Tag Archives: earnings-center

Bring Data

When doing financial modeling, one of the first things to look at is if your empirical work makes sense. In other words, are there valid economic reasons why a model should work? This can help you avoid drawing erroneous conclusions based on creative data mining. [1] Next, you should look for robustness. This can take several forms. One of the most common robustness tests is to see how well a model does when it is applied to somewhat different markets. Even though equities have historically offered the highest risk premium, it is desirable to see a model do well when it is also applied to other financial markets. Another robustness test is to see if a model is consistent over time. You do not want to see success based on spurious short periods of good fortune. Similarly, you would like to see a model hold up well over a range of parameter values. Getting lucky can be good in some things, but not in financial research. Relative and absolute momentum have held up well according to all of the above criteria. But now that momentum is attracting more attention, it is important to remain vigilant and to keep robustness in mind. What makes this especially true is the natural tendency to come up with modifications and “enhancements” that can add complexity to a once-simple model. An interesting new paper by Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey (2015) called ” Overcoming Algorithm Aversion: People Will Use Algorithms if They Can (Even Slightly) Modify Them ,” shows that people are considerably more likely to adopt a model if they can modify it. Everyone likes to feel that they have some personal involvement with a model, and that they may have made it better. But simpler is often better in the long run. Data-mined “enhancements” may fit the existing data well, but may not hold up on new data or over longer periods of time. I have seen dozens of variations and “enhancements” to momentum, and I will undoubtedly see many more in the days ahead. One variation that attracted considerable attention a few years ago was by Novy-Marx (2012), who found that the first six months of the lookback period for individual stocks gave higher profits than the more recent six months. This became known as the “echo effect.” However, it never made much sense to me. So I tested the echo effect on stock indices, stock sectors, and assets other than stocks. I was not surprised when incorporating the echo effect gave worse results than the normal way of calculating momentum. A subsequent study by Goyal and Wahal (2013) showed that the echo effect was invalid in 37 markets outside the U.S. Goyal and Wahal also demonstrated that the echo effect was largely driven by short-term reversals stemming from the second to the last month. Overreaction to news leading to short-term mean reversion of individual stocks does make sense. Prior to that time, only the last month was routinely skipped when calculating momentum for stocks. [2] Based on this finding, the latest research papers skip the prior two months instead of just the last month when calculating individual stock momentum. [3] While robustness tests are very important, the best validation of a trading model is to see how it performs on additional out-of-sample data. The statistician W. Edwards Deming once said, “In God we trust; everyone else bring data.” When I first developed the dual momentum-based Global Equities Momentum (GEM) model, my backtest went to January 1974. This is because the Barclays Capital bond index data I was using began in January 1973. I am now able to access Ibbotson bond index data, which has a much longer history. My GEM constraint has now changed to the MSCI stock index data going back to January 1970. Having this additional bond data, I have another three years of out-of-sample performance for GEM. My new backtest includes the 1973-74 bear market, and shows dual momentum sidestepping the carnage of another severe bear market. (click to enlarge) GEM is more attractive than it was previously on both an absolute basis and relative to common benchmarks. Here is summary performance information from January 1971 through July 2015. 60/40 is 60% S&P 500 and 40% Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Bonds (prior to January 1976, Ibbotson U.S. Government Intermediate Bonds). Monthly returns (updated each month) can be found on the Performance page of our website. GEM S&P 500 60/40 Ann Rtn 18.2 11.9 10.2 Std Dev 12.5 15.2 9.8 Sharpe 0.91 0.38 0.44 Max DD -17.8 -50.9 -32.5 Results are hypothetical, are NOT an indicator of future results, and do NOT represent returns that any investor actually attained. Indexes are unmanaged, do not reflect management or trading fees, and one cannot invest directly in an index. Please see our GEM Performance and Disclaimer pages for more information. In our next article, we will look at longer out-of-sample performance using the world’s longest backtests. Fortunately for us, these were done to further validate simple relative and absolute momentum. [1] For example, between 1978 and 2008, U.S. stocks had an annual return of 13.9% when a U.S. model was on the cover of the annual Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue versus 7.2% when a non-U.S. model was on the cover. [2] Short-term mean reversion is not an issue with stock indices or other asset classes, so the last two months do not need to be excluded from their momentum lookback period. [3] See Geczy and Samonov (2015). The discovery of two-month mean reversion is an example of the Fleming effect in which different but related research can lead to serendipitous results.

