Favorable Power Generation Bucking the trend of utilities that are woefully behind the curve in emissions standards, Avista’s 1,800MW of generation capacity currently consists of 56% renewables and 35% clean burning natural gas. It isn’t a surprise that the company consistently wins awards for being one of the greenest power producers in the United States. This is a big positive for shareholders. My attraction to Avista and companies with such strong renewables mixes is not born out of liberal thinking but a mere acknowledgement that it is extremely unlikely that current federal and state regulations regarding emissions standards get dialed back. The company’s power generation portfolio simply makes regulatory overhang due to increased renewable standards from state regulators and the federal government a non-issue. If I’m an investor looking for steady income, I don’t want to see surprise jumps in capital expenditures to bring plants into compliance or bad press from dirty power generation [think PLM Resources’ San Juan Generating Station (NYSEMKT: PLM ) or Duke Energy’s (NYSE: DUK ) coal ash basin spills]. Fact is Avista’s power generation mix greatly exceeds even the strictest of mandates, including those set for implementation in 2035 or later. This should help investors sleep easier at night. Operational Results (click to enlarge) Utility revenue has been moving up slowly, primarily based on growth in residential and commercial consumers, while revenue from industrial customers has been weakening since the expiration and subsequent renewal at lower rates of some large customer contracts recently. Revenue can be volatile. This is because Avista often chooses to sell its excess natural gas when current wholesale market prices are below the cost of power generation using its natural gas plants. Years that see these sales generally see higher revenue (due to these sales) but lower profit and operating margins. Investors can use 2014 versus 2013 as an example. In 2014, Avista sold $43M less natural gas in the open market ($84M in sales versus $127M in 2013). So while revenue only expanded marginally (2.2%), operating income grew 10% due in part to better margins. Additionally, shrinking operations and maintenance costs in spite of growing revenues is also a compelling sign to me that management is keeping a close eye on costs. With incremental revenue gains being hard-fought in the utility sector, any expense reductions that yield operational efficiency gains should be lauded. Money In, Money Out (click to enlarge) Like I do with all utility analysis, I look to make sure that cash being spent does not greatly outweigh cash being generated from operations. Utilities in general have been on a spending spree in the past few years due to looming regulatory burdens and record low interest rates. Debt issuance has been both necessary and coincidentally quite cheap, leading utility management to feat on the smorgasbord of easy money. Avista’s overspending and subsequent debt issuance has been relatively mild in comparison, especially considering that the company raised $245M in cash from the sale of the Ecova business in 2014, with the majority of those proceeds used to offset common stock dilution. Total long-term debt raised between 2011 to the current period has been just $250M. Because of this, Avista’s net debt/EBITDA stands at 3.3x, making it one of the least leveraged utilities I’ve analyzed recently. Operational cash flow should grow during 2015-2017 through rate recovery increases while capital expenditures flatten in the $350M range. This should decrease the deficit we see in the cash flow analysis. Overall, I don’t see an alarming trend here that should worry investors. Conclusion With a current dividend yield of approximately 4%, shares are trading slightly higher than historical averages by approximately 5%. While many investors would elect to wait it out for shares to drop, in the grand scheme of things an investment strategy like that can make you miss out on some valuable opportunities. Establishing a half position and electing to buy on dips might be the better strategy. In my opinion, Avista’s diversified utility business is one of the safest available options in the publicly-traded utility sector. Shares, however, don’t seem to carry any real premium for this value. While I don’t own shares (I instead own shares in Calpine Corporation (NYSE: CPN ) and AES Corporation (NYSE: AES ) given my heavier risk appetite than most), I certainly would if I was an income investor, even at these prices. Management’s guidance of 4-6% dividend growth in the years to come is both manageable and ahead of most utility peers. I’ve looked at many picks in the utility sector in the current market, and very few of them appear to trade at or below fair value. Avista isn’t one of them. If you’re long, congratulations on holding a winner. If you aren’t and are an income investor, you should consider it.

