Tag Archives: income

Seeking The Asian See’s Candies

Buffett’s Investment In See’s Candies See’s Candies, a manufacturer and distributor of candy, in particular, boxed chocolates, was cited by Warren Buffett in his response to the first question asked at this year’s Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A ) annual meeting. Buffett said that “The ideal business is one that takes no capital, and yet grows. And there are a few businesses like that, and we own some.” See’s is one of them.” Buffett purchased See’s Candies in January 1972 for $25 million, equivalent to 10 times and 6.2 times its after-tax earnings of $2.5 million and pre-tax earnings of $4.2 million respectively. See’s Candies’ Wide Moat At Berkshire Hathaway’s 1997 annual meeting, Charlie Munger made reference to the purchase of See’s Candies as “the first time we paid for quality,” according to Robert G. Hagstrom’s book “The Warren Buffett Way.” In Berkshire Hathaway’s 2007 letter, Buffett called See’s Candies the “prototype of a dream business.” See’s Candies’ wide moat is derived from several factors, including an enduring brand, strong pricing power, low capital intensity and local dominance. A 71-year old lady named Mary See started See’s Candies as a small candy shop in Los Angeles in 1921. In the domain of enduring consumer brands, where histories are measured in decades, instead of years, See’s Candies benefits from significant customer loyalty driven by habitual purchases and affiliation with the brand. The best illustration of See’s Candies’ brand power comes from none other than Buffett himself: When you were a 16-year-old, you took a box of candy on your first date with a girl and gave it either to her parents or to her. In California the girls slap you when you bring Russell Stover, and kiss you when you bring See’s. See’s Candies’ pricing power is validated by the fact that its pre-tax earnings per pound of chocolate sold grew by a 8.3% CAGR from 25 cents in 1972 to $2 in 1998, which were largely attributed to annual price increases which can be as much as 5% . It had the power to raise prices due to its brand equity and customer price sensitivity. While See’s Candies derived tremendous profit from the sale of boxed chocolate, the money spent on a small-ticket item like chocolates was only a small proportion of household expenditure (and were occasion-driven purchases), and buying more modestly-priced chocolate generated limited cost savings. According to Berkshire Hathaway’s 2007 shareholder letter, See’s Candies was a capital-efficient business which generated a 60% pre-tax return on invested capital at the time of Buffett’s purchase, helped by the fact that sales were transacted in cash (receivable days close to zero) and the production and distribution cycle was short (low inventory days). Regarding local dominance, it was noted in Buffett’s letters that See’s “obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states,” “our candy is preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor, and “most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy costing two or three times as much” in the company’s primary marketing area on the West Coast. On the demand side, it is impossible to be everything to everyone given local tastes and heritage; See’s Candies clearly cemented its reputation in California and on the West Coast. See’s also benefited from local economies of scale by dominating the few states and benefiting from fixed cost leverage for logistics and advertising. In a nutshell, See’s Candies enjoyed the widest moat possibly by combining high customer captivity with scale economies. Asia’s See’s Candies Thailand-listed Taokaenoi Food & Marketing, a manufacturer of seaweed snacks, is potentially Asia’s See’s Candies and a wide moat investment candidate at the right price. Taokaenoi was founded by Mr. Itthipat “Tob” Peeradechapan in 2004 (he was 23 years old then), who is currently in his early-thirties. Mr. Itthipat had an entrepreneurial bent since his high school days, when he made money selling virtual weapons for cash on the online role-playing game EverQuest, according to a December 2015 Wall Street Journal article titled “Thai Fried Seaweed King Is on a Roll.” Tao Kae Noi was started as a roasted-chestnut stall business, before he discovered the huge demand and potential for seaweed snacks. Seaweed snacks can be perceived as the Asian equivalent of potato chip and snacks in the West. The brand Tao Kae Noi is synonymous with seaweed snacks in Thailand and many parts of Asia. Taokaenoi passes the local dominance test, boasting a 61.5% market share of Thailand’s 2.5 billion baht packaged seaweed snack market in 2015, according to AC Nielsen research. In other words, Taokaenoi has more than three times the market share of its closest competing brand Masita (17.5% market share) owned by Singha Corporation. The Company’s gross margin, a proxy for pricing power, increased by 610 basis points from 29.3% in 2011 to 35.4% in 2015. I estimate Taokaenoi’s 2015 return on invested capital to be approximately 80% in 2015, comparable with See’s Candies’ 60% pre-tax return on invested capital at the time of Buffett’s investment. Taokaenoi’s inventory days are decent at slightly over a month. Taokaenoi has set an ambitious target of becoming the top Asian seaweed snack brand with annual revenues of 5 billion baht by 2018 and transforming into a global (Taokaenoi derived 52% of its 2015 sales outside of its home market Thailand via export to 34 countries) seaweed snack powerhouse with yearly sales of 10 billion baht by 2024. This implies three-year and nine-year revenue CAGRs of 12.6% and 12.4% respectively compared with Taokaenoi’s 2015 sales of 3.5 billion baht. Taokaenoi was first highlighted to my premium research service subscribers on December 5, 2015 in a subscribers-only article listing five Asian hidden champions. Since Taokaenoi’s listing and trading debut in December 2015, its share price has surged by over 70%. Please refer to my article “Hidden Champions As A Source Of Wide Moat Investment Opportunities” for more information on hidden champions. As a bonus for my subscribers of my premium research service , they will get access to a profile of another Asia-listed hidden champion/See’s Candies in the food business and a list of five “new” Asian hidden champions. Asia/U.S. Deep-Value Wide-Moat Stocks Premium Research Subscribers to my Asia/U.S. Deep-Value Wide-Moat Stocks exclusive research service get full access to the list of deep-value & wide moat investment candidates and value traps, including “Magic Formula” stocks, wide moat compounders, hidden champions, high quality businesses, net-nets, net cash stocks, low P/B stocks and sum-of-the-parts discounts. The potential investment candidates I profiled for my subscribers in May 2015 include: (1) a U.S.-listed market leader in a niche consumer lifestyle space which is trading at 0.80 times P/NCAV and 0.70 times P/B, but remains debt-free and profitable; (2) a U.S.-listed Net Operating Losses-rich deep value play valued by the market at 2.6 times EV/EBITDA net of the present value of its NOLs; (3) an Asian-listed manufacturer of wireless communication products which is the market leader in its home market and the first to export such products to the U.S.; it is a net-net trading at 0.75 times P/NCAV with net cash equivalent to its market capitalization; (4) a U.S.-listed Magic Formula stock trading at 3 times trailing EV/EBIT and Acquirer’s Multiple, sporting a 10% dividend yield net of withholding tax; (5) a U.S.-listed Munger Cannibal trading at 7 times trailing EV/EBIT and Acquirer’s Multiple; (6) an Asian-listed company which is a global leader in a certain medical device niche trading at 3.5 times trailing EV/EBIT and 3.5 times Acquirer’s Multiple, versus a trailing ROIC of 27%. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

