Tag Archives: financial

Activist Investors Cannot Generate Significant, Long-Term Gains

Originally posted in TheStreet on May 18, 2016. Can activist investors deliver the outsized returns that their actions and rhetoric seem to promise? TheStreet recently published an interesting article about the potential impact of activist hedge fund managers and the failure of mega mergers – sometimes potentially good deals. But the article only touches on part of the dilemma of the whole activist strategy and mania. While activism becomes popular at specific times, particularly in bull markets, the strategy probably cannot generate long term alpha or outperformance. The central problem is that an activist has to have a large position in a stock to have an impact. This is fine in a bull market as stock prices rise. Indeed, it is probable that a large amount of the stock uplift in a position held by an activist has nothing to do with the activism; rather, it stems from buying into a rising market. Naturally, an activist’s buying helps with demand for the stock. But if the wider market declines, the activists’ ‘activism’ tends to become increasingly irrelevant to the direction of the stock (if it ever really was in the first place). In a sudden bear market, activists tend to find they have large concentrated positions that often become highly illiquid – or at least can only be sold down at a significant discount to their then market price. This phenomena wiped out various activists with limited experience in the last credit crisis. They included Aticus Capital , the fund of Timothy Barakett and Nathan Rothschild. Curiously enough, these types of financial models are not uncommon. There are numerous industries that make a significant ROIC during good times, only systematically to wipe out years of historic retained profits in bad times. It is true, for example, of many aviation lessors . These companies are betting not just on aircraft lease rentals, but more importantly on the residual value of aircraft at the end of say a typical 5-year lease. If aircraft values have gone up during that lease period (usually because of benign economic conditions) the lessors make out like bandits. However in an economic downturn, there are fewer passengers, aircraft sit in deserts unused, their rentals collapse, and critically, so do their values. The result is aircraft lessors usually make a nice ROE for a few years and then wipe out most of the last few years’ retained earnings in downturns . For many such companies their long term ROE may even be negative. An honest aircraft leasing executive in presenting his budget would show gradually rising returns for a few years and then suddenly profits falling off a cliff during an expected market downfall. Unsurprisingly, you rarely see such budgets in the industry, as the leasing executive would be unlikely to keep his job for long. Other industries have similar features, including the investment banking industry. Significantly, it seems activist hedge fund managers fit into the same category. They experience a solid and easy run as the equity markets rise and then often a wipe-out of numerous years of return when the market collapses. Large, illiquid positions make orderly disposals, and avoiding such losses, in a downturn extremely difficult. Like the leasing executive, I’ve yet to see an activist investment prospectus that says: “we forecast to make solid returns for a number of years, and then in the next market downturn can be expected to lose our shirt….” There are also now so many managers dabbling in activism that like many hedge fund strategies it has just become ubiquitous. There is the odd activist like Carl Icahn who seems to make it always work, but then in reality he has unique market influence and uses other methods, aside from pure activism to influence management decisions and share price. There are also maneuvers (e.g., taking profits when a merger is announced even if it doesn’t happen, partial hedging of long positions before it’s too late, etc.) that good activists regularly use to mitigate downside risk. But the central long-term flaw in the strategy remains. Approach activism with great caution and do your research. Consider what costs it is worth paying for this type of strategy? The activist may be just a heavily concentrated, long only bull market investor. Probe how he will manage the inevitable downturns? Jeremy Josse is the author of Dinosaur Derivatives and Other Trades , an alternative take on financial philosophy and theory (published by Wiley & Co). He is also a Managing Director and Head of the Financial Institutions Group at Sterne Agee CRT in New York. Josse is a visiting researcher in finance at Sy Syms business school in New York. The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CRT Capital Group LLC, its affiliates, or its employees. Josse has no position in the stocks mentioned in this article.

