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Hedge Funds – Misunderstood, But Still Not Worth It

Cliff Asness has a wonderful new piece on Bloomberg View discussing hedge funds. He basically argues that: Hedge fund criticism has been unfair largely due to false benchmarking. Hedge funds should hedge more. Hedge funds should charge lower fees. These are fair and balanced statements. And they’re worth exploring a bit more. The first point is dead on. The media loves to compare everything to the S&P 500, which is ridiculous. The S&P 500 is a domestic slice of 500 companies in a global sea of millions of companies. It neither represents “the stock market”, the “global stock market” nor anything remotely close to “the financial markets”. I have pleaded with people at times to stop comparing everything to the S&P 500. But no one listens to me, so it’s not surprising that this continues. 1 Hedge funds are treated particularly unfairly here, because, as Cliff notes, they’re not even net long stocks on average. The average hedge fund is only about 40% net long stocks. The portfolio is also comprised of bonds and alternatives, making classification difficult to average out. But the point is that the S&P 500 is absolutely not a good comparison. 2 I would argue that the proper benchmark for all active managers is the Global Financial Asset Portfolio , which is the true benchmark for anyone who actively deviates from global cap weighting (which is everyone, by the way). The second point is also clearly true, as hedge funds have become increasingly correlated to the S&P 500 over time. Differentiation is what makes alternative asset classes valuable. Unfortunately, you don’t get much differentiation in hedge funds, and I don’t think this can reasonably change as the industry grows, because, as assets under management grow, the managers will inevitably start to look similar, since there are only so many assets that can be held at the same time. The paradox of active management is that the more active everyone becomes, the more all this activity starts to look like the same thing (minus taxes and fees). The last one is my major point of contention. A globally allocated 40/60 stock/bond portfolio earned about 7.5% per year over the last 40 years. And this was in an era when that 60% bond piece averaged about 6.3% per year. Those days are long gone. I think it’s safe to assume that balanced portfolios will generate lower returns simply due to the fact that the bonds cannot generate the same returns in a 0% interest rate environment. Either that, or the stock piece will probably expose the portfolio to more risk, resulting in similar but riskier returns, on average. I’ve discussed this in some detail, and we even have some historical precedent for this when bonds generated about 2.5% returns from 1940-1980 during a period of low and rising rates. So, the question becomes: In a world of low returns, how can hedge funds justify charging something like 2 & 20, which cuts the total return by almost 50% assuming benchmark returns? Hedge funds have a huge hurdle to overcome on the fee side, and the arithmetic of the markets shows us that they can’t all do it. That arithmetic is clearly coming into play in an environment where aggregate returns have been fairly weak. At the same time, many people clearly benefit from having an investment manager. Vanguard has shown that a good advisor/manager can be worth as much as 3% per year (which I suspect is high), and the average investor has been shown to do far worse than they do when someone like an advisor consistently slaps their hand away from making persistent changes. The value-add of a manager is largely subjective and always personal, but I have a hard time believing people should pay more for an asset manager than they do for doctors, accountants, lawyers, etc. In my mind, portfolio managers and advisors are more like personal trainers – they’re a luxury for people who know they’re not knowledgeable or disciplined enough to build and maintain a proper plan. But personal trainers shouldn’t cost you an arm and a leg. I like Cliff’s points, and there’s some good takeaways in there. But I still think point three is really difficult to overcome. Hedge funds simply charge too much. In a world where you can now mimic a hedge fund index for the cost of 0.75% , it’s very hard to imagine that there’s any rationale for fees being higher than that, on average. And I suspect that, like most high-fee active managers, these sorts of funds won’t benefit investors in the long run anyhow. 3 1 – This is not an entirely true statement. My wife listens to me on rare occasion, but has good reason to ignore most of what I say, since it mostly involves rants about things like quantitative easing and other things almost no one cares about. My dog listens to me roughly 90% of the time, though she selectively ignores me, such as late last night when she got sprayed in the face by a skunk because she did not properly respond to my commands. My chickens do not listen to me at all. I am not sure if it’s because they are geniuses or idiots. Probably geniuses, as they’ve clearly evolved to be unable to hear the Cullen Roche voice. By the way, if you’re still reading this, you should probably be questioning your own evolutionary development. 2 – Part of what’s exacerbated this problem is that Warren Buffett made a public bet with some hedge fund managers who decided it was smart to benchmark their performance to the S&P 500 on a nominal basis. I can only assume that Buffett drugged them before getting them to agree to this deal, since only someone on drugs would benchmark hedge funds to the nominal return of the S&P 500. 3 – Yes, I know this is not a perfect hedge fund replicator, but it’s close enough.