New 50-Year Bull Market For Precious Metals? (Podcast With Avi Gilburt)

Click to enlarge Avi Gilburt is a student of Elliott Wave analysis and has been following gold (NYSEARCA: GLD ), silver (NYSEARCA: SLV ), and other precious metals for years. In this interview, he takes us behind the scenes to better understand Elliott Wave. In addition, Avi gives his argument for why he believes we are near the beginning of a 50-year bull market in precious metals. That means both the metals and miners (NYSEARCA: GDX ). (Click the play button above to hear the podcast.) When I pressed Avi for more details about what he expects a 50-year bull market in the metals to look like, he compared it to the Dow going from ~100 in 1941 to 18,000+ in the past year. Click to enlarge This chart just shows the last 30 years for the Dow, but still helps put Avi’s point in perspective a bit. I hope you enjoy the interview as much as I did. I look forward to your thoughts and comments below. – Brian Disclosure : This article is for information purposes only. Comments made my guests do not necessarily represent the views of Brian or Investor in the Family. There are risks involved with investing including loss of principal. Brian and Investor in the Family makes no explicit or implicit guarantee with respect to performance or the outcome of any investment or projections made. There is no guarantee that the goals of the strategies discussed by Brian and Investor in the Family will be met. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Shiller Was Warned Not To Tell The Truth About The Stock Market – And We All Heard The Message