Open Letter To Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: Target Lions Gate Entertainment

Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund’s CEO Yngve Slyngstad recently told the Financial Times that the fund is looking to restructure compensations plans at certain companies in its portfolio. “We have so far looked at this in a way that has focused on pay structures rather than pay levels…We think, due to the way the issue of executive remuneration has developed, that we will have to look at what an appropriate level of executive remuneration is as well.” As the fund looks for a company it can target, we offer a candidate: Lions Gate Entertainment (NYSE: LGF ). How Reforming Executive Compensation Creates Value For Investors We applaud the fund for looking at both the structure and the size of executive compensation packages. Many of the fund’s 9,000 holdings overpay their executives for hitting targets that don’t create shareholder value. Over the past several months, we’ve written a number of articles about the risks that excessive and misaligned executive compensation plans pose to investors. We’ve dissected examples of poor compensation plans leading to significant shareholder value destruction, from Valeant (NYSE: VRX ) to Men’s Wearhouse (NYSE: TLRD ). When boards of directors pay executives based on misleading and easily manipulated performance metrics, they harm investors in two ways. Immediate wasted money: the compensation going to executives, in the form of cash or equity, decreases the amount of cash flows available to investors. Long-term value destruction: poorly designed compensation plans incentivize behavior that leads to poor operational and strategic decisions with respect to the long-term interests of shareholders. For more evidence of the outsized impact of compensation plans on a business, look no further than Home Depot (NYSE: HD ). From 2001-2006, CEO Robert Nardelli earned $240 million in compensation. For comparison, his counterpart at Lowe’s (NYSE: LOW ) made around $30 million over that same time, about 1/8th of Nardelli’s compensation despite Lowe’s being between 1/4th to 1/3rd Home Depot’s size. In addition, Nardelli’s compensation was heavily tied to EPS-which he boosted by buying back billions of dollars of shares every year-and sales growth, which he accomplished by investing heavily in the company’s low margin, low return on invested capital ( ROIC ) wholesale business. These moves helped Nardelli’s bonus, but they created little value for investors. During Nardelli’s tenure, Home Depot’s stock was essentially flat. In the midst of a bull market and a housing bubble, Home Depot delivered almost no returns to shareholders! In 2006, activist Ralph Whitworth took a 1.2% stake in Home Depot and began agitating for a change to the company’s executive compensation practices. He was able to force Nardelli out, significantly reduce CEO pay to less than $10 million a year, and institute a compensation plan with long-term incentives for increasing ROIC. Figure 1: Stock Prices Move In Line With Return On Invested Capital Click to enlarge Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings Figure 1 shows how Home Depot significantly underperformed Lowe’s stock during Nardelli’s tenure. It also shows how it significantly outperformed after Whitworth’s reforms, gaining more than 200%. This link between stock prices and ROIC is intuitive and well-known among more diligent investors. Increasing ROIC is the best way to create long-term value for shareholders . Linking executive compensation to ROIC has helped companies such as AutoZone (NYSE: AZO ) outperform the market for many years. Don’t just take our word for it either. S&P Capital IQ recently released a study showing a significant statistical link between ROIC improvement and outperformance. Finding A Target: Lions Gate Entertainment Lions Gate turned heads when it handed CEO Jon Feltheimer over $60 million in equity awards as part of a new five-year contract. The board lauded the company’s strong performance in 2014 as justification for the large stock award, but our numbers show that ROIC actually fell from 12.1% to 11.1% that year. As Figure 2 shows, the problem goes far beyond just 2014. Over the past five years, Lions Gate has spent a larger portion of its enterprise value on executive compensation than any of the companies in its self-identified peer group for which we have five years of data. Figure 2: High Executive Compensation + Poor Return On Invested Capital = Bad News For Investors Click to enlarge Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings. “TTM” = Trailing Twelve Months. Figure 2 also shows that Lions Gate’s ROIC has dropped to just 2.3%, putting it near the bottom of its peer group. That’s due in part to disappointing results from several films this year. It also reflects a compensation plan that does a poor job aligning executive incentives with shareholder interests. Both annual and long-term incentive bonuses are tied to a non-GAAP metric called “adjusted EBITDA.” This metric does a poor job of measuring shareholder value creation for several reasons: Excluding depreciation and amortization means that executives are not held accountable for capital allocation. They can boost adjusted EBITDA by investing heavily in low return projects and excluding the costs. Adjusted EBITDA excludes stock-based compensation, which is a real expense and should be accounted for. Since executives are largely paid in stock, they get to largely exclude their own compensation when calculating profitability. Adjusted EBITDA makes a number of adjustments for purchase accounting, start-up losses, and backstopped expenses. These are real costs, and executives have a high degree of discretion when it comes to calculating these numbers so they can hit their targets. Tying executive compensation to such a flawed metric is a recipe for low ROIC and significant shareholder dilution. Sure enough, going back to 2005 Lions Gate has earned an ROIC below its cost of capital ( WACC ) in every year except 2013-2015, when it was buoyed by the success of the (now-ended) Hunger Games franchise. Over that time, its share count increased by 47%. Succeeding through creating original content is tough. It’s even tougher when management is not a responsible steward of capital. It should come as no surprise that the most successful company in the industry, Disney (NYSE: DIS ), is also one of the few that links executive compensation directly to ROIC. If Lions Gate wants to have any hope of creating long-term value for shareholders, it needs to cut back on executive compensation and better align compensation incentives with investors’ best interests. Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund should consider Lions Gate as its first target in its campaign against excessive executive compensation. Disclosure: David Trainer and Sam McBride receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, sector, style, or theme. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