DCF Myth 2: A DCF Is An Exercise In Modeling And Number Crunching!

Most people don’t trust DCF valuations, and with good reason. Analysts find ways to hide their bias in their inputs and use complexity to intimidate those who not as well versed in the valuation game. This may surprise you, but I understand and share that mistrust, especially since I know how easy it is to manipulate numbers to yield almost any value that you want, and to delude yourself, in the process. It is for this reason that I have argued that the test of a valuation is not in the inputs or in the modeling, but in the story underlying the numbers and how well that story holds up to scrutiny. Left brain, meet right brain! This fall, as I have twice a year, for almost 30 years, I will be teaching a valuation class at the Stern School of Business at New York University. When the 300 registered students walk into my classroom, I know that they will come in with preconceptions about what the class will cover. Many will bring in their laptops, with the latest version of Microsoft Excel installed, eagerly anticipating session after session on modeling, hoping to become Excel Ninjas, by the time the class is done. They expect it to be a class about numbers, more numbers and still more numbers, with Greek alphabets (alphas and betas) thrown in. I begin the class by asking students to tell me whether each of them is more comfortable with numbers or with stories, and not surprisingly, the class draws disproportionately large numbers of the former, but there are more than a handful of the latter. (There are a number of tests online, like this one , that you can take to make this judgment for yourself, but most of us have a sense without tests.). I then explain my vision of valuation, as a bridge between the two groups, a way of connecting narratives to numbers. While this picture is only an abstraction in that first class, the rest of the class is really my attempt to flesh out the picture and make the bridge real. I don’t always succeed, but my vision of a successful class is that my number crunchers walk out with a little more imagination and that my storytellers acquire a bit more discipline along the way. Connecting Stories to Numbers: The Process The process by which you connect stories to numbers is neither obvious nor intuitive, but it can be learned. In an earlier post on the topic , I laid out five steps in this process, not intended to be either exhaustive or sequential. To illustrate, consider Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ), a high profile company where the world is divided into those that believe that it is an extraordinary company with a plan to conquer the world and those that use it as an example of how you can fool a lot of people for a really long time. In a post in October 2014 , I valued Amazon and arrived at a value of $175 per share. (click to enlarge) Rather than get stuck into the details, it is worth laying bare the narrative that I have for Amazon that is determining its value. In my story, Amazon will continue on its path of delivering high revenue growth (with revenues growing to $249 billion by year 10), generally by selling products or offering services at or below cost for the near future (note that margins stay close to zero for the next 5 years), but will eventually start to use its market power to deliver profits, but this market power will be checked by the entry of new players into the retail business, leaving the target margin at a number (7.36%) that reflects the overall retail business in 2014. To see where the optimists in the spectrum come up with higher value, consider an alternative narrative, where Amazon’s market power is unchecked allowing it to expand into more extensively in the media market (with revenues of $329 billion in year 10) and earn an operating margin of 12.84% (the 75th percentile of retail/media firms). Those changes increase the value per share to $468/share. (click to enlarge) To complete the process, consider the pessimistic narrative. In their story, they see Amazon as a company with a charismatic CEO (Jeff Bezos) who is less interested in creating a profitable business than he is in changing the retail world. In that story, Amazon will continue to grow revenues with little attention paid to margins, with the end game being world domination (at least of the retail business). In the valuation, that translates into higher revenue growth and paper-thin operating margins (2.85%, the 25th percentile of large US retail/media firms), even in steady state, the value per share drops to $32/share. (click to enlarge) I followed up my post on narratives and numbers with one on how a change, shift or break in the narrative can translate into a significant change in value , and why the conventional view that intrinsic value, if done right, is timeless is nonsense. Using earnings reports as the vehicles that deliver news about narratives, I looked at my narratives for Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ), Twitter (NYSE: TWTR ) and Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ) in August 2014, and valued them. Since the last few weeks have brought new earnings reports from all three companies, I will be doing an updated version of that post in the next few days. If you are a number cruncher, this process may seem too free form and subjective to you, and if you are a storyteller, the numbers will seem made up. To me, though, it is the essence of valuation and if you are interested in my extended discussion of this process of connecting narratives to numbers, you may want to take a look at this keynote talk that I gave at the