By Rob Bennett Robert Shiller says in his book Irrational Exuberance that: “On several occasions I have discovered firsthand the pressure on public prognosticators to deliver positive statements about the market. Once, just before going on national television, the anchor looked me squarely in the eye and told me that what I said could conceivably have an impact on the market, and that people can get upset if they perceive prognosticators as disrupting the market.” I’d like to know what Buy-and-Holders think of that statement. Buy-and-Hold is rooted in the belief that it is economic developments, not investor emotion, that determine stock prices. If that were so, nothing that Shiller said could affect the market. Do Buy-and-Holders think that the television anchor’s worries were foolish ones? I don’t think they were foolish so much as dangerous. What Shiller or anyone else says certainly can affect market prices. Buy-and-Holders agree even though they follow a strategy rooted in a belief that only economic developments matter. I know because it is Buy-and-Holders who have insisted that I be banned at the 20 investing sites at which I have gotten the boot. If what I said didn’t matter, why would the Buy-and-Holders want to see me banned? The Buy-and-Holders haven’t convinced even themselves that only economic developments matter. We all filter out information that disturbs us because it threatens our confidence in our world view. Conservatives filter out information advanced by liberals and liberals filter out information advanced by conservatives and it has ever been so. It’s a universal phenomenon. What possible reason could there be for believing that it doesn’t work that way with stocks? A man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest. I filter out information casting doubt on the merit of the Valuation-Informed Indexing strategy. I am not aware of doing so, and I understand that it’s a bad idea to do so. I need to know the drawbacks more than anyone else does. It is foolish for me to tune out the words of my critics. But it’s hard to imagine that I do not often do so. Humans always tune out stuff they don’t want to hear. Is that not so? And it always hurts us. That’s also so. That’s why I see such a huge opportunity in Shiller’s research. If we were to begin taking Shiller’s research seriously, we could overcome the force that has made stock investing risky since the beginning of time. That force is self-deception. Do away with self-deception and you change the game in a fundamental way. Many people think it can’t be done. Since we always have engaged in self-deception re stocks, they think we always will. I am more hopeful because Shiller’s P/E10 metric quantifies the effect of self-deception. Now that we can tell people the dollar-and-cents price of following Buy-and-Hold strategies, we can persuade them to ditch the self-deception. People like to make money. We now have the tool we need to motivate investors to demand that Shiller and lots of others tell them the straight story. Even Shiller does not tell the straight story today. It is not my intent to be critical with that statement but to point out how deep the problem goes. Shiller’s next words in the passage that I quoted above are: “He was right, of course, to give me such advice, and I shudder to think that I (or anyone else) could ever help cause a market event that would cost some people their fortunes.” Huh? The television anchor invited an expert onto his television show and then discouraged that expert from sharing his true beliefs with his listeners. How could that possibly be the right thing to do? The television anchor should be ashamed of himself. Shiller should be proud of himself for sharing this revealing anecdote and also a little ashamed as well for soft-peddling the danger of the practice (which is widespread) described. Everyone does what the television anchor did. The newspapers celebrate price jumps even though all they do is raise the price of stocks, a good that all of us who hope to be able to retire someday must buy. Investment advisors brag about the good advice they gave when prices rise even though all price increases greater than those justified by the economic realities (that is, all price increases greater than the 6.5 percent real price increase that has been the price increase that has applied in the U.S. market for as far back as we have records) are temporary cotton-candy gains fated to be blown away in the wind as time passes. Retirement calculators assume 6.5 percent gains on a going-forward basis even when prices are insanely inflated and it is obviously unrealistic to expect such gains. Everyone lies in the stock investing field. Because everyone demands lies. Those who don’t lie are silenced. Those who don’t lie make the ones who do lie look bad. A bull market cannot survive truth-telling. And we all like those pretend cotton-candy gains. For obvious reasons. Two paragraphs down from the passage cited above, Shiller tells a different anecdote: “One investment manager for a pension plan spoke to me about how difficult it was for him to suggest in his public statements that people should perhaps be concerned about overpricing of the stock market. Despite his considerable reputation and apparent sympathy with the views expressed in my book, he seemed to be saying that it was not within his authority to make bold and unprovable statements contrary to conventional wisdom. He seemed to view his charge as interpreting received doctrine and that it would be considered a dereliction of duty to voice contrary opinions that came only from his own judgment.” We expect doctors to express their own judgment. That’s why they get paid the big bucks. It’s the same with baseball umpires. And with accountants. And with lawyers. And with engineers. And with every other kind of professional. The person giving investing advice is the only exception to the otherwise universal rule. Because of what the television anchor said to Shiller. Question Pretend Gains and they might disappear. No one wants that. And so the Pretend Gains grow bigger and bigger and bigger until the cost associated with their disappearance (which is ultimately inevitable) becomes so large that it causes an economic crisis. It’s a problem. Disclosure : None