Tag Archives: investment

Spinoffs: Outperformance And Investment Strategies

Originally published on March 8, 2016 By Rupert Hargreaves Spinoffs Investment Strategies… Warren Buffett, Benjamin Graham, Seth Klarman and Walter Schloss are probably some of the greatest value investors of all time, and at one point or another, these investment titans have all mentioned spinoffs as a critical area for value investors to seek out bargains. And there’s plenty of cold hard data to back up this conclusion. Indeed, only last week, Goldman Sachs issued a Portfolio Strategy Research note to clients on this very topic using data from the past six months. Spinoffs Investment Strategies – Spinoffs are highly likely to outperform parents Goldman’s research note, titled Investment Strategies For Spinoffs And Carve-Outs looked at the performance of spincos relative to their parent companies and the S&P 500 in the first two years after spinoff. The bank’s research showed that since 1999, spincos have outperformed their parents and the index by a median of 9% and 6% respectively in the first two years after the spinoff. During 2015, the value of spinoffs at completion jumped 81% to $176 billion, the highest level in 15 years. Goldman expects this trend to continue throughout 2016. The prospect of modest top line growth coupled with flat margins this year is likely to push managements to pursue spinoffs as a means of generating shareholder returns. If the above forecast does play out, and a new wave of spinoffs hits the market this year, value investors will be spoilt for choice when it comes to picking undervalued, and unloved spinoffs that have been unfairly sold by the market. Unpopular spinoffs were plentiful last year. 18 of the 28 spinoffs that have taken place since June 15 had, at least, one of three alpha-generating attributes: Spinoffs Investment Strategies – Lower P/E multiple Spincos that traded at a lower forward P/E multiple than their parents outperformed their parents by 18 pp and 26 pp respectively during the one-year and two-year period after the spinoff. Goldman found the hit rate of this outperformance was 63% and 75% respectively. Lower expected EPS growth Spincos with lower twelve-month EPS growth expectations compared to the parents generated median excess returns of 21pp and 6pp respectively during the one-year and two-year period after the spinoff. The hit rate here was 81% and 56% respectively. Operated within a distinct industry versus their parents If the spinco and parent operate in different industries, the relative median return of spinco versus the parent was +3 pp for both one and two-year periods. If the two companies operated within the same industry, the performance was -7pp and +20pp. Spincos with a lower P/E multiple, lower expected EPS growth and operating in a different industry to the parent generated a median relative return of +29 pp and +47 pp versus their parents during the one-year and two-year post-spinoff periods, with hit rates of 80% and 90%, respectively. Click to enlarge And if you’re looking for ideas, 26 announced spinoffs are currently pending completion: Click to enlarge Disclosure: Rupert may hold positions in one or more of the companies mentioned in this article. You can find a full list of Rupert’s positions on his blog. This should not be interpreted as investment advice, or a recommendation to buy or sell securities. You should make your own decisions and seek independent professional advice before doing so. Past performance is not a guide to future performance.

In Which I Answer A Question About The Volatility ETNs

The prevailing wisdom on the volatility ETNs, VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short-Term ETN (NASDAQ: XIV ) and iPath S&P 500 VIX ST Futures ETN (NYSEARCA: VXX ), is that XIV will rise over time and VXX will fall as long as the term structure is in contango more often than it’s in backwardation. A recently elapsed period, slightly longer than a year, makes apparent that’s not the case. Over the period from 2-Mar-2015 to 18-Mar-2015, both XIV and VXX experienced substantial net losses. VXX declined -27.5%, while XIV declined -29.9% (Figures 1 and 2). Figure 1. XIV prices Figure 2. VXX prices This loss for both ETNs over a prolonged period occurred while the term structure was in contango 73% of the time – 2.7X more often than it was in backwardation, as Figure 3 shows below. Why is that? Click to enlarge Figure 3. Percent Contango from 2-Mar-2015 to 18-Mar-2016 One way to answer this question is by reference to variance drain. I picked the period 2-Mar-2015 to 18-Mar-2015 for illustration purposes in this article because it happens that the average of percent daily returns over this period is very close to zero for both ETNs. You can see that in Figure 4 below, which shows running totals for the percent daily returns for the indexes of both ETNs. Running totals for each end at zero, which of course means that the average percent daily return was also zero. Click to enlarge Figure 4. Running total of daily percent changes. The concept of variance drain was introduced by Tom Messmore in the context of comparing investment advisors based on average yearly percent returns. In brief, average periodic returns is a mathematically incorrect basis for comparison, since percentage gains accrue multiplicatively, not additively. This is best explained by example. Suppose you invest $100 in asset X. On Day 1, its market value falls by 25%. However, on Day 2, it rises by 25%. The average daily rate of return is (-25% + 25%)/2 = 0%. But your investment has not returned to its original value. Instead, it is now worth: $100*(1-0.25)*(1+0.25) = $93.75 A 6.25% loss. Since multiplication is commutative, order doesn’t matter. Investment Y that performs inversely to investment X, gaining 25% on Day 1, then losing 25% on Day 2 will also lose 6.25%. In general, this can be expressed as: I 0 *(1-α)*(1+α) = I 0 -α 2 , where I 0 is the initial investment. Clearly, the larger α is, the greater the net loss. Note that variance drain is not an actual loss. There’s no counterparty to variance drain. Nor is it a frictional drag in the sense that fees or leverage cost are. Rather it’s a demonstration that average periodic returns do not represent longer-term returns over multiple periods. In the case of the volatility ETNs XIV and VXX, the inverse relationship of their daily percent returns simply does not carry over to longer time periods, except by chance. What this means is that the question of why both XIV and VXX lost value, which several readers have raised in the comment sections of recently published articles on the volatility ETNs, is only a question if one starts from an incorrect assumption – namely that XIV and VXX are inversely correlated over time periods longer than one day. Since they’re not, both may lose value over time. Additionally, during time periods longer than one day when one loses as the other gains, those changes should not be expected to be equal and opposite. It’s also worth noting that excess of contango during this approximately one-year period did not result in XIV gaining value. On the contrary, it lost a substantial amount of its prior value. I’d like to encourage those who trade these ETNs to be certain the risks are well understood. Among those risks is the risk of placing too much faith in axioms and strategies that were formed during a period when the VIX was generally calm and declining. They may not apply during prolonged periods when the VIX is rising or is more frequently spiking. Disclosure: I am/we are long XIV. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: I may initiate or close a long or short position in any of the volatility ETNs over the next 72 hours.

