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Managed Futures To Smooth Out Market Bumps
This article first appeared in the March issue of WealthManagement magazine and online at WealthMangement.com . Skeptics were easy to find in the bull market, but these funds are now working as advertised. If there was ever a time when a countertrend strategy was needed, it would be now. By countertrend, of course, I mean a tactic that gains while the stock market swoons. There are bear market funds aplenty but those aren’t suitable as permanent portfolio allocations. There are bond funds of various stripes, too, which boast of low correlations to equities, but those are typically low volatility products whose gains are often swamped by equity losses. Enter the 361 Capital Global Counter-Trend Fund (MUTF: AGFQX ) , a managed futures strategy of a different sort. Employing a suite of systematic trading models, AGFQX takes long and short positions in equity index futures contracts – and equity futures only – in U.S., European and Asian markets. At times, the fund also goes to cash. Over the past 12 months, the $18.9 million fund gained more than five percent while the S&P 500 lost nearly nine. Countertrend indeed. It didn’t score its gains by simply shorting equity futures. That would be trend following, just in an opposite direction. No, AGFQX thrives where there’s short-term up-and-down movement in its target equity indices. The fund aims to sell overbought contracts and buy futures at oversold levels to harvest market “noise,” or the frequency of directional changes. The greater the number of price swings, the more opportunities to buy on down days and sell on up ones. The fund’s managers, expecting that the size of trading losses and gains will be roughly equal over time, rely upon a high “hit ratio” (percentage of winning trades) to garner profits. The fund runs into trouble when its target markets trend violently in one direction. That’s what happened late last summer when a market drop sent the fund skidding into a sharp drawdown (see Chart 1). The fund subsequently recovered, ultimately reaching new highs as the broad stock market found fresh lows. More Strategies The equity countertrend fund wasn’t the only managed futures strategy that found purchase this year. In fact, 96 percent of public managed futures funds – exchange-traded and ’40 Act alike – have booked year-to-date gains. Some capitalized on the downtrend in the petroleum complex. Some picked up bullish gold positions. Others bought bond futures. For most, though, the gains haven’t been enough to overcome a year’s worth of setbacks. Of 34 portfolios extant (31 mutual funds and 3 ETFs), 21 are still under water on a 12-month basis. A handful, AGFQX included, stand out because their year-to-date gains built on positive results earned over the preceding 12 months. They’re tallied in Table 1. Like most managed futures strategies, these five mutual funds exhibit little correlation to the equity and bond markets. Notice the low r-squared (r 2 ) coefficients versus the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) and the iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: AGG ) . Think of these values representing the degree (in percentage points) that movements in the index ETFs explain the managed futures products’ price variance. Most are quite low, though AGFQX, not surprisingly, shows a modest link to SPY because of the summer selloff. Notable, too, is volatility or, rather, the relative dearth of it. Maximum drawdowns for four of the five funds are fractions of SPY’s. These drawdowns represent the greatest peak-to-trough loss for each portfolio before a new high is attained. Maximum drawdown is used to compute a managed futures or hedge fund’s risk-adjusted return. You can think of the Calmar ratio as the alternative investment world’s Sharpe ratio. The higher it is, the better an investment performed over a specified time period; the lower the ratio, the worse it behaved. Under the Hood We’ve already looked inside the 361 Capital countertrend portfolio, so let’s peek under the hoods of the others: The $555.4 million LoCorr Managed Futures Strategy Fund (MUTF: LFMAX ) manages the futures side of its portfolio through an investment in a wholly-owned Cayman subsidiary. This controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) is not subject to all of the investor protections of the ’40 Act, a fact that might be worrisome for some investors. At the very least, the arrangement makes the fund opaque. We can see fairly well how the fund’s collateral – the fixed income portfolio used to meet margin requirements – is managed, but insight into the fund’s futures strategy is extremely limited. The fund engages a triad of trend-following commodity trading advisors (“CTAs”) on the futures side. At last look, the fund had a sizable short exposure in the energy sector. LFMAX is the most expensive product in the table with an annual expense ratio at 2.11 percent. The Abbey Capital Futures Strategy Fund (MUTF: ABYIX ) is another multi-manager product which allocates, through its own CFC, to a roster of nine global investment advisors, each pursuing diverse trading strategies. Like the LoCorr fund, ABYIX actively manages its fixed income collateral. And, like the LoCorr fund, Abbey’s $353 million futures fund most recently has been short the energy sector. Shorts in agricultural commodities also added to the fund’s gains. You’ll pay 1.99 percent a year to invest in ABYIX. Trend momentum drives the Goldman Sachs Managed Futures Strategy Fund (MUTF: GMSAX ) which has profited through short positions in the commodities, currency and equity sectors as well as positions designed to capitalize on flattening in the fixed income sector’s yield curve. GMSAX’s fund runners don’t use a CFC and manage the fund in-house, keeping the cost structure relatively low. Annual expenses run 1.51 percent currently for the $153.3 million portfolio. With assets of just $16.9 million, the TFS Hedged Futures Fund (MUTF: TFSHX ) is the table’s smallest – and best performing – portfolio. The fund relies upon a Cayman-based CFC to obtain its futures exposure which is managed internally based on proprietary models. The TFS models don’t look for trends. Instead, they plumb the futures market term structure looking for value plays – buying underpriced contracts and selling those deemed rich which, by combination, reduces exposure to the underlying asset. Ergo the “hedge” in the fund’s title. Hedging comes at a price, namely a 1.80 percent expense ratio. A Diverse Variety of Strategies Managed futures – at least those funds showcased here – represent a diverse variety of strategies. That makes them difficult to classify as a true asset class. It behooves investors, and their advisors, to look closely at a fund’s return pattern to get a sense of its ability to mesh with existing allocations. Sometimes, a fund with a high return takes a backseat to one that is the better yin to an investor’s yang. A lookback over the past 12 months (see Table 2) illustrates the impact each of our five managed futures funds might have had on classically allocated stock and bond portfolio. Here, a 20-percent exposure to managed futures is obtained with a carve-out from the equity allotment, transforming a 60/40 (by percentage, SPY and AGG respectively) portfolio into a 40/40/20 mix. Adding any of the managed futures products to the basic portfolio improves returns. Though a 20 percent allocation isn’t enough to overcome the entirety of the equity market’s damage, it comes darn close. Portfolio volatility, too, is appreciably dampened. Is it likely these funds will continue their (mostly) winning ways? Keep the words of Finnish Formula 1 racer Kimi Raikkonen in mind: “You always want to have a winning car, but there is no guarantee that it will be.”
Underweight Or Overweight: What’s Your Allocation To U.S. Stocks?
Some are interpreting the 9% bounce off of the 1812 lows for the S&P 500 as a sign that all is right with stocks once again. Indeed, many may view the S&P 500 trading at 1978 on the first day of March as a pretty good deal relative to where the benchmark began the year (2043). Yet the number of wrenches in the mountain bike wheel – fundamental valuation levels, historical price movement, global economic weakness – is likely to cause injury for the unprotected rider. In recent commentary ( Are Stocks Cheap Now? Get GAAP If You Want To Get Real ), I discussed the significance of the differential between a non-GAAP P/E of 16.5 and a GAAP-based P/E of 21.5. That was with the S&P 500 trading at 1940. At 1978, the less manipulated GAAP-based version of reported earnings clocks in at a P/E of 22. It gets worse. According to JPMorgan Chase, “pro-forma” non-GAAP earnings estimates have already dropped 6.2% for year-end 2016. The fact that they have dropped further than the market itself – roughly 3.2% through March 1 – means that stocks are more expensive today than they were at the start of the year. With respect to manipulated non-GAAP earnings, then, the S&P 500 at 1978 represents a forward P/E of 17. Fundamental overvaluation rarely matters until it does matter. In particular, consecutive quarters of declining earnings per share (EPS) typically weigh