Tag Archives: kmi

No High-Yield Relief For MLP ETFs Post Fed

The Fed went ahead and hiked the short-term interest rates after almost a decade and investors are probably looking for high-yield but stable investing tools to weather the prospective bounce in the U.S. Treasury yields, but this search will not be easy now. Investors need to be very careful while picking high-yields securities in the present market condition. This is because of the fact that the Fed hike is not the only threat to the market, a below-$40 oil price seems to be the main culprit now. As a result, conventionally high-yield securities MLPs, which are normally stable in nature too, are now having a bloodbath. MLPs are involved in the business of transportation and storage of oil and gas, and they are suffering even more than the oil producers from the downturn in the market. MLPs primarily benefit from an uptick in oil production. Oil Price Slump Hurts Now oil prices are in a freefall and hovering around a seven-year low following the prospect of more production from OPEC nations amid supply glut and falling demand. So energy MLPs are being crushed. Now, Russia’s deputy finance minister expects oil price to range between $40 and $60 per barrel in the next seven years. So one can easily expect how prolonged the pain could be for the MLPs. As you may know, MLPs often operate pipelines or similar energy infrastructures that make it an interest-rate sensitive sector. This group catches investor eye as the players in it do not pay taxes at the entity level and hence must pay out most of their income (more than 90%) in the form of dividends. Investors looking for higher income levels outside the traditional bond sources generally bet on these products. Rising Rate Scenario: A Pain A rising interest rate environment would also adversely impact the performance of MLPs for a number of reasons. First, higher interest rates lower the appeal of high-yielding stocks such as MLPs, which have historically offered around 5% in yields and hence have attracted investors’ attention due to ultra-low interest rates. Secondly, MLPs heavily depend on external financing to run their operations as they distribute most of their income as dividends. As a result, a rise in interest rates would increase their financing costs, which in turn would diminish their ability to keep distribution payments at the existing level. Dividend Cuts Also, thanks to the oil rout, the cash position of MLPs is weakening. Upstream exploration MLP companies earn from every barrel of oil and are being thrashed by the endless weakness in oil prices. U.S. oil producers are resorting to a cutback in oil production in response to falling prices. Since pipeline operators are heavily dependent on them, a blow to the MLP balance sheet is inevitable. The situation is so acute that Street.com indicated a few MLPs which may cut dividend – the sole lure of the MLP investing – in the near term. Already the largest energy infrastructure company in North America – Kinder Morgan, Inc. (NYSE: KMI ) – cut its dividend by 75% on December 8. The author in the Street.com believes that Targa Resources Partners (NYSE: NGLS ) and Vanguard Natural Resources (NASDAQ: VNR ), which yield about 20% and as high as 55%, respectively, may resort to a cutback in the coming days. Crestwood Equity Partners (NYSE: CEQP ) is yet another mid-stream MLP which yields about 38.52% annually in dividend, but is in the danger list. Others are NGL Energy Partners (NYSE: NGL ) presently yielding 26.42% and NuStar Energy (NYSE: NS ) with a dividend yield of 13.05% at present that may not be able to sustain the same payout in the coming months due to financing issues. ETF Impact All these have kept the MLP ETFs space depressed, each losing in the range 15% to 30% in the last one-month frame (as of December 14, 2015). Year to date, these products have lost in the range of 22% to 55%. InfraCap MLP ETF (NYSEARCA: AMZA ), Yorkville High Income MLP ETF (NYSEARCA: YMLP ) and Cushing MLP High Income Index ETN (NYSEARCA: MLPY ) were the worst hit during the last one-month frame. Original Post

A Closer Look At Suburban Propane Partners’ Results And Cash Flows As Of 6/30/15

SPH benefited from lower oil prices; it did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs thus increasing gross margin to 57% in 3QFY15 . Distributions coverage at 1.09x in the TTM ended 6/30/15; sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the prior TTM period. SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months. SPH may not provide substantial distribution growth and may underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels. But the ~10% yield appears secure, the valuation multiple is lower, and it is less leveraged. This article focuses on some of the key facts and trends revealed by results recently reported by Suburban Propane Partners LP (NYSE: SPH ). The quarters are noted with an FY designation because SPH’s fiscal year ends in September. Its third quarter