Investment Strategy: When To Sell A Stock?

By Rupert Hargreaves Deciding when to sell a stock is often a more complicated process than buying it in the first place. Indeed, holding onto a loser for too long can severely curtail long-term returns. The same can be said if you hold onto a winner for longer than needs be as a sudden shift in market sentiment might see the majority of your gains erased. With this being the case, refining your selling process is a vital part of developing your investment strategy. This is a topic the February 29 issue of Value Investor Insight looks at in an interview with Danny Bubis, Ben Ellis, Jay Hedstrom and Amar Pandya of Tetrem Capital Management , which has produced an annualized return for investors of 8.9% since 1997, vs. 7.1% for the S&P 500. When To Sell A Stock? Investment strategy: When To Sell A Stock? Tetrem seeks out companies using a value approach: beaten-down stocks reflecting an unwarranted pessimism over the persistence and sustainability of their businesses. Of course, the selling process starts when the fund first buys an investment and research on each company is focused on modelling each potential investment’s fair value on the basis of normalised earnings in the base case, bull case, and bear case and the justified multiple for earnings in each of those scenarios. When these scenarios have been calculated, the fund’s analysts assign probability weightings to each case, and then use this probability weighting to calculate the potential upside the security. Generally speaking, the fund is looking for $3 of upside for every $1 of downside. Why does Tetrem Capital use a probability-weighted fair value calculation? Well, according to Danny Bubis this approach helps the fund better frame things in terms of risk versus reward and results in better investment decisions. When it comes to selling, Tetrem’s team has decided to refine their selling process after observing that many of the fund’s missteps have involved sticking with losers too long or not letting winners run long enough. To counter these mistakes, the fund’s team is making a more concerted effort to have high conviction buys push out more marginal ideas. The key test here: if the stock in question fell 10% to 20%, would the fund step in and aggressively buy more? If the answer is no, then there could be better ideas out there. Another rule the fund has introduced is that when something happens, which puts the original investment thesis at risk, the weighting in the fund is immediately reduced to 1.5%, a normal weight the fund is around 3% – no matter what the stock price does. These two parts of the firm’s investment strategy help Tetrem manage the downside; when it comes to the upside, the fund also has a rule in place to ensure that it does not get caught out by letting a winner run too long. Upside management technique Tetrem’s upside management or profit taking method is based on its fair value probability calculation. In the interview with Value Investor Insight, one of the fund’s current positions, Microsoft (NASDAQ: MSFT ) is used as an example. Originally, Tetrem acquired Microsoft when it was a beaten down by the market due to its entrenched management, reliance on PC and weakness in consumer markets. However, over the past two years, the company has transformed itself and successfully adapted to a mobile-first, cloud-first world. The stock is up 100% in five years, excluding dividends and Tetrem’s probability fair value estimate has increased alongside the stock price, as the company has grown and developed with the market, the probability of the bull case is higher, and the probability of the bear case is lower. This floating fair value probability estimate helps Tetrem’s team stick with compounders longer than it might have done without the floating calculation. Disclosure: Rupert may hold positions in one or more of the companies mentioned in this article.