Real Risk Taking Will Not Return Until The Fed Flip-Flops

In a strong bull market, higher volatility stocks tend to outperform lower volatility stocks. The PowerShares S&P 500 High Beta (NYSEARCA: SPHB ):iShares USA Minimum Volatility (NYSEARCA: USMV ) price ratio demonstrates how the bull market in equities has been giving way since the highs in the Dow and the S&P 500 one year ago (May 2015). Similarly, in a strong bull market, growth-oriented assets tend to outperform value-oriented holdings. Instead, the iShares Core Growth (NYSEARCA: IUSG ):Vanguard Value (NYSEARCA: VTV ) price ratio illustrates a shift in preference from higher-flying growth securities to “safer” value stocks. The hallmark of bullishness, indiscriminate risk taking, is no longer present in equities. It has been steadily eroding in bonds as well. Take a look at the SPDR High Yield Bond (NYSEARCA: JNK ):iShares 7-10 Year Treasury (NYSEARCA: IEF ) price ratio. The remarkable rally off of the February lows offered some “hopium” that the worst is over for junk debt. On the other hand, the long-term trend toward pursuing safety in treasuries as well as the likelihood of “sell in May” defensive posturing does not favor yield seeking speculation going forward. Perhaps risk taking will return in a meaningful manner soon. I doubt it. Valuation extremes would need to become valuation bargains or, at the very least, the Federal Reserve would need to expand its balance sheet (QE/QE-like activity) yet again. Low borrowing rates alone cannot do the trick when corporate earnings (EBITDA) are deteriorating, revenue is softening and the year-over-year percentage growth of net debt is exploding. Consider the following chart from the Financial Times. Non-financial corporations found themselves leveraged to the hilt in 2000 and again in 2007. Bear market retreats of 50%-plus in stocks occurred shortly thereafter. Why should investors believe that this time is different? The corporate debt balloon is going to be a problem even if central banks perpetually support asset prices through direct purchases and/or rate manipulating schemes. Ten years ago, companies carried $4.6 trillion in outstanding debt. Today? We’re looking at $8.2 trillion. The annualized growth rate of that debt far exceeds the growth rate of profitability or sales. Worse yet, HALF of the $8.2 trillion in corporate bonds is set to mature over the next five years. The implication? Any recession in the next five years will see the vast majority of corporations issuing new debt in an environment where their coupons will be at higher yields and their total total debts will be more difficult to service. Think the resilient U.S. consumer can magically make the problem go away? Fat chance. Since 2001, consumers have only maintained respective living standards by borrowing more in credit to make up for the shortfall in disposable personal income. Take a good hard look at the chart below and ask yourself, “Can this possibly end well? How long can households spend more than they take home before the caca hits the fan once again?” Click to enlarge Can catastrophe be averted? Anything’s possible. Heck, the U.S could experience a remarkable renaissance of high paying careers. It is more probable, unfortunately, that the working-aged population will grow at a faster clip than jobs themselves. There have been 14 million new jobs created (mostly low-paying) since the end of the Great Recession, yet 17 million people entered the labor force in the same period. Not enough jobs. Not enough high-paying employment. And too much household borrowing to make up the difference. Click to enlarge If corporations are getting closer to retrenchment — voluntary or involuntary deleveraging — there will be less money spent on stock buybacks . That would be a problem for the stock market. If households are getting closer to retrenchment — voluntary or involuntary deleveraging — the reduction in consumption would be problematic for equities as well. Brick-and-mortar retailer woe may largely be attributable to online retailer cheer, though some of the troubles are related to consumer spending. Bottom line? Riskier assets are unlikely to gain significant ground in the near-term. An investor would be wise to maintain a defensive posture until valuations improve dramatically or the Federal Reserve flip-flops, ultimately announcing plans to expand its balance sheet once more. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.

Outperforming Buy And Hold Does Not Prove Skill

It is common in finance to compare returns of market timing strategies to buy and hold returns. Although this is useful in determining any excess returns achieved by the timing strategy, it is far from a proof of skill. This is because, depending on the path prices follow, random traders may achieve returns much higher than buy and hold. I will approach this problem by providing two examples that are based on simulating random traders who use a fair coin to purchase shares in SPY (NYSEARCA: SPY ) at the close of a trading day and when heads show up. The shares are sold at the close of a day when tails show up and this is repeated for the whole price history under consideration. Then, the simulation is repeated 20,000 times to get a distribution of the net return of all random traders. Starting capital is $100K and commission is $0.01 per share. Equity is fully invested. Results for 2013 Click to enlarge The SPY buy and hold total return for 2013 was about 26.45%. It is shown in the results above that the return for significance at the 5% level is about 22%, which means that this return is better than the return of 95% of random traders. In this case, a return of a market timing strategy below the buy and hold but above 22% can be an indication of skill since it is significant at the 5% level or better. Also note that more than 97% of random long traders made a profit in 2013 due to the strong uptrend. Results for 2015 Click to enlarge Although the SPY buy and hold total return for 2015 was just 1.3%, the minimum significant return for comparison to random traders was about 14%! A market timing strategy would have to generate a return of more than 14% to prove that it was better than 95% of random traders, or significant at the 5% level. About half of the random long traders made a net profit in 2015, still better than casino odds of course. Therefore, even a return of 10% would not be sufficient for proving skill in this case, as it would not be significant at the 5% level. Therefore, comparing to buy and hold for proving skill may not make sense depending on the path prices follow. During strong uptrends, the minimum significant return to support skill may be closer to buy and hold but when markets consolidate it may be much higher because there are always those lucky random traders that skew the distribution of returns. As a corollary, comparing average returns to buy and hold returns may make no sense at all since the difficulty of generating excess alpha varies from year to year. Original article Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: Analysis program: Price Action Lab