CFA Institute Conference last year. I have to warn you that the length of the webcast (almost 3 hours) could lead you to seek the protection of the Geneva Conventions. Tie to the life cycle: The Investor Angle While narrative and numbers are tied together in every company’s valuation, the importance of each in driving value will shift over a company’s life cycle, as it evolves from a start up to a mature firm to one in decline. Very early in the life cycle, when numbers on the company are either scarce or uninformative, it is almost entirely narrative that drives value. In addition, that narrative can also have a much wider range of possibilities and end values, depending on the path that you map out for the company. In December 2014, I let readers pick their narrative for Uber and mapped out widely divergent values (ranging from less than $1 billion to in excess of $90 billion) for the company, based on the narrative path picked. As companies mature, the numbers start to get weighted more, as it becomes more difficult for companies to not only break away from the past, but the pathways narrow. If you are valuing Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ), for instance, it is more difficult to visualize explosive breakaways (either up or down in the narrative), though not impossible. If you are an investor uninterested in valuing companies, there are still lessons that you can draw from the link between where a company is in its life cycle and the importance of narrative/numbers. Value Differences: If you get big differences in the perceived value of a young company, they come from fundamentally different narratives about the company, not disagreements about the numbers. Thus, if your assessment of Etsy’s (NASDAQ: ETSY ) value is very different from mine, it is not because we disagree about revenue growth next year but because we have fundamentally different narratives about the company. Value focus: Early in the life cycle, large value changes have to come from large narrative shifts (resulting in large changes in value). Consequently, the focus when you scrutinize earnings reports and other news announcements should be on whether they change your narrative, not on whether the company met or beat some metric (earnings per share, revenues, number of users). To illustrate, much as I have taken issue with the market pricing of Tesla (NASDAQ: TSLA ), I think it seems to me an overreaction, to knock off 15% of its price because it sold 50,000 cars instead of 55,000 , since I see little change in the narrative for Tesla, as a consequence. In contrast, I do think that Tesla’s announcement of a $5 billion investment in a battery factory is cause for a big narrative change (though I am still trying to figure out in which direction), as it may shift your view of the company for an auto manufacturer to an energy producer. (I know… I know… It is time for another look at Tesla as well, and I will…) Value mistakes: If the essence of investing is finding misvalued companies, it seems to me that the odds of doing so are greater early in a company’s life cycle, where narratives can get mangled or when investors overreact to incremental reports. As the investment world gets flatter (in terms of everyone having access to past numbers), the most successful investors of the next millennium will be those are skilled at creating and fine tuning narratives for young companies or those in transition. Tie to the Life Cycle: Implications for managers The link between narratives and value has implications for those who run businesses and for what defines success for a top manager as companies move through the life cycle. Narrative control: If it is narrative that drives value early in the process, it should come as no surprise that the most successful entrepreneurs are the ones who are best at establishing narratives that are compelling, plausible and potentially profitable. Thus, Tesla is lucky to have Elon Musk as a CEO, and Uber has been fortunate with Travis Kalanick at its helm. Both men have their faults (who does not?), but they are enormously gifted storytellers, who (for the most part) have the discipline to stick with their narratives, even in the face of distractions. Narrative consistency: One characteristic that sets apart top managers at those young growth companies that have succeeded is that they have (a) not changed their narratives substantively and (b) have acted consistently with their narratives. The stand out example for this is Jeff Bezos, who has stuck with his narrative of “revenues now, profits later” story for Amazon, sometimes to the chagrin of analysts, and everything that the company has done and continues to do advances that narrative. Mark Zuckerberg has been almost as impressive in his focus on turning Facebook’s immense user base into profits, albeit over a shorter period, but one reason for Twitter’s travails is that there seems to be no coherent narrative emerging about how the company ultimately plans to make money. Bar Mitzvah Moments: In keeping with the theme of this post, which is that narratives have to be tied to numbers, it is worth emphasizing that even the most compelling and consistent narrative will ultimately fail, if the company cannot deliver the numbers to back it up. It is true that this “day of reckoning”, which I labeled a “bar mitzvah” moment , may come later for some companies than for others, but when it does come, you need a management team that recognizes that the market has shifted its focus from narrative to numbers, and behaves accordingly. I have tried to capture the change in balance between narrative and numbers, with the management