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PIMCO High Income Fund: Is The Pain Over?

Summary PHK’s premium has fallen from over 50% to around 30%. That’s a big drop and well below the CEF’s 3-year average premium. So is the pain over and now the time to buy back in? The PIMCO High Income Fund (NYSE: PHK ) is a contentious closed-end fund, or CEF, that has a long history of trading at an impressive premium to its net asset value, or NAV. Right up front, I’m not a big fan of any CEF trading above its NAV, particularly at such an extreme premium. However, after such a large drop, some investors may be wondering if the hurt is over and whether now might be a good time to buy in. A little background To understand why a closed-end fund trades at a price different than its net asset value, you have to understand how CEFs differ from their mutual fund cousins. Mutual fund sponsors stand ready to buy and sell shares at the close of every trading day at NAV. Therefore, there’s a premade liquid market at NAV. Closed-end funds, meanwhile, sell a set number of shares to the public. Those shares then trade based on supply and demand on the open market. If investors like a CEF for whatever reason, they will demand a higher price to get them to sell. And if investors don’t like a CEF for some reason, they will take lower prices to get out. Thus, CEFs trade above and below their NAV. The NAV is still what the shares are worth – it is their intrinsic value, if you will. But it isn’t always what they will trade for. Using a simple example, if investors are fond of biotechnology a biotech-focused CEF might find itself trading at a 10% premium to NAV. The reason is investor sentiment; essentially investors are saying they expect good things from the CEF in the future. The important take away is that investor sentiment is the driving factor – not the actual value of the CEF’s shares. People really like PHK Closed-end funds normally trade around their NAV or at a discount. It’s unusual to see a CEF with a long history of trading well above NAV. PHK, then, is an exception to the norm. It’s long traded at a premium, and notably, at an extreme premium to its NAV. For example, its three-year average premium is nearly 50%. Its five-year average is just over 50%. People really like PHK. I’ve posited that the reason for this premium was partially because Bill Gross took over managing the fund in 2009, the year in which the premium started to widen. Since he’s no longer there, others have noted the fund’s steady distribution even through a difficult market period – notably the 2007 to 2009 recession. In the end, it’s probably a combination of the two. But whatever the reason, the CEF has a long history of trading well above its NAV. Which is why some argue that the selloff from an over 50% premium to the more recent 30% premium is a buying opportunity. This is a normal investment approach in the closed-end fund space, buying when a CEF is notably below its average premium/discount. The idea being that investor sentiment likely went too far in one direction and will eventually swing back toward the historical level. On the one hand, this makes sense for PHK. The average premium is close to 50% in recent history, so at a 30% premium, it’s fallen pretty far from the norm. In fact, this isn’t the first time there’s been such a drop. In the back half of 2012, PHK went from a roughly 75% premium down to a 25% premium before recovering to a 40% premium and eventually to the 50% and 60% levels seen earlier this year. I’d say, for aggressive investors who like to trade premiums and discounts, this is a CEF you should be looking at. Still too expensive But if you are a conservative investor, you should still avoid PHK. Why? We know with almost no doubt what PHK is worth; that’s the point of net asset value. That’s the value of PHK, no more and no less. If you buy PHK for a 30% premium, you are paying 30% more than its portfolio is worth on a per share basis. One of the reasons why playing premiums and discounts works is because you know the value of the asset you are buying – its NAV. So when a CEF is trading well below its NAV, there’s a clear catalyst for the discount to narrow. As investors realize the disconnect between price and value, they’ll correct it. PHK, however, is trading below its historical premium . Which means that anyone buying now is betting that investor sentiment will improve so that the premium gets wider. That’s akin to momentum investing in which you buy an expensive stock hoping that you can eventually sell it to someone at an even more expensive price – with little regard to its intrinsic value. There’s nothing wrong with this when it works, and it does work for some people. But it can also go horribly wrong when investors have changed their minds. Think back to the carnage in the dotcom bust, when investors realized that they didn’t like Internet companies as much as they thought they did. The companies didn’t change, investor psychology did. So, if you are a conservative investor, why bother buying something you know is overpriced? There are so many investment options in the market that taking such risks just isn’t worth it. And that’s true even taking into consideration PHK’s 15% yield. I’d rather take a yield half that and sleep well knowing that I don’t have to rely on fickle investors to buy my shares at a higher price. Or, better, yet, I’d rather buy something trading below its NAV and below its average discount, and wait for the market to realize the price disparity. With the NAV being a magnet to draw investors in to an undervalued investment opportunity. So, if you are an aggressive CEF investor looking to play discounts and premiums, PHK is definitely worth a look. Just go in knowing the game you are playing. I’d still suggest caution, but the fall from the average at PHK fits the bill for the trade. For conservative investors, don’t get sucked in by a big yield or the fall in the premium. PHK is still expensive even after its premium has fallen some 20 percentage points, and the yield just isn’t worth paying a still high 30% premium. You’ll be better off investing elsewhere. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

