Tag Archives: investing ideas

EQT: 4 Key Takeaways From The Q3 2015 Investor Call

EQT reported a tough Q3/15 but that much was expected – the important updates were given on the investor call that followed the financial updates. EQT, even in advance of presentations to its Board, was able to be granular with forward-looking expectations. I have to wonder about risk management of an EQT position at this point in time – I wonder if investors shouldn’t be managing total capital exposure. EQT (NYSE: EQT ) is out with a tough quarter. Still, much of what EQT reported was expected as the energy sector continues into what have been historically punitive pricing environments. That said, the Q3/15 reporting exemplifies perfectly the pressure that even quality E&Ps like EQT are under: Q3/15 adjusted loss of $0.33 per diluted share, representing a $0.83 per share decrease Y/Y Q3/15 adjusted operating cash flow of $156.3 million, a 46% decrease Y/Y Q3/15 adjusted operating revenues of $188.5 million, a $142.5 million reduction Y/Y Production sales volumes increased 27% compared to the third quarter of 2014 Average realized price of production of $1.21/mcfe, a 55% decrease from $2.69/mcfe Y/Y With EQT’s financials being expected as reported, this placed an extra importance on the investor call that followed the financial reporting. EQT CEO David Porges, SVP & CFO David Conti, and EVP & President of E&P Steven Schlotterbeck did well to cover a wide range of topics on the call. The team also did well to break out as much of the go-forward strategy at the E&P as possible in advance of a presentation of this information to the Board in roughly six weeks. Put simply, without having Board approval, and with being respectful to not presume Board approval, the management team tried to be as granular as possible. The following is my analysis of the key takeaways. Capital Plans and Play Deployment… “Given this potential for lower long-term gas prices, we do not think it’s prudent to invest much money in wells whose all-in after-tax returns exceed our investment hurdle rates by only a relatively small amount. As a result, we are suspending drilling in those areas such as Central Pennsylvania and Upper Devonian play that are outside that core. This decision will affect our 2016 capital plan though we are just starting to develop the specifics of the 2016 drilling program that forms the core of that plan. The focus in 2016 will be on this more narrowly-drawn notion of what the core Marcellus would be assuming the deep Utica play works… We will also pursue the deep Utica play with a goal of determining economics, size of resource that midstream needs and on lowering the cost per well to our target range. Our initial thoughts are a 10 well to 15-well deep Utica program in 2016 with flexibility to shift capital between Marcellus and Utica as warranted based on our progress… I feel uncomfortable putting numbers out there when we’re still what six weeks away from putting numbers in front of our own board. But if you’re looking for directional, it would be – clearly we’re heading less than 2015” A few things were made clear by Porges early on in the call. The first, that EQT is taking operations quite literally day by day. The second, that EQT has to do something regarding what are near-zero ( maybe even negative IRR) after-tax Core Marcellus IRRs on production (SEE: graphic below – current NYMEX is $2.29). I want to think that the returns outlined in EQT’s October investor deck are a blended core rate, but the slide is pretty clearly labeled “Core Marcellus”. If that’s the case, I’m having a hard time seeing where EQT can deploy capital that can be productive . That said, I think Porges was alluding to this as well. He and EQT aren’t willing to continue to invest in wells of this ilk and obviously that’s the only decision that makes sense. In that, EQT is looking to move into its Utica assets (which it believes are deep core) in an effort to begin averaging up IRRs at current NYMEX spot. The big takeaways here? EQT is hurting in a big way on Marcellus production and EQT is going to begin looking elsewhere for the derisking of production. This makes full-year 2016 one of the riskiest on record for the company. Stay tuned here. (click to enlarge) Capital Plans and Play Deployment PART 2: Investments into the Future… “Yeah, we look at all-in return. All-in after-tax returns is the way we tend to look at things. But that overlay that I mentioned in my prepared remarks was we just think we need to bear in mind what if the deep Utica works and what does that mean for clearing prices, et cetera, and therefore we should be particularly cautious about investing in anything but the core Marcellus which does stand up still in those environments and in the core Utica. So, it’s more of that. There’s always uncertainty about what prices are going to be. But whenever you have a new low-cost supply source in any commodity business, you’ve got to start being wearier of where one wants to invest one’s money. So, I think there’s a certain amount of caution that we’re taking that we’re talking about because of that unknown because of not knowing yet the extent to which the deep Utica will work… But our feeling that if it works the way it’s looking like it might that the core areas for Marcellus and Utica are simply going to be narrower. I mean, we’re going to be able to supply a big portion of North America’s natural gas needs from a relatively small geography.” This is hugely important and for me this is a reason to either risk off EQT, even assuming serious mean reversion to 52-week highs on oil beta and then natural gas beta, OR to manage total capital exposure (this can be done using CALL and PUT options as well). For me, Porges is alluding that the Marcellus is staring at potential disruption from the Utica. The Utica core, which