qualities that are most needed at each stage in the picture below: (click to enlarge) As a company makes it move from young start-up to growth company to mature business, the characteristics that make up a good CEO will change as well. One argument for a strong board of directors and shareholder power even at a well-managed young company is that there may well come a time when the top management has to change with the times or be changed. Work on your weak side There is no one path to valuation nirvana, but I think that you need to find a balance between your storytelling and your number crunching skills, for your valuations to have heft. This balance may come easier to you than it did to me, since my natural instincts are to go with the numbers, and building my storytelling side has been slow going, at times. With each valuation that I do, I still have to force myself to be explicit about the narrative that I am building my valuation around, even when it seems obvious, and each time I do it, it gets a little easier. If you are a natural storyteller, you will probably find yourself resisting just as strongly to working with numbers, but I believe that you too will find a way to strengthen your weak side. I would like to think that a valuation that is the result of both sides of my brain working together is better than one that emerges out of only my left side, but even if it is not, it is a lot more fun getting there. Blog Posts Narrative and Numbers: Modeling, Story Telling and Investing (June 2014) If you build it (revenues), they (profits) will come: Amazon’s Field of Dreams (October 2014) Reacting to Earnings Reports: Narrative Adjustments and Value Effects (August 2014) Up, up and away: A Crowd Valuation of Uber (December 2014) Twitter’s Bar Mitzvah: Is social media coming of age? (November 17, 2014) Reacting to Earnings Reports II: Apple, Twitter and Facebook revisited (August 2015) (Still to come) Valuations Amazon Valuation (October 2014) Uber Valuation (December 2014) Other My keynote talk at the CFA Conference in November 2014 DCF Myth Posts Introductory Post: DCF Valuations: Academic Exercise, Sales Pitch or Investor Tool If you have a D(discount rate) and a CF (cash flow), you have a DCF. A DCF is an exercise in modeling & number crunching. You cannot do a DCF when there is too much uncertainty. The most critical input in a DCF is the discount rate and if you don’t believe in modern portfolio theory (or beta), you cannot use a DCF. If most of your value in a DCF comes from the terminal value, there is something wrong with your DCF. A DCF requires too many assumptions and can be manipulated to yield any value you want. A DCF cannot value brand name or other intangibles. A DCF yields a conservative estimate of value. If your DCF value changes significantly over time, there is either something wrong with your valuation. A DCF is an academic exercise.

What Would Larry Tisch Do?

I am a long-time admirer of Larry Tisch, as well as a disciple of his investing principles, along with those of Warren Buffett. I was fortunate enough to have been invited many times to Larry’s “power breakfasts” at the Regency Hotel, where virtually everything in the news, and also not in the news, was discussed openly and freely. The debates were fierce, and everyone left the table a little bit smarter. Larry was an asset buyer, and loved to buy at fire-sale prices and then wait for a return to normalcy, at which time, he would sell. He also loved cash flow, and especially free cash flow, which is why the Loews (NYSE: L ) empire comprised hotels, tobacco, financial, real estate and CBS for a while. He was a contrarian thinker, out of the box, with a long-term outlook to create long-term value. I remember when he bought a fleet of tankers at liquidation value and sold them when shipping recovered. Gosh, I admired Larry Tisch. I emulate in many ways his investment principles. He taught me to be patient and keep your eye on the long term. He definitely bought low and sold high, and had the liquidity to wait it out. He did not measure himself in quarters, but in years. Sounds like Buffett, doesn’t it? Larry died in 2003, and I miss him and his breakfasts. Why do I bring up Larry at this time? I have mentioned the need to both have and monitor your core investing beliefs. While I consider myself an investor with a several-year time horizon, it is so easy to get sucked into the daily gyrations in the marketplace and marking to the market each day forcing us to question our beliefs. Those days are certainly not fun, but are worthwhile and teach a valuable lesson. Never get too comfortable and complacent. I do not consider myself a contrarian as Larry was, but I am a value buyer who has consistently made singles and doubles over 35 years with only a few setbacks. How else did I compound at over 18% over 35 years, with only 4 down years. I buy value, maintain my liquidity and am an investor rather than a trader. My portfolios tend to have very low turnover. Sounds like Buffett too, doesn’t it? By the way, why would Berkshire Hathaway ( BRK.A , BRK.B ) consider buying Precision Castparts (NYSE: PCP ) today? It’s an out-of-favor industrial whose earnings are depressed, has underperformed for three years and sells at 18 times current earnings. But Buffett sees it as a great value play having a good future with strong cash flow. By the way, this would be a standalone acquisition for Berkshire, so there are no merger synergies as in most mergers today. Sounds like a Tisch play! Mine, too. So what is the point of all of this? As I mentioned last week, the market has bifurcated, with perceived growth