IBB: Price Gouging Assertion Is Overblown

Summary Price gouging by Turing Pharmaceuticals and the subsequent comments by Hillary Clinton have exacerbated this sector decline. This price gouging incident has elicited widespread backlash, and in my opinion, rightfully so; however, this criticism has been unfairly painted across the entire sector. Attempts to heavy regulate the sector with government intervention will likely end in a futile effort in arresting drug price increases. The unprecedented secular growth streak in biotech has been more than tested as of late with the biotechnology officially in bear territory. IBB is down 25% from its 52-week high, from $400 to $295 per share during the recent market weakness, presenting a potential buying opportunity. Price gouging assertion and Hilary Clinton Recently, Turing Pharmaceuticals and its CEO Martin Shkreli garnered criticism after the company boosted the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per pill, resulting in a greater than 5,400% increase after acquiring the drug in August. This price gouging of a decades’ old drug drew fire from the general public on social media, and in particular, the presidential candidate and democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton (Figure 1). Figure 1 – Tweet by presidential candidate and democratic front runner Hillary Clinton referring to the drug price gouging This price gouging incident has elicited widespread backlash, and in my opinion, rightfully so; however, this criticism has been unfairly painted across the entire sector. It’s noteworthy to point out that democratic lawmakers have requested pricing policies and further information on pricing of drugs by Canadian drug marker Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE: VRX ). Despite the public backlash and public statements by lawmakers, I believe this is a temporary headwind rooted in the public relations arena. Although the aforementioned example of Daraprim is an isolated and extreme example, at the end of the day, these companies are in business to make a profit, retain fiduciary responsibilities and return value to shareholders. Many contend that these prices are not sustainable, and the cost to the overall healthcare system is a huge financial burden. Qualitatively, this is true; however, this situation draws parallels to the housing market, education costs and social security. All of these areas of our economy are facing similar fates with unsustainable financial barriers to entry and unfunded liabilities. Attempts to heavy regulate the sector with government intervention will likely end in a futile effort in arresting drug price increases for the following terse reasons: 1) Companies spend billions of dollars in acquiring a company and/or billions of dollars and years of research and development costs to bring a given therapy to the market. 2) These costs must be reasonably factored into the pricing of the product. If government intervention is successful, this will hinder innovation and M&A activity since the back-end reward will no longer generate lucrative rewards. 3) Unlike education costs, housing price increases and social security, drug pricing is negotiated with many insurers and organizations that dispense drugs at a substantial discount to the market price and often along with rebate programs. 4) Loss of exclusivity; drug companies must also capitalize on their window of exclusivity to their drugs. Depending on patent expiration, after varying time on the market, patents will inevitably expire, and these drugs will no longer possess exclusivity and face generic competition. 5) Taken together in concert with the fact that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is now law of the land, no one will be paying the market price of any drug since the annual deductible and maximum out-of-pocket is established depending on the tier of coverage he/she chooses. 6) Lastly, an often overlooked benefit is the cost savings to the overall healthcare system. This occurs when curative drugs or drugs that increase the overall survival and/or improve the quality of life are introduced to the market. These highly effective drugs can effectively remove patients from the system whereby eliminating years of high-cost medical treatment and hospitalization. While drug prices continue to rise, there’s substantive rational in the form of input costs, loss of exclusivity, curative treatments, increase in quality of life and removal of some patients from the overall healthcare system, thus reducing the overall cost burden of the given healthcare system. For the reasons stated above, I personally feel that these attempts by lawmakers will end in a futile endeavor. Overview The culmination of extraneous events such as sustained lower oil prices, an ostensibly imminent rate hike and weakness in China have indiscriminately plummeted the biotech sector in lock-step with the broader indices. Now, a second and more specific wave of sector-related stories such as price gouging by Turing Pharmaceuticals and the subsequent comments by Hillary Clinton has exacerbated this sector decline. These former events are ostensibly unrelated to the biotechnology sector; yet, this group has been taken along for the downhill ride with the broader indices. The latter events have been detrimental to all biotechnology stocks as this is a direct threat to pricing power and our capitalism-based structure. The unprecedented secular growth streak in biotech has been more than tested as of late with the biotechnology officially in bear territory. These latest events, some unrelated and others directly related to the biotech sector, may provide a unique opportunity to add to a current position or initiate a position over time as this correction continues to unfold. Based on annual and cumulative performance throughout both bear and bull markets, the iShares Nasdaq Biotechnology ETF (NASDAQ: IBB ) may provide the opportunity investors have been waiting for in the face of our current