A Look At The Energy Sector Impact On Dividend ETFs

Summary While every index is slightly different, one theme that you often see repeated throughout the high dividend arena is an emphasis on big energy names. As a result of the energy sector woes over the last 12 months, I thought it prudent to look at the overall impact of these stocks on total return. One example of a fund with an outsized allocation to energy stocks is the iShares Core High Dividend ETF. One of the most popular strategies at our firm is the Strategic Income Portfolio, which focuses on a multi-asset approach to generate consistent income and overall low volatility. In order to accomplish those goals, we are continually scanning the ETF landscape to evaluate suitable equity income funds that meet our investment criteria. These ETFs typically consist of high-quality stocks with above-average dividend streams and low internal expenses. While every index is slightly different, one theme that you often see repeated throughout the high dividend arena is an emphasis on big energy names. Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM ) and/or Chevron Corp. (NYSE: CVX ) are commonly in the top 10 holdings of these diversified dividend portfolios. According to dividend.com, XOM has a current dividend yield of 3.74% while CVX yields 5.00%. As a result of the energy sector woes over the last 12 months, I thought it prudent to look at the overall impact of these stocks on total return. In addition, it should be noted that ETFs with a fundamental or dividend weighting methodology may be increasing their energy exposure in the future to adjust for the higher yields these companies are now paying. One example of a fund with an outsized allocation to energy stocks is the iShares Core High Dividend ETF (NYSEARCA: HDV ). This ETF is based on the Morningstar Dividend Yield Focus Index, which selects 75 stocks based on their high dividend yields and financial history. HDV currently has $4.3 billion in total assets, a 30-day SEC yield of 3.90%, and an expense ratio of 0.12%. The top holding in HDV is XOM, which makes up 8.3% of the total portfolio. Energy stocks as a whole are the second largest sector in HDV with a total weight of 18.45%. Obviously, this is going to result in these energy companies making a big impact on total return and overall yield. On a year-to-date basis, HDV is down 1.50% while the broad-based SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) has gained 2.63%. This path of divergence really kicked into high gear over the last two months as the energy sector rolled over once again. While this overweight exposure has certainly been a drag on HDV, it hasn’t been a catastrophic event because of the counterbalancing effect of consumer staples and healthcare stocks. Other well-known dividend ETFs with a relatively healthy dose of energy exposure include: Vanguard High Dividend Yield ETF (NYSEARCA: VYM ) ~ 11.90% energy Schwab U.S. Dividend Equity ETF (NYSEARCA: SCHD ) ~ 11.40% energy WisdomTree Equity Income ETF (NYSEARCA: DHS ) ~ 13.55% energy First Trust Morningstar Dividend Leaders Index ETF (NYSEARCA: FDL ) ~ 10.62% energy Investors who believe the carnage in the oil & gas space is due for a bounce may be more inclined to choose a dividend ETF with a higher weighting in this sector. Conversely, those that are less enthusiastic about the prospects for an imminent recovery may choose to underweight or avoid these funds altogether. I continue to own VYM as a core equity income holding in my Strategic Income Portfolio. Despite its flat performance so far this year, the diversified basket of over 430 dividend-paying stocks offer attractive value characteristics and a dependable 30-day SEC yield of 3.26%. In addition, the ultra-low 0.10% expense ratio keeps the overall portfolio fees to a minimum. The Bottom Line One of the most important exercises that individual investors can do is analyze the index construction of their ETF holdings. Take note of any sectors that your funds are overweight or underweight in order to gauge how they will react under different circumstances. That way you are prepared in the event that a significant divergence occurs and can make adjustments as necessary. In addition, it’s important to reevaluate the portfolio on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. These funds undergo regular rebalancing and may shift their exposure based on the mandate of the index provider. Disclosure: I am/we are long VYM. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article. Additional disclosure: David Fabian, FMD Capital Management, and/or clients may hold positions in the ETFs and mutual funds mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell, or hold securities.