on the price that the collective investment community is willing to pay for S&P 500 exposure. For example, according to Dubravko Lakos-Bujas at JPMorgan, there have been 27 instances of two consecutive quarters for EPS declines since 1900. An economic recession came to pass on 81% of those occasions. The S&P 500 has already contracted for three consecutive quarters. What’s more, according to FactSet, first quarter profits for 2016 are likely to fall 6.5% and second quarter earnings are likely to retreat 1.1%. That will mark 15 months of decreasing profitability. Is earnings growth no longer a precursor for stock price appreciation? Perhaps not in 2016. Nevertheless, historical price movement alone is presenting unfriendly indications. Specifically, according to data provided by Robert Shiller and confirmed by Lance Roberts, there have been 87 instances since 1900 when the equivalent of the S&P 500 declined for three consecutive months. Make that 88. The S&P 500 logged -1.8% in December. The benchmark registered -5.0% in January and it served up -0.5% in February. Three consecutive months of losses is not really that unusual. That said, 74 of those previous three-month negative runs involved a 20%-plus bear market descent. Historical probability wonks might take notice that a bear transpired 85% of the time. More recently, the S&P 500 last registered three straight months of losses in the summer of 2011. The 19.4% price collapse may not have qualified for an official bear market descent. On the other hand, a 19.4% erosion from the top today would mean the S&P 500 dropping to 1716. If you are not prepared for the possibility, you might want to lighten up on your stock allocation. Keep in mind, stock valuations at the lows as well as the highs of 2011 were far more attractive than they are at this moment in 2016. Investors in 2011 also benefited immensely from a stimulus-minded Federal Reserve. How much so? Near the bottom of the September-October lows, the Fed launched “Operation Twist.” The promise of selling short maturity U.S. treasuries to acquire long maturity U.S. treasuries depressed borrowing costs and stoked the stock fire. For one to believe that the “coast is clear,” he/she would have to ignore the valuation conundrum as well as the history of EPS contractions and historical price movement. One would also need to dismiss economic weakness around the globe. Consider world trade measured by volume or by dollars. The last time world trade activity was this anemic? 2008-2009. And before that? 2001-2002. It does not get any more cheerful if you examine global manufacturing data. According to data compiled by Markit, nearly three quarters of economies around the world worsened in February. Meanwhile, JPMorgan’s Manufacturing PMI is sitting at the stagnation line. The last time the global economy had weakened to such an extent? The U.S. Federal Reserve launched open-ended quantitative easing (a.k.a. “QE3.”) – its most influential stimulus measure ever. The bear market in European stocks provides perspective on what to expect stateside. Specifically, the Stoxx Europe 600 Index has already dropped 26.5% from a high-water mark set in April of 2015. There was a double bottom in August-September of 2015, and again in January-February of 2016 at a lower ebb. There were a number of false dawns as well. As it stands, though, the bear that began in April of 2015 will likely remain intact until the slope of the downtrend turns positive. The top-to-bottom decline of 14.1% over nine months on the S&P 500 does not officially meet the 20% bear market definition, but the bear likely began in May of 2015 nonetheless. There was a double bottom in August-September of 2015, much like there was with the Stoxx Europe 600. And a lower one reached in January-February, much like the Stoxx Europe 600. Until the slope of the longer-term trend reverses course, however, one should anticipate sellers of strength to win the battle . We remain underweight equities for our moderate growth-and-income clients. Our current allocation of 45%-50% stock – only large-cap U.S. stock – has been in place for the better part of the last seven months. Our top holdings include ETFs like iShares MSCI USA Minimum Volatility ETF (NYSEARCA: USMV ), iShares MSCI USA Quality Factor ETF (NYSEARCA: QUAL ) and Vanguard High Dividend Yield (NYSEARCA: VYM ). Each has provided slightly enhanced risk-adjusted returns over the S&P 500 SPDR Trust (NYSEARCA: SPY ) during the downtrend. For Gary’s latest podcast, click here . Disclosure : Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. 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