EQT does have exposure to and that’s important to remember, is expected to be much, much more cost effective from a production standpoint (at least for EQT) than the non-Marcellus core production at the E&P currently. Porges believes that if the Utica core plays out how it is expected that the Marcellus core by comparison will shrink substantially. Outside of the Marcellus core, because of geographical proximity, it just wouldn’t be competitive to produce in the Marcellus . That matters in a big, big way for EQT. Again, this total uncertainty and required conservatism, which is smart, to me makes the full year one of the riskiest ever at EQT. Be careful when staring in the face of disruption. Production Estimates… “Our preliminary estimate for production volume growth in 2016 versus 2015 is 15% to 20% which we will refine when we announce our formal development plan at early December. If we turn online our fourth quarter wells in late December, as contemplated in our fourth quarter guidance, 2016 growth would likely be near the upper end of that range as those wells would contribute little if anything to volumes until early 2016. Obviously, this overall approach will result in a 2016 capital budget, absent any acquisitions that is a fair bit lower than 2015 and would result in continuing (16:28) of cash on hand as of end 2016 but we will provide specifics in December.” So this was short but meaningful. Keeping with the theme of “day by day” management, the only certainty at EQT at this point is lower CAPEX and potentially 15%-20% production increases based on 2015 activities. EQT isn’t willing, and this makes some sense being in advance of its Board presentations, to commit to any production increases from 2016 activities. At least that’s my read. My guess is, and I’ll reserve the right to be wrong about this, that EQT’s production growth doesn’t come anywhere near the top-end of this range and that its CAPEX sees not one but two big cuts into 2H/16 (the conclusion of 1H/16). I just don’t see the above-noted conservatism and overall NYMEX spot expectations as being productive to increased production. M&A… “Finally, the deep Utica potential has also affected our thoughts around acreage acquisitions. Given our view that our existing acreage sits on what is expected to be the core of the core in deep Utica, we are focusing our area of interest even more tightly on acreage that is in our core Marcellus and potentially core deep Utica area. As you can probably deduce from the lack of significant transaction announcements, the bid/ask spread continues to be wide… We are a patient company and believe that there will be acreage available at fair prices eventually. But the definition of fair has to contemplate the potential that the deep Utica works. We do not think that bodes well for that price of acreage concentrated in anything but the core Marcellus and core Utica. This narrowing focus also suggests that smaller asset deals are much more likely than larger corporate deals. However, as we have stated previously, we are comfortable maintaining our industry-leading balance sheet even as we look for opportunities to create value.” (Steven T. Schlotterbeck – Executive Vice President and President of Exploration & Production) “So, right now, it seems like there’s – people are interested in selling assets. So far, the prices have still been a bit high. But as Dave said, we plan on being patient waiting for what we would consider fair prices before we transact.” Porges’ thoughts here are basically what those following this space have been hearing dating back to November of 2014. The bid/ask spreads are too wide and continue to be too wide for increased M&A velocity. I outlined this dynamic in a recent Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ) note , detailing how Exxon has used this spread to its advantage. That said, if we continue into a lower for longer (which, of course, is the expectation of this space), look for EQT to be in position to take assets at even further firesale prices as those currently marketing assets will likely have to take lower subsequent pricing as their balance sheets continue to degrade in structural integrity. That would bode well for longer-term EQT investors, as EQT might be able to “reset” its blended Utica/Marcellus IRRs by force rather than by organic development . If EQT can bid away core Utica acreage (assuming production does prove out to be more competitive in size than core Marcellus production), this would derisk its Marcellus-focused model significantly and have the E&P back on the board as one of the safest plays in this space (natural gas focused from a resource standpoint). That’s the big takeaway from this excerpt. That and EQT might be able to play a lower for longer, which is punitive to its financials in the immediate term, into securitization of seriously competitive long-term viability. It’s just as beneficial sometimes to be lucky as it is to be good. Again, stay tuned. Summary Thoughts… I’ve been an EQT bull in the past and I’m not implying anything of catastrophic risk in the immediate or the mid-term. I believe in EQT’s balance sheet, management, and operations as-is currently. But, and this is important, if the Utica usurps the Marcellus as the low cost, prolific production source in the geographic area, that’s going to matter in a big way for EQT. With EQT management being clear about that on the Q3/15 investor call, I think investors should take into consideration what that should mean to risk management. I would recommend taking a hard look at capital exposure to this name and at considering hedging that exposure via CALL or PUT options. I just view the EQT story as having significant implied risk at this point (if not real risk). I’ll closely follow this E&P for updates and provide analysis as possible. Good luck everybody.