Warren Buffett And The Art Of Focus Investing

Summary Buffett (BRK.B) stated he would have a portfolio of 4-5 securities if he were managing smaller sums of money ($50 million, $100 million, or $200 million). Most value investors who use a focused approach significantly outperform the market. The secret to this approach is the Kelly Growth Formula for portfolio allocation. “If I were running $50, $100, $200 million, I would have 80 percent in five positions, with 25 percent for the largest. In 1964 I found a position I was willing to go heavier into, up to 40 percent. I told investors they could pull their money out. None did. The position was American Express after the salad oil scandal. ” -Warren Buffett; 2008 Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A ) Annual Meeting Source: Dang Le, “Notes from Buffett meeting 2/15/2008,” Underground value blog , February 23, 2008; also cited in The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Criterion by Edward Thorpe, William Ziemba, Leonard Maclean ” Back in the 1960s I actually took a compound interest rate table and I made various assumptions about what kind of edge I might have in reference to the behavior of common stocks generally. I knew from being a poker player that you have to be heavily when you’ve got huge odds in your favor (he concluded as long as he could handle price volatility, owning as few as three stocks would be plenty). I knew I could handle the bumps psychologically because I was raised by people who believed in handling bumps. So I was an ideal person to adopt my own methodology.” –Charlie Munger; D*mn Right! By Janet Lowe Introduction Today I briefly wanted to illustrate the concept of a focused investing approach. I remember when I started investing nobody ever seemed to have a methodology as to how many stocks to have in their portfolio or how to decide which amount/percentage to place of each stock in a given portfolio. Obviously there was the academic theory of diversification taught in most finance classes that advocated 50-100 stocks, but it continued to puzzle me that it was so difficult to find information on a more focused approach. In this article I’ll attempt to outline the parameters of a focused strategy that I use, and also list several resources on focus investing to hopefully save everyone time as finding all of this research was quite time consuming for me. Academic Theory, Diversification, and Value Investing Focus “The Berkshire-style investors tend to be less diversified than other people. The academics have done a terrible disservice to intelligent investors by glorifying the idea of diversification. Because I just think the whole concept is literally almost insane. It emphasizes feeling good about not having your investment results depart very much from average investment results. But why would you get on the bandwagon like that if somebody didn’t make you with a whip and a gun?” — Charlie Munger, 2005 There are no winners in the short-term, relative performance derby. Attempting to outperform the market in the short term is futile…The effort only distracts a money manager from finding and acting on sound long-term opportunities…As a result the clients experience mediocre performance…Only brokers benefit from the high level of activity. – Seth Klarman; quote taken from James Montier’s Value Investing Most universities and institutions teach that a diversified approach to investing is the best way to minimize risk and still obtain good results in the market. The majority of the investment community believes this, and most mutual funds own anywhere from 50-100 stocks with few exceptions. This approach typically leads to a return that is equal to or less than the S&P 500 and also causes most mutual fund performance to fall in a very narrow range. There is no incentive for the average fund manager to deviate from the norm as even one year of performance that is significantly less than his or her peers would probably result in the mutual fund manager being fired or severely reprimanded. Investment management companies reinforce this behavior as investment companies performing in-line with their peers don’t suffer significant losses of assets under management even if their long run performance is abysmal. A study