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A Simple Way To Think About Moat

By Quan Hoang A moat is really about protecting a company’s profit as Warren Buffett said: “You give me a billion dollars and tell me to go into the chewing gum business and try to make a real dent in Wrigley’s. I can’t do it. That is how I think about businesses. I say to myself, give me a billion dollars and how much can I hurt the guy? Give me $10 billion dollars and how much can I hurt Coca-Cola around the world? I can’t do it. Those are good businesses.” A business may make less profit because of lower sales, lower margin, or both. So, there are two sides of a moat: the sales side and the margin side. The sales side can be broken down into customer retention and customer acquisition. Customer Retention There are many factors that lead to high retention, including customer behavior, price insensitivity, switching cost, etc. Customer behavior is subtle. Sometimes customers just don’t think about switching. I used to wonder how small banks can compete with big banks. I realized that a bank’s moat doesn’t come from low funding cost or low operating cost but actually from customer habit. Customers rarely change their primary banking account. So, a small bank may have a low ROE because of its high costs but it can still have stable local market share. Despite their big scale to sell many financial products, big banks can’t steal business from small banks very easily. Similarly, car owners rarely shop for a new insurer unless there’s a bad experience, there’s a major event in their life (move or marriage) or there’s a spike in the price of their premiums. In fact, insurers like State Farm and Allstate (NYSE: ALL ) have greater retention rate than Progressive (NYSE: PGR ) and Geico because they sell bundled products. So, even though Progressive and Geico have a huge cost advantage, they have only low double-digit market share after decades of gaining market share. There are simply not many people shopping for new car insurance policies each year. Price insensitivity helps retain customers in the face of price competition. Customers may pay little attention to price when it’s a tiny part of their total spending. Switching from Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO ) to a private label cola simply doesn’t save much. Even better, some customers are willing to pay more for convenience, tailored solutions, product quality, or customer services. I find it interesting that Frost often pays less than one-tenth of the Federal Funds Rate for its interest-checking deposits. For example, Frost paid only 0.47% on its interest-checking deposits in 2007 while many other banks paid about 1.50%. I’m not sure why but perhaps Frost’s customer service is so good that customers simply don’t care about getting interest income on their deposits. Customer Acquisition Strong customer acquisition can be achieved through distribution, mind share, product superiority, or price. The best example of distribution power is perhaps big food companies. By owning key brands, they have the power to convince retailers to carry new brands. Similarly, journal publishers like John Wiley have distribution power by selling bundles of journals to university libraries. Mind share also benefits customer acquisition. Mind share can be created by advertising, word of mouth or simply positive experience. If a customer decides to buy car insurance directly, he’ll pick either Geico or Progressive. Price comparison is actually much less common in the direct channel than in the agency channel. Direct customers know they’ll get a good price from Geico or Progressive. Mind share is particularly strong when a purchase is infrequent. The classic example is See’s Candies. People shop on only one or two occasions a year so there’s no incentive to look for other brands. To a lesser extent, some furniture brands in the U.S. spend a lot in advertising so that people think of Tempur-Pedic when they want to buy a memory foam mattress, think of Select Comfort (NASDAQ: SCSS ) when they want to buy an air-adjustable mattress, or think of La-Z-Boy (NYSE: LZB ) when they want to buy a recliner. Product superiority usually results from investment in R&D or service. It is strongest when there’s a network effect, which makes a popular product more valuable to customers. People join Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ) because many of their friends are there. People go to Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ) or eBay (NASDAQ: EBAY ) because that’s where they can find the most sellers and thus the best price. Finally, low price is always a powerful customer acquisition tool. Margin Protection Margin can be protected by maintaining the gap between price and costs. To analyze the margin side of moat, the key questions are: Does the company have lower costs than competitors? Does the company have higher asset turnover than competitors? Does the