Tag Archives: economy

Video: The Devil Is In The Details

The conventional thinking is that all quantitative managers are the same – that they analyze the same data, read the same academic research, and use the same concepts to identify attractive stocks. In this video, Robert Furdak, Co-Chief Investment Officer at Man Numeric, challenges this view by arguing that ‘the devil is in the details’ and that the distinctions in how quantitative managers construct and combine models to generate trading signals are significant. To illustrate this, he looks at existing value models that most people might think would be highly correlated to show that returns become progressively better (and volatility decreases) as the value models become more evolved. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The value of an investment and any income derived from it can go down as well as up and investors may not get back their original amount invested. Opinions expressed are those of the author, may not be shared by all personnel of Man Group plc (‘Man’) and are subject to change without notice.

Is Indexing Just Another Wall Street Fad?

Here’s an interesting comment from value investor Seth Klarman on the rise of indexing (this is from 1991!): Klarman is obviously biased because he’s in the business of selling a high fee asset management platform. If indexing is right, then his form of highly active alpha chasing asset management is wrong. This is basically what Bill Ackman was saying when he lashed out against indexing earlier this year. Anyhow, I think Klarman and Ackman are brilliant and I could never do what they’ve done over the years, but I did want to highlight some of the comments here because there are common concerns that I don’t think are fully warranted. SK: Indexing is predicated on efficient markets. CR: No, this is one point I’ve reiterated in my repetitive posts on the myth of passive investing . Indexing doesn’t work because markets are efficient. Efficiency has nothing to do with it . Indexing works because the costs of active management are so high. Bogle outlined this thinking back in 2003 . SK: The higher the percentage of all investors who index, the more inefficient the markets become as fewer and fewer investors would be performing research and fundamental analysis. CR: This is the paradox of indexing. Indexing, by definition, requires active management. In order for the passive indexers to remain passive, they need active managers to make the markets that fulfill their indexing needs. There cannot be a world of only passive indexers. So, if indexing is eating the world, then there should be more opportunities for active managers in the form of market making and index arbitrage opportunities. Active managers like high frequency trading firms are flourishing in this world. Indexing doesn’t kill active management. It just forces it to change. And if Klarman is right, then he should embrace indexing as it could create more opportunities for more active managers to discover inefficiencies. SK: If everyone practiced indexing… CR: Nope, this is impossible. Indexing requires active management to implement the various index fund strategies that exist. Speaking of which, there are so many “indices” out there today that the whole idea of indexing has become rather nebulous. The indexing world is comprised of all sorts of different strategies that try to take advantage of different inefficiencies in the market. Index funds are just product wrappers doing exactly what Seth Klarman is trying to do in his hedge fund. For instance, the Vanguard Value Fund is trying to capture the value premium by holding a specific set of stocks that meet a certain “value” criteria. The only real difference between this index fund and Seth Klarman’s hedge fund is that the Vanguard fund is lower fee, more tax efficient and more diversified. SK: “[Indexing] means that in a proxy contest, it makes no real difference to the manager of an index fund whether the dissidents or the incumbent management wins the fight”. CR: The vast evidence on the failure of active managers over the decades shows that public market investors don’t understand corporations better than managements. I don’t see how this evidence adds credence to the idea that we should want public investors to be even more active in the daily management activities of corporations… If anything, the failure of active managers means we should want public investors to voice fewer opinions about how companies should be run and instead of voting with their proxies, stick to voting with their wallets. SK: I believe that indexing will turn out to be just another Wall Street fad. CR: Well, this was fabulously wrong. Indexing assets have exploded since 1991 as more active strategies have floundered.

Hedge Fund Peer Groups Are Hazardous To Your Wealth

In his seminal 10 Things Investors Should Know About Hedge Funds Dr Harry Kat documents a big problem with hedge fund peer groups. Funds in these peer groups do not belong together because their performance is not correlated. They behave differently. Click to enlarge Consider, for example, “market-neutral.” This very popular strategy comes in many forms — dollar, beta, style, sector — the list goes on, and many funds that call themselves market-neutral should not. Kat finds correlations to be a mere 0.23 among funds in market-neutral peer groups, substantiating the fact that these funds are different from one another. These funds do not belong together. Consequently, hedge fund managers win or lose based on beta rather than alpha. Back to Basics Hedge fund due diligence can be distilled down to two crucial questions: (1) Do we like the strategy that this manager employs? (2) Does this manager execute the strategy well? Common hedge fund due diligence, as it is practiced today, answers the first question with hot performance, and accepts conceit and concealment as answers to the second. This is a shame because investors have been shammed by fake due diligence. The Madoff and Stanford scams were enabled by the due diligence sham. Here’s a simple 2-step due diligence approach that is rigorous and sham – free. (1) The adage “Don’t invest in what you don’t understand” is particularly relevant to hedge fund investing. To address this issue we recommend that the researcher complete a fairly straightforward profile like the following: Sample manager profile Approach long: Exposures to styles, sectors, countries, etc., as well as exposures to economic factors. Approach short: Exposures to styles, sectors, countries, etc., as well as exposures to economic factors. Direction: Amounts long and short Leverage Portfolio construction approach: Number of names, constraints, derivatives, etc. If we can’t complete this profile, we don’t invest. That’s the deal. If we can complete this profile we can move on to the question of manager competence. The profile gives us the option of replicating or hiring (make or buy), so we want to know that value – added exceeds fees. (2) Perform Scientific Tests of Manager Competence: There’s nothing worse than a mediocre doctor or a mediocre hedge fund manager. Albert Einstein once said ” The problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking that created them. ” A corollary is that it’s unlikely that the people who created the problems can succeed at fixing them. The solution to the problems with peer groups and indexes is actually quite simple, at least in concept. Performance evaluation ought to be viewed as a hypothesis test where the validity of the hypothesis ” p erformance is good” is assessed. To accept or reject this hypothesis, construct all of the possible outcomes and see where the actual performance result falls. If the observed performance is toward the top of all of the possibilities, the hypothesis is correct, and performance is good. Otherwise, it is not good. In other words, the hypothesis test compares what actually happened to what could have happened. Using the profile described above, a computer simulation randomly generates portfolios that comprise a custom scientific peer group for evaluating investment performance. A reported return outside the realm of possibilities is suspicious, and can be explained in one of three ways: T he return is in fact extraordinary, the return is fraudulent, or we do not understand the strategy. Of course the test itself cannot tell us which of the three possibilities is the reality, but it does give us motive to look. In other words, the hypothesis test either validates the credibility of reported performance or provides the wherewithal to question the incredible. Financial audits are not designed to provide this validation. The Challenge of Change Behavioral scientists tell us that we are all hard-wired to resist change. We want to continue to use hedge fund peer groups. Advocates of change preach “change talk,” the language of overcoming the challenge of change. We need to hear and understand the disadvantages of the status quo , and to appreciate the benefits of a new, improved future. Most importantly, people need to listen, so the message should be entertaining. That’s why we produced a short video on the Future of Hedge Fund Due Diligence and Fees to re-frame your thinking. In the future we won’t pay much for hedge fund exotic betas (risk profiles). We’ll pay for superior human intellect instead. We’ll know the difference because we’ll abandon simpleminded performance benchmarks like peer groups and indexes, and replace them with smart science. Disruptive innovation will elevate our comprehension and contentment. Everybody will win. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.