by Randy Cohen et al. (2009; quoted in Montier’s Value Investing) the obsession with relative performance is one of the key sources of underperformance among active fund managers. Although 80-90% of fund managers underperform the S&P 500 averages in a given year, it is interesting to note how much the performance of fund managers top picks deviate from the average. Cohen’s study focused on the top 25% of “best ideas” among active managers and noted active fund managers “best ideas have a long-term average return of 19% per year vs. a market return of 12% over the same period. Best ideas were determined by portfolio allocation and looking at manager’s most significant holdings in size, especially those differing from weights in a typical index fund. If active managers followed a more focused approach and invested a larger percentage of their investable funds in their “best ideas,” both the managers and their clients would be a lot wealthier. In contrast to the diversified approach I described above that is praised by most academics and mutual fund managers there is a school of thought in the value investing community labeled “Focus Investing” by Robert Hagstrom of Legg Mason . This approach advocates putting your investable funds into a few securities and is based on a formula known as the Kelly Growth Criterion. As noted above, Warren Buffett advocates holding four to five securities using this approach and his partner Charlie Munger advocated an even more extreme approach, holding just three securities. This approach is often misunderstood, and there were a few questions on this topic at the Berkshire annual meeting this year. The main question was generally why Berkshire held so many securities and wasn’t “more focused.” Although at first glance this may appear to be true, let’s dig a little deeper to see just how focused the portfolios are. Despite holding roughly 50 stocks, Berkshire’s portfolio is still very focused with 63% of the portfolio invested in four securities (AXP, KO, IBM, WFC), and 82.10% invested in the top ten holdings (in addition to the four previously mentioned, positions five through ten are: WMT, PG, USB, DVA, MCO, GS) as of 3/31/2015. Although at first glance this focused investing approach may seem very risky, Joel Greenblatt tells a different story in his book You Too Can Be a Stock Market Genius noting that, “owning just two stocks eliminates 46 percent of the nonmarket risk of owning just one stock. This type of risk is supposedly reduced to 72 percent with a four stock portfolio, by 81 percent with eight stocks, 93 percent with 16 stocks, 96 percent with just 32 stocks, and 99 percent with 500 stocks.” Greenblatt seemed perplexed at why an investor would add hundreds of stocks to his portfolio to reduce risk by 3 percent. ROBERT HAGSTROM’S STUDY: DOES THE TYPICAL FOCUSED PORTFOLIO OUTPERFORM? ” The deleterious effects of such improbable events can best be mitigated through prudent diversification. The number of securities that should be owned to reduce portfolio risk to an acceptable level is not great, as few as ten to fifteen different holdings usually suffices.” — Seth Klarman, Margin of Safety In their study “Focus Investing: An Optimal Portfolio Strategy Alternative to Active versus Passive Management, ” Joan Lamm-Tennant, Phd., and Robert Hagstrom concluded that while a portfolio consisting of 15 stocks gives an investor a 1-in-4 chance of beating the market (S&P 500 index); a 250 stock portfolio reduces those odds to 1-in-50. Their study was based on 12,000 randomly assembled portfolios constructed with the following parameters: 3,000 portfolios with 250 stocks 3,000 portfolios with 100 stocks 3,000 portfolios with 50 stocks 3,000 portfolios with 15 stocks When sorting the ten year data, they found that 63 portfolios from group #1 (250 stocks) beat the market returns, 337 from group 2 (100 stocks) beat the market, 549 from group #3 (50 stocks) beat the market returns, and 808 from group #4 (15 stocks) beat the market’s return over the time period studied (1987-1996). Although the data below will show that the average portfolio returned less than the S&P 500 over that period (a particularly well performing period for large cap stocks), it also shows that as you reduce the number of