company have higher customer willingness to pay than competitors? Is the power of suppliers and buyers low? Low cost, high asset turnover, and high customer’s willingness to pay provide a cushion against price competition in the industry. Low power of buyers and suppliers keeps profits from leaking out of the industry. Increasing concentration of buyers or suppliers is a big threat to future profits. Better organized buyers or suppliers may demand better pricing or they threaten to sell or source directly. Moat Evaluation To evaluate moat, we should look at 3 things: Barrier to entry Potential damage of new entrants Rivalry among existing firms Barrier to Entry In this step, we should try to detect all advantages of a company in customer retention, customer acquisition, and margin protection. Barrier to entry is high when several factors are required at once so that entrants need not only money but also time to compete well. Let’s look at Hunter Douglas ( OTC:HDUGF ) . Customer retention isn’t very important for Hunter Douglas because purchases are infrequent. That said, Hunter Douglas’s customers are highly satisfied. Hunter Douglas’s focus on product innovation and services raise a customer’s willingness to pay. Customers rarely downgrade to a lower quality product unless they move to a rental home. Hunter Douglas’s greatest strength is in customer acquisition, specifically distribution. Independent dealers choose Hunter Douglas because the product quality is higher and they can sell the brand more easily. In fact, it’s usually the brand that draws traffic to dealers rather than dealers getting the traffic themselves. Hunter Douglas advertises more than anyone else in the window coverings industry. It also enjoys great word of mouth. Hunter Douglas’s margin is sustainable. Thanks to its huge relative market share, Hunter Douglas benefits from economies of scale in advertising, in R&D, and in fixed investments in its integrated and highly automated manufacturing facilities. Customer’s willingness to pay is higher than competitors because of product quality, advertising, and dealer service. Finally, the power of suppliers and buyers is low. Hunter Douglas is an integrated manufacturer so its inputs are mostly commodities. Dealers have little power because they’re individual mom-and-pop operations. A competitor needs brand recognition and low cost to recruit dealers. But it needs wide distribution to have low cost and to justify advertising investment. So, this is a chicken and egg problem. The best chance to compete with Hunter Douglas is through the online channel or through the big box channel. The only weakness in Hunter Douglas’s moat is the possibility of a market share shift between channels. It’s worth noting that customer power is very strong in the big box channel, which Hunter Douglas avoids. Home Depot (NYSE: HD ) or Lowe’s (NYSE: LOW ) usually demand a low price. Hunter Douglas’s competitors sell through big boxes and make little profit to reinvest in marketing or product innovation. And they tend to cut product quality to meet the low-price demand from big boxes. So, end-customers can be segmented by channels. A weak example is Weight Watchers (NYSE: WTW ) . WTW’s customer retention is weak because its members come and go. People don’t take responsibility for their failure so they’re always eager to try new weight loss programs. WTW’s customer acquisition is a bit better. It has no distribution advantage because fads can pick up easily in health and fitness. However, it has strong mindshare. Many people know what it is and know its effectiveness. In fact, its members re-enroll in the program on average three more times during their lives. All WTW needs to do is to give people a reason to join right now instead of putting off joining indefinitely. WTW’s margin is great. Customer willingness to pay is high thanks to the social value of weight loss. The power of suppliers and customers is low. So, it’ll make a lot of profits as long as it gets enough customers. So, WTW doesn’t have moat but it has some strength in customer acquisition. Its former customer base, about 20 million in the U.S., grows over time. The overweight population grows over time. So, it just needs the right program news and the right marketing buzz. In the past, Weight Watchers has always made record profits after each cycle. Potential Damage from New Entrants Sometimes a business can be good despite a low barrier to entry. I think WTW is a good example. So, it’s useful to make some attempts to judge the potential damage of new entrants. The best tool in this step is to look at history. I unfortunately underestimated WTW’s risk in the recent cycle. The problem is that I only had WTW’s financial data back to 2001. I would have been more cautious if I had financial data back to 1990 to see how WTW performed in its previous crisis in early 1990s. Without financial data, we only know that WTW has always been able to reinvent