4 Best-Ranked Touchstone Mutual Funds

As of April 30, Touchstone Investments managed $15.6 billion of assets (excluding money market instruments) invested in a wide range of mutual funds. The mutual funds are managed by equity and fixed income funds as well as domestic and foreign funds. The company seeks to “help investors achieve their financial goals by providing access to a distinctive selection of institutional asset managers who are known and respected for proficiency in their specific area of expertise.” Touchstone provides financial services to its clients, with around 18 sub-advisors, including Analytic Investors LLC and Apex Capital Management Inc. Below, we share with you four top-rated Touchstone mutual funds. Each has earned a Zacks Mutual Fund Rank #1 (Strong Buy) and is expected to outperform its peers in the future. To view the Zacks Rank and past performance of all Touchstone mutual funds, investors can click here . Touchstone Mid Cap Value Fund Adv (MUTF: TCVYX ) seeks growth of capital. It invests a large chunk of its assets in common stocks of companies having market capitalization within the range of the Russell Midcap Index. The fund gained 16.9% over the last three-month period. Jay C. Willadsen has been one of the fund managers of TCVYX since 2014. Touchstone Dynamic Diversified Income Fund A (MUTF: TBAAX ) is a “fund of funds.” It invests in a wide range of underlying mutual funds, including both equity and fixed-income focused mutual funds. Most of the underlying funds in which TBAAX invests its assets are expected to be affiliated. It gained 8.9% over the last three-month period. TBAAX has an expense ratio of 0.49%, as compared to the category average of 0.80%. Touchstone Value Fund A (MUTF: TVLAX ) seeks capital appreciation over the long run. It invests primarily in equity securities of mid- and large-cap companies. The fund invests in securities of companies that are believed to be undervalued. TVLAX may invest not more than 15% of its assets in securities of companies located in foreign lands. It gained 10.3% over the last three-month period. As of March 2016, TVLAX held 46 issues, with 3.57% of its assets invested in Verizon Communications Inc. (NYSE: VZ ) Touchstone Active Bond Fund Adv (MUTF: TOBYX ) invests a lion’s share of its assets in bonds, including government as well as corporate debt securities, and mortgage-related securities. It may also invest a maximum of 20% of its assets in debt securities that are issued by foreign entities. The fund gained 1.4% over the last three-month period. TOBYX has an expense ratio of 0.65%, as compared to the category average of 0.82%. Original Post