What Is And Isn’t ‘Risk’

It’s a popular thing to bash on measuring the risk of an investment portfolio with standard deviation, the preferred metric of most academic studies. If you skipped stats in college (congratulations, by the way), standard deviation measures how much movement around an average return you might expect in an asset or portfolio. So higher standard deviation = bigger “swings” in, say, annual stock market returns. Of course, standard deviation is far from perfect. Most commonly cited is that no one cares about big swings to the upside – a big up year is hardly perceived as risk by any investor! A popular line from many institutional investors, especially value-oriented stock pickers, is that “the only real risk is the permanent loss of capital.” Such a nice little soundbite. You hear this all the time, including from giants like Seth Klarman and Howard Marks. And for a stock picker, I suppose avoiding the permanent loss of capital is huge. Especially if you run a concentrated portfolio of 20-30 stocks. Right now I wouldn’t want to be the guys managing the Sequoia fund, which at the end of the second quarter had a 28.7% stake in Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE: VRX ). Valeant is down big ($96.65 today from $178 and change less than a week ago) this week after becoming the target of a short-seller accusing the company of massive fraud. I don’t know or particularly care how Valeant shakes out, but if you have a stock that is over 25% of your portfolio, you don’t want it to go bankrupt. There’s no coming back from that. The trouble with the “permanent loss of capital” risk definition for most investors is that it is laughably easy to avoid. Anyone who owns one single diversified index fund has done it. Sure, if you have a fund with 3,000 stocks in it, a few are bound to go bankrupt. But those fractional losses are indistinguishable from the day-to-day 1% swings in the broad market. Any diversified investor has effectively eliminated the permanent loss of capital. So we’re back to other definitions of risk. Despite its imperfections, standard deviation (or volatility, call it what you want) is a pretty decent measurement of risk. No one is shocked to learn that a 90-day T-Bill has less volatility than an emerging market stock. Or that a 30-year Treasury Bond has more volatility than that 90-day T-Bill. And sure, standard deviation measures big swings to the upside right alongside big drawdowns. But the thing is that you can’t find me an asset class that has big upside swings without the big drawdowns. Here’s everybody’s favorite chart: (click to enlarge) Emerging markets stocks were up 66.42% in 1999! Of course they were down 25% the year before that and down 30% the following year. Small-cap growth stocks crushed it in 2009-2010 up 34.47% and 29.09%, but they were down -38.54% in 2008, worse than the S&P 500. Nothing gives you high double-digit gains without the occasional double-digit loss, unless you’re Bernie Madoff. The last argument against using volatility as a measurement of risk is usually, “So what?” Many value stock managers like to act as if huge one-year drawdowns don’t matter in the long run. They don’t want to talk about risk-adjusted returns. Well, maybe they don’t interact with their investors very much, but volatility matters to investors for two very real reasons. Drawdowns are hard to deal with, emotionally. Big losses can make for skittish investors. I don’t care how “experienced” you are as an investor. It is still hard. I remember in 2008-2009 talking to very intelligent, longtime investors who were really convinced (for a myriad of reasons we’ll get into some other time) that this time was worth being scared. Each new bear market is scary. It’s different, the economy is different, your life is different, your portfolio’s behavior is different. Each and every time. Successful investors have to stick to their investment strategy throughout these periods. We are often the greatest risk to our own portfolio, and a very real risk indeed. Drawdowns can be hard to deal with, financially. Warren Buffett is famous for saying that his favorite holding period is “forever,” but you aren’t Warren Buffett. At some point in our lives, most of us will spend money regularly from our investment portfolios. If you’re taking regular distributions, volatility matters a lot. A big drawdown can put a portfolio’s longevity at risk if liquidity is insufficient, withdrawals are too large or the drawdown is too deep. Platitudes about indefinite time horizons are lovely, but real life doesn’t always work that way. Volatility as risk matters to the bottom line of any portfolio funding regular withdrawals.