of fiscal 2015 ended on 6/30/15 and is designated as 3QFY15. The article evaluates the sustainability of the partnership’s Distributable Cash Flow (“DCF”) and assesses whether SPH is financing its distributions via issuance of new units or debt. SPH is organized into 3 principal business segments. The propane segment, which generates the bulk of SPH’s revenues and cash flows, is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of propane to residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural customers and, to a lesser extent, wholesale distribution to large industrial end users. The fuel oil and refined fuels segment is primarily engaged in the retail distribution of fuel oil, diesel, kerosene and gasoline to residential and commercial customers for use primarily as a source of heat in homes and buildings. The natural gas and electricity segment is engaged in the marketing of natural gas and electricity to residential and commercial customers in the deregulated energy markets of New York and Pennsylvania. SPH is also engaged in other activities, primarily the sale, installation and servicing of a wide variety of home comfort equipment, particularly in the areas of heating and ventilation. SPH’s business is highly seasonal. It typically sells ~ 2/3 of its retail propane volume and ~ 3/4 of its retail fuel oil volume during the peak heating season of October through March. Consequently, the bulk of sales and operating profits are concentrated in the quarters ending December and March (the first and second quarters of the fiscal year). In the quarters ended June and September SPH typically reports losses. Cash flows and DCF coverage ratios are typically highest during the quarters ending March and June; this is when customers pay for product purchased during the winter heating season. SPH’s profitability is largely dependent on volumes generated by its retail propane operations and on the gross margin it achieves on propane sales – the difference between retail sales price and product cost. Table 1 shows volumes and gross margins for the 8 most recent quarters: (click to enlarge) Table 1: Figures in $ Millions, except gallons and percentages. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Volumes and earnings for 3QFY15 were adversely affected by unseasonably warm weather during much of 3QFY15 (16% warmer than normal and 6% warmer than 3QFY14 in areas served by SPH). In addition, the timing of the much colder than normal temperatures in March 2015 led to additional deliveries during 2QFY15, obviating the need for further deliveries in 3QFY15 to many customers. Propane prices in 3QFY15 fluctuated between $0.32-$0.57 per gallon and, on average, declined by 55.9% vs. 2QFY15, in line with the dramatic declines in crude oil and natural gas prices as prices. Lower propane prices benefit SPH’s customers and affect SPH by decreasing both its revenues and cost of goods sold. The impact on gross margin may vary; in 3QFY15 gross margin increased to 57% of revenues compared to 46% in 3QFY14 because SPH did not pass on to its customers all the benefits of lower propane costs. However, gross margin declined in absolute dollar terms ($126 million vs. $136 million) due to lower volumes. DCF and adjusted earnings before interest, depreciation & amortization and income tax expenses (“Adjusted EBITDA”) are the primary measures typically used master limited partnerships (“MLPs”) to evaluate their operating results. Making comparisons between MLPs is difficult because of lack of standard definitions these terms (a recent article discusses some examples). It is even more so in the case of SPH because it does not measure its results in terms of DCF and does not provide DCF data. However, SPH does provide Adjusted EBITDA figures: (click to enlarge) Table 2: Figures in $ Millions except per unit amounts, percent change and gallons sold. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Net income included expenses of $1.1 million and $4.3 million in 3QFY15 and 3QFY14, respectively, related to integration of the retail propane business acquired from Inergy L.P for ~$1.9 billion in August 2012. For 3QFY14, net income also included an $11.6 million loss on debt extinguishment. Adjusted EBITDA excludes the effects of these charges, as well as the unrealized (non-cash) mark-to-market adjustments on derivative instruments. SPH was able to decrease its investment in working capital in the trailing twelve months (“TTM”) ended 6/30/15, with lower commodity prices significantly reducing both inventories and accounts receivable. This resulted in a sharp increase in net cash from operations, as shown in Table 3: Table 3: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. To enable comparison of DCF, investors must generate their own estimates because, as previously noted, SPH does not utilize this metric. Table 4 below provides my estimate of sustainable DCF generated by SPH in the periods under review, as well as my estimate of what SPH’s reported DCF would have been had it adopted a methodology similar to that used by some other MLPs (see article titled ” Distributable Cash Flow” ). Most of the MLPs I follow exclude working capital changes, whether positive or negative, when deriving their reported DCF numbers. This is one of the differences between DCF as is typically reported by MLPs and sustainable DCF. The relevant numbers for SPH are as follows: Table 4: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. The two corresponding coverage ratios are as follows: Table 5: Figures in $ Millions except coverage ratio. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. For the TTM ended 6/30/15 there were no material differences between DCF (excluding the impact of working capital changes and risk management activities, as it is generally reported by MLPs) and what I call sustainable DCF. Coverage of distributions ratio was positive (above 1x). Sustainable DCF shows a marked improvement over the TTM ended 6/30/14, primarily due to $82 million that was required for working capital in that earlier period. Table 6 presents a simplified cash flow statement that nets certain items (e.g., acquisitions against dispositions, debt incurred vs. repaid) and separates cash generation from cash consumption in order to get a clear picture of how distributions have been funded. It provides further insights on changes in coverage ratios. (click to enlarge) Table 6: Figures in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Table 6 indicates that net cash from operations, less maintenance capital expenditures, exceeded distributions by $104 million in the TTM ended 6/30/15, but fell short of covering distributions by $63 million in the TTM ended 6/30/14. Cash reserves were used to fund the shortfall. Table 7 provides selected metrics comparing the MLPs I follow based on the latest available TTM results. Of course, investment decisions should be take into consideration other parameters as well as qualitative factors. Though not structured as an MLP, I include KMI as its business and operations make it comparable to midstream energy MLPs. As of 08/26/15: Price Current Yield TTM Adjusted EBITDA EV / TTM Adj. EBITDA IDR- Adjusted EV/Adj. EBITDA Long-term debt (net of cash) to TTM Adj. EBITDA Buckeye Partners (NYSE: BPL ) $69.00 6.74% 844 14.7 14.7 4.2 Boardwalk Pipeline Partners (NYSE: BWP ) $12.89 3.10% 672 10.0 10.1 5.2 Enterprise Products Partners (NYSE: EPD ) $27.29 5.57% 5,239 14.6 14.6 4.1 Energy Transfer Partners (NYSE: ETP ) $46.86 8.83% 5,308 9.0 10.4 5.2 Kinder Morgan Inc. (NYSE: KMI ) $30.80 6.36% 7,373 15.2 15.2 6.0 Magellan Midstream Partners (NYSE: MMP ) $68.29 4.33% 1,102 17.1 17.1 3.0 Targa Resources Partners (NYSE: NGLS ) $27.38 12.05% 1,065 9.5 10.7 4.8 Plains All American Pipeline (NYSE: PAA ) $33.23 8.37% 2,229 10.3 12.8 4.3 Suburban Propane Partners $35.74 9.93% 332 9.8 9.8 3.3 Williams Partners (NYSE: WPZ ) $37.52 9.06% 3,681 10.6 12.3 4.6 Table 7: Enterprise Value (“EV”) and TTM EBITDA figures are in $ Millions. Source: company 10-Q, 10-K, 8-K filings and author estimates. Note that BPL, EPD, KMI, MMP and SPH are not burdened by general partner incentive IDRs that siphon off a significant portion of cash available for distribution to limited partners (typically 48%). Hence multiples of MLPs without IDRs can be expected to be much higher (see Table 4, column 5). In order to make the multiples somewhat more comparable, I added column 6, a second EV/EBITDA column. I derived this column by subtracting IDR payments from EBITDA for the TTM period. Other approaches can also be used to adjust for the IDRs of the relevant MLPs. In prior articles I expressed concerns regarding the susceptibility of SPH to weather conditions, volatile commodity costs, customer migration to natural gas or electricity, difficulties encountered by SPH in passing on higher propane costs to its customers, flat distributions since February 2013 and lack of a clear path to achieving distribution growth. These concerns are still valid, although some are mitigated by lower oil prices. But while the midstream MLP universe has been violently shaken by the decline in the price of oil, SPH has demonstrated less volatility and has performed better than the Alerian MLP Index over the past 12 months (19.5% decrease in unit price vs. a 35.5% decline in the index). Furthermore, the outperformance has been consistent whether measured on a 12-months, year-to-date, 6-months, 3-months or 1-month basis. Although SPH may not offer distribution growth and will probably underperform the index if we see sustained increases in MLP price levels, its ~10% yield appears secure, its valuation multiple is lower and it is less leveraged (3.3x long terms debt, net of cash, over TTM EBITDA). Investors brave enough to broaden their exposure to midstream energy MLPs should consider initiating, or adding to, positions in SPH. Disclosure: I am/we are long EPD, ETP, MMP, NGLS, PAA. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.