stocks in a given portfolio, the probability of beating the returns of the S&P 500 increases. KELLY GROWTH CRITERION AND PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION “It is known that the great investor Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway actually has had a growth path similar to full Kelly betting.” – Scenarios for Risk Management and Global Investment Strategies; Rachel and William Ziemba “Discussion of Buffett’s concentrated bets gives considerable evidence that Buffett thinks like a Kelly Investor, citing Buffett bets of 25% to 40% of his net worth on single situations. — The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Growth Criterion: Theory and Practice, ” World Scientific Publishing Company, 2011; written by Thorpe, Maclean, and Ziemba. When I first started investing the most difficult topic for me was deciding how much of my portfolio to invest in a given position. This changed when I stumbled upon the Kelly Growth Criterion while reading through Ed Thorpe’s classic book on blackjack Beat the Dealer , after it was mentioned in Ben Mezrich’s book Bringing Down the House , which was later turned into a movie called “21.” The Kelly Growth Criterion is a probability based model that teaches one how much of his bankroll he should wager in a given situation, whether it’s gambling at a casino or investing in the stock market. Ed Thorpe mentions the Kelly Growth Formula in his classic book on Blackjack, “Beat the Dealer,” which became the foundation for the MIT Blackjack team as shown in the book Bringing Down the House: The Inside Story of Six MIT Students Who Took Vegas for Millions by Ben Mezrich. Interestingly enough the Kelly formula was not developed by J.L. Kelly (who it is named after) but rather by the incredible genius Claude Shannon as detailed in the excellent , Fortune’s Formula: The Untold Story of the Scientific Betting System that Beat the Casinos and Wall Street , by William Poundstone. After the formula was developed and published by Shannon another Mathematician, J.L. Kelly realized the formula could be applied to gambling, and the Kelly Growth Formula for gambling/investing was born. The formula is simply expressed as: 2p – 1 = X, where 2 times the probability of winning minus 1 equals the percentage of one’s bankroll that should be bet. For example, if the probability of beating the house is 55 percent, you should bet 10 percent of your bankroll to maximize profit. If the probability of beating the house is 70 percent you should bet 40 percent, etc. Kelly Growth: Application “We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could change the underlying value of the investment.” – Warren Buffett; Letters to Investment Partners In his excellent book The Dhando Investor, Mohnish Pabrai outlines the application of the Kelly Growth Formula to Buffett’s 1964-67 investment in American Express (40% of partnership assets). Pabrai estimates the odds of this bet in a conservative case would be: Odds of 200% or greater return in three years – 90 percent. Odds of breakeven return in three years – 5 percent. Odds of a loss of up to 10 percent in three years – 4 percent. Odds of a total loss on the investment – 1 percent. Using the above odds, the Kelly formula would advocate betting 98.3 percent of assets on American Express according to Pabrai. Buffett invested an amount (40%) under the maximum suggested and placed a few other bets with the remaining 60% of assets. Pabrai gives several examples of ideal portfolio allocation in Dhando Investor, and also notes that several other famous value investors (Joel Greenblatt and Eddie Lampert) seem to be using a Kelly Approach. As noted above, Buffett’s ideal portfolio allocation places 25 percent of assets into the best idea, with the remainder allocated to four investments. Although Buffett has never advocated the Kelly formula, it seems that he uses it or some variation in his portfolio allocation. Kelly Growth: Target Investments “Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken down nags.” — Warren Buffett In a recent presentation for the website Singular Diligence , Tobias Carlisle did an excellent job describing and summarizing the ideal investment targets under a Kelly approach. On a side note, if you haven’t