market conditions. IBB is down 25% from its 52-week high, shares have plunged from $400 to $295 per share during the recent market weakness, presenting a potential buying opportunity. Debunking the bubble thesis Many content that this sector is in bubble territory based on its overall high P/E ratio, lack of adequate cash flows, and in some cases, lack of any marketable products. Thus, many companies are not deserving of this generous P/E. Many also try to draw parallels to the dot.com bubble that occurred in the early 2000s and use this as a proxy for the current biotech “bubble”. I would counter that after the most recent correction of ~25% this narrative holds much less weight and that traditional metrics on which to evaluate stocks are not applicable when evaluating clinical-stage biotech companies. Clinical-stage biotech companies are solely evaluated and priced based on potential sales of pipeline candidates and/or valuation to a potential acquirer. Holding clinical-stage biotech companies to the same standards as a traditional Dow Jones stock isn’t appropriate, and thus, I feel that this argument is flawed. Comparison to the dot.com bubble is not an accurate proxy either as the Internet companies relied heavily on user growth, subscribers, ad revenue and crowd-sourced content. This is in sharp contrast to biotech companies that innovate in the many different disease states and may have a multi-billion life-saving blockbuster drug around the corner to drastically change the trajectory of the company and its future. Additionally, major M&A activity has always been a driving factor in this sector due to the fact that companies are willing to pay very high premiums for the rights to potential blockbusters or a robust pipeline to replenish its own outdated pipeline. Taken together, I feel that after the recent sell-off and lack of any substantive argument against the biotech sector, this may be a great entry point. Perennial performer in bear and bull markets Despite the headwinds outlined above, the biotech sector has exhibited its resilience in both bear and bull markets with secular growth over the past decade. The returns for IBB have been very impressive in both annual and cumulative performance, unparalleled by any major index. Over the past 10- and 5-year time frames, IBB has posted cumulative returns of over 310% and 265%, respectively. These results are unrivaled by any major index, outperforming on a 10-year cumulative basis by 3-fold or greater when compared to the S&P 500, NASDAQ, and Dow Jones (Figure 2). These returns are accentuated during the previous 5 years. IBB notched cumulative returns of 265%, outperforming the S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones by roughly 2.5-fold or greater over this 5-year time frame (Figure 3). (click to enlarge) Figure 2 – Google Finance; comparison of IBB returns relative to the S&P 500, NASDAQ, Dow Jones over the previous 10 years (click to enlarge) Figure 3 – Google Finance; comparison of IBB returns relative to the S&P 500, NASDAQ, Dow Jones over the previous 5 years IBB has displayed impressive resilience in the face of the market crash in 2008, the bear markets of 2011 and the choppy market thus far in 2015. During the market crash of 2008, IBB posted an annual return of -12.2% while the S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones posted returns of -37.0%, -40.0% and -31.9%, respectively (Figure 3). During the bear market of 2011, IBB posted an annual return of 11.7% while the S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones posted returns of 2.1%, -0.8% and 8.4%, respectively (Figure 4). Thus far, during the choppy market of 2015, IBB posted an annual return of 4% while the S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones posted returns of -6.3%, -1.4% and -8.6%, respectively (Figure 5). These data suggest that IBB outperforms during bear markets as well as bull markets to establish itself as a secular growth sector. (click to enlarge) Figure 4 – Morningstar comparison of IBB’s annual returns relative to the NASDAQ over the previous 10 years (click to enlarge) Figure 5 – Google Finance; comparison of IBB’s annual performance thus far in 2015 relative to the S&P 500, NASDAQ and Dow Jones Conclusion As the confluence of broader disconnected factors and price gouging inquiries by leading politicians continue to bring down the biotechnology sector, it may be time to consider capitalizing on this correction via adding to existing positions or initiating a new position in this cohort given this opportunity. As the United States continues to absorb an ageing population alongside growing overall healthcare costs, more specifically prescription drug costs, the biotech sector looks poised to benefit and continue to outperform the broader market. Data suggests, provided a long-term position that volatility within the biotech sector is negated by its long-term performance that is unparalleled by any major index. This sector provides high returns unrivaled by any major index with moderate risk (based on its resilience during the bear markets of 2008 and 2011 and thus far in 2015) and volatility. IBB may be providing investors with a great opportunity to add or initiate a position for any long portfolio desiring exposure to the biotechnology sector with a long-term time horizon given the recent market conditions. Disclosure The author currently holds shares of IBB and is long IBB. The author has no business relationship with any companies mentioned in this article. I am not a professional financial advisor or tax professional. I wrote this article myself and it reflects my own thoughts and opinions. This article is not intended to be a recommendation to buy or sell any stock or ETF mentioned. I am an individual investor who analyzes investment strategies and disseminates my analyses. I encourage all investors to conduct their own research and due diligence prior to investing. Please feel free to comment and provide feedback, I value all responses.