companies doing well, while industrial companies have languished a la Precision Castparts. I will come back to this point later, but you can sense where I am going. The key event of last week was clearly the employment numbers in the United States. There was a gain of 215,000 jobs in July, the unemployment rate stood at 5.3% (down from 6.2% a year ago), average earnings of workers were up 2.3% from a year earlier, and the broader measure of unemployment, which includes discouraged workers and part-time employees, fell to 10.2%. Since the Fed’s goal is 5-5.2% unemployment, the general consensus is that the first Fed rate increase is near. As I mentioned last week, the Fed is caught between a rock and a hard place, as it MUST maintain its credibility, so a rate increase is at hand, despite weakness overseas and a strong dollar. Do you really believe that an increase in the funds rate of 25 basis points from near zero will stop out the economy? No, and if the dollar increase dramatically more as foreign capital is sucked into the United States, our exports will only suffer more depressing growth. But the financial markets think differently, as the stock market fell on fears of the negative impact of a Fed hike on growth, and the yield curve flattened as the long end rallied. Something that we predicted would possibly occur after the Fed did raise rates even by a token amount. The U.S. economy continues to chug along at a 2.5%-plus rate led by the consumer, with inflation staying beneath 1.5%. By the way, did any of you go to the pump this weekend? I paid $2.80 a gallon. Consumer sales in the eurozone were weak in June, held down by fears of a Greek default and its potential negative impact. But I believe it that the slowdown is transitory and will pick up for the remainder of the year, bolstered by a strengthening economy led by exports and higher consumer disposable income benefiting from lower energy prices. German manufacturing orders have surged, and the country’s trade surplus will hit an all-time high this year. Germany is the clear winner of a weak euro. Maybe by design! China has continued to stumble along, at least compared to its historical growth rates. While the country’s Services sector has improved, with a reading of 53.8 last month, its exports have weakened more than anticipated due to lower demand from Europe, the United States and Japan. As I mentioned last week, I expect that the Chinese government will permit the yuan to weaken in order to bolster exports, and implement additional stimulus to boost domestic demand. Don’t cry for China, as growth in 2015 will still exceed my 6.5% growth target. The country reported that its inflation rate rose to 1.6%, so Bill Gross’ fears of deflation appear to be off the mark. The stock markets weakened every day last week, led by the industrials, and finally, some of the high-fliers like biotech. The pundits are clearly anticipating that a Fed rate hike will be the beginning of the end for our economy, so it’s time to honker down now and get defensive. Tisch would disagree, and Buffett, too, would clearly disagree, as he is putting his money where his mouth is in purchasing Precision Castparts – and I would disagree as well. I mentioned last week that I was beginning to cover many of my commodity shorts, excluding in the energy patch, as I began to see aggressive cuts in capital spending and a rationing in production to bring it in line with growth. Finally, the decline in many commodity prices has fallen beneath cash costs of production, which is a precursor for bankruptcies. All good for the well-capitalized, low-cost producers. Not only did I cover my shorts, but I went long BHP and RIO, which both have strong balance sheets, good cash flow and dividends over 5.5%, which are well-supported. Like Tisch, I am willing to wait for a return to normalcy in industrial commodity prices. I cannot say the same about energy, though, for many reasons which I have discussed over the year. Politics play a large role in continued over production of oil, and that won’t change with Iran likely to come on-stream. I started adding to my industrials, including chemicals, last week as they weakened as mentioned earlier. If Buffett could buy a Precision Castparts, I could add to General Electric (NYSE: GE ), Honeywell (NYSE: HON ) and United Technologies (NYSE: UTX ). There is tremendous value out there if you are patient. Find those companies making strategic changes to enhance their future prospects that are not fully recognized. There is so much to discuss with all of you that I have decided to begin a weekly webcast in September. It will create a forum, much like Tisch’s power breakfasts, where we can discuss the global events impacting investing and brainstorm on its implications. I will say more about this and some other things that could enhance our relationship in a beneficial way soon. I have enjoyed putting myself on the firing line week in and week out. I hope that you find it helpful too. The results are in after 18 months of writing weekly blogs, and I have been told that I batted over 750 during that period, which is way above the norm even for the most successful money managers whom I have been compared to, like Leon Cooperman. My funds under management during this period were up over 50% net of fees, including up 16% year-to-date averaging less than 92% net long. Next on my agenda is to build our relationship by maximizing my strengths in the area of your needs. The weekly webcast is the start. More to come. Remember to review all the facts, step back and take a deep pause to reflect, control risk at all times and… Invest Accordingly!