read Tobias Carlisle’s books Deep Value , and Quantitative Value , you are missing out — they are two of my all-time favorites. Carlisle suggested that the Kelly approach favors investments with the following characteristics: Stable, low risk targets. Reasonable valuation (free cash flow yield 8-10%) Growing bigger in the next 3-5 years. High Quality businesses High Quality Management. To summarize, one should focus on buying companies with wide economic moats at affordable prices. In addition placing large bets when pessimism is at a maximum (See Buffett’s 1964 AXP Investment) is also advantageous. Conclusion “If you are a professional and have confidence, then I would advocate lots of concentration. For everyone else, if it’s not your game, participate in total diversification. If it’s your game, diversification doesn’t make sense. It’s crazy to put money in your twentieth choice rather than your first choice.” — Warren Buffett (NYSE: BRK.B ); The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Criterion by Edward Thorpe, William Ziemba, Leonard Maclean “Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even after a lifetime of looking for them… Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable, Charlie and I recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio, therefore, we add a few “Highly Probables.” – Warren Buffett; 1996 Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders In conclusion, if one has the time and resources a focused approach to portfolio management is ideal. Since I started my investment partnership I’ve consistently had 40-50% of AUM in 4 companies: Directv (NASDAQ: DTV ), Markel (NYSE: MKL ), Express Scripts (NASDAQ: ESRX ), and Davita (NYSE: DVA ); the only time the top 4 changed (added MasterCard (NYSE: MA ) to replace DTV) was when DTV was acquired by ATT. This approach can be frightening at times as your portfolio is exposed to any volatility driven by the largest positions, but in the long run the results are incredible. Appendix Examples of Modern Day Focus Investing in Practice Allan Mecham; Arlington Value Management Nelson Peltz; Trian Capital Chuck Akre; Akre Focus Fund (MUTF: AKREX ) Hennessy Focus Fund (MUTF: HFCSX ) Lou Simpson; SQ Advisors, LLC Tom Bancroft; Makaira Partners Resources: Recommended Reading Fortune’s Formula: The Untold Story of the Scientific Betting System that Beat the Casinos and Wall Street , by William Poundstone Probabilistic Reasoning by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman Skin in the Game Heuristic as Protection Against Tail Events by Nassim Taleb and Constantantine Sandis Understanding Uncertainty by Dennis V. Lindley Scenarios for Risk Management and Global Investment Strategies by Rachel and Bill Ziemba The Kelly Capital Growth Investment Criterion by Edward Thorpe, William Ziemba, Leonard Maclean An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volumes 1-2 , by William Feller The Mathematics of Gambling by Edward O. Thorpe The Unfinished Game: Pascal, Fermat, and the Seventeenth-Century Letter that Made the World Modern by Keith Devlin The Dhando Investor by Mohnish Pabrai The Warren Buffett Portfolio by Robert Hagstrom More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places by Michael Maubossin In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from the Brink by Robert Rubin Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Edited by Daniel Kahnemann, Paul) Value Investing by James Montier Margin of Safety by Seth Klarman Quantitative Value by Wesley Gray and Tobias Carlisle Deep Value by Tobias Carlisle Theory of Gambling by Richard Epstein Theory of Poker by David Sklansky Singular Diligence website ( singulardiligence.com ); Tobias Carlisle Kelly Criterion in Blackjack, Sports Betting, and the Stock Market by Edward Thorpe (available at edwardothorpe.com ) Beat the Dealer : A Winning Strategy for the Game of Twenty-One Bringing Down the House: The Inside Story of Six MIT Students Who Took Vegas for Millions by Ben Mezrich. Against the Gods The Remarkable Story of Risk by Peter L. Bernstein Winning Decision: Getting it Right the First Time by Paul Shoemaker and Edward Russo Disclosure: I am/we are long MKL, BRK.B, DVA, MA, ESRX. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.