Insight From Quant Research Part 1: Quality Minus Junk

Summary Renowned investors like Warren Buffett proclaim the attractiveness of “high quality” stocks. But what evidence is there that these really outperform across the board? Prominent researcher / hedge fund manager Cliff Asness investigated this question. Background Even for those that consider themselves purely bottoms-up, fundamental investors, there is a lot of valuable insight to be gleaned from the large volume of quantitative research available in the academic literature. One of the most noteworthy pieces over the past few years, “Quality Minus Junk” , is an emblematic example. This paper was written by Cliff Asness (one of the best known quantitative investors / hedge fund managers today), along with Andrea Frazzini and Lasse Pedersen from AQR Investments, and studies the tendency for “high quality” stocks to generate alpha relative to “low quality” stocks. In this article, I’ll walk through the key findings and why they’re valuable for us. Research Methodology In order to test the hypothesis about whether high-quality stocks do in fact outperform, Asness et al. first had to decide how to define “quality.” They ultimately decided to adopt a broad definition, by taking the average of four different proxies: Profitability : They measured profits (per unit of book value) in several ways, including gross profits, margins, earnings, accruals and cash flows. Growth : This was calculated over the period spanning from the prior five years in each of their profitability measures. Safety : They assessed both return-based measures of safety (e.g., market beta and volatility) and fundamental-based measures of safety (e.g., stocks with low leverage, low volatility of profitability, and low credit risk). Payout : The payout ratio is the fraction of profits paid out to shareholders, and can be seen as a measure of shareholder friendliness. The particular metrics they used were equity and debt net issuance and total net payout over profits. They then computed a quality score based on this definition for 39,308 stocks, covering 24 developed market countries between June 1951 and December 2012. Finally, for each of the U.S. and the global basket of developed market countries, they calculated the historical-return series resulting from buying the top 30% high-quality stocks and shorting the bottom 30%. Here is what these series look like. Key Findings As the visuals above would suggest, this ‘quality minus junk’, or QMJ, factor delivered positive returns in 23 out of 24 countries that they studied and highly statistically significant risk-adjusted returns both in the U.S. and abroad. This reflects the researchers’ observation that although higher-quality firms have exhibited higher prices on average, they have still been sufficiently undervalued relative to low-quality firms to deliver meaningful excess returns. Upon digging in deeper, there are also a couple of additional noteworthy findings from this analysis. Importantly, beyond looking just at the raw returns of their QMJ series, they also calculated its alpha by running regressions on the four standard Fama-French risk factors (market beta, small-minus-big, high-minus-low book value, and up-minus-down – i.e., momentum). The purpose was to demonstrate whether there is indeed statistically significant alpha beyond what can be explained by the standard risk factors. As shown below, they found that there was, with 0.5%+ of monthly alpha in most geographies. Finally, they evaluated QMJ’s alpha in different types of market environments, shown below. Interestingly, they found that the alpha was particularly strong during recessions, which they attribute to a “flight to quality” among investors during these periods of time. In other words, in addition to offering positive returns, QMJ could also reduce a portfolio’s market risk. This characteristic is particularly notable given that it seems to clearly contradict the critical underpinning of the efficient market hypothesis that investors can only be rewarded with excess returns for taking additional market risk. Conclusion Many renowned investors (most famously, Warren Buffett) have proclaimed the attractiveness of long-term investing in high-quality businesses, particularly when prices are relatively low. Investors can take more comfort in these assertions given that they are in fact backed up by a relatively large body of historical data from around the world.