its program during each crisis. I think there’s some similarity between WTW and restaurant chains. The market is huge. Each chain has a different concept and few have a big market share. But barrier to entry is low and customers are willing to try new restaurants. New entrants actually don’t do as much damage to existing chains as people think. There are not many new successful stories like Chipotle (NYSE: CMG ) . And it took Chipotle 20 years to seize just a 2% market share. A rate of two percent is less than the restaurant industry grows in a single year. Moreover, new restaurants don’t always open in a brand new location. Often, they open in or near a location another restaurant concept had occupied before. So, the total supply of fast food restaurants doesn’t necessarily increase more than population growth despite the industry’s low barrier to entry. So, the biggest competition in fast food chains is actually among existing chains. Recently, Value and Opportunity argued that Fossil (NASDAQ: FOSL ) has no moat because “…wholesale distribution network seems to be quite open for newcomers like Daniel Wellington.” It’s true that department stores always have store space to test new suppliers. Retailers care about gross profit per square foot so they often switch suppliers in that area of their stores. Sometimes a new entrant may succeed. But how much will the success of a new watch brand actually hurt Fossil? Customer’s willingness to pay is high in this category so it won’t hurt margin. It may hurt volume, thus reducing gross profit per square foot of Fossil’s licensed watches. But cannibalization might not be as high as most people expect. Revenue of Michael Kors (NYSE: KORS ) watches went from $100 million to $900 million in 5 years but it didn’t hurt Fossil’s other brands. And Fossil’s other brands didn’t benefit from the recent fall in Michael Kors either. Perhaps not many people wear watches today so Michael Kors helped bring more consumers to the category. Or it simply induced people to buy more often. Also, can Daniel Wellington build on its early success and keep its brand relevant? It’s a big challenge for any newly successful entrant. So, I think it’s safe to bet that a (growing) diversified portfolio of strong licensed brands can help Fossil gain market share over time. Rivalry Among Existing Firms This step is similar to the Barrier to Entry step. However, we compare a company’s strengths in customer retention, customer acquisition, and margin with its competitors. We want to see some durable competitive advantages that allow a firm to gain market share over time. And we want to make sure that the moat is widened over time. In our bank example, every American bank has a pretty good retention rate. However, some regional banks such as Commerce Bancshares (NASDAQ: CBSH ) and BOK Financial (NASDAQ: BOKF ) have the scale to sell other products like wealth management or payment systems service. Selling more products to a customer creates a closer relationship and improves retention. More products also mean more touch points to acquire new customers. Finally, more products result in more fee income, reducing net operating cost and creating a cost advantage. A cost advantage may allow for more reinvestment in products and services. So, these banks will possibly gain market share from tiny local competitors over time. Conclusion There’s nothing innovative in this framework. But I think it can help us connect different competitive advantages and see a clearer picture of moat. It’s a simple way to think about moat. But the most important question is always the one Warren Buffett asks: “I say to myself, give me a billion dollars and how much can I hurt the guy?”

What I Do When The Market Tumbles

When stocks take a dive, investors call their financial advisors and ask them what they should do. I received a few of those calls this week. Most advisors respond with some version of “Don’t panic.” Here’s what I do when the market crashes: nothing. To be completely honest, I wasn’t aware that the market had fallen 8% so far in January until my wife told me late this week. I don’t watch business news – life is too short. She picked it up on CNN while she was watching election news. (I don’t follow that, either.) Here’s my theory. If you have such a high allocation to equities that market declines make you anxious, you own too much stock. Find the allocation at which severe bear market losses won’t keep you up at night. In the 2007-2009 bear market, the S&P 500 fell over 50%. My portfolio fell just 15% because I had a 40% equity allocation. As one of my favorite baristas, Mandy, would say, “It didn’t feel totally awesome.” On the other hand, I didn’t lose sleep. William Bernstein addressed this in a couple of his early books, including The Four Pillars of Investing (page 268). He suggests that the initial pass at the correct asset allocation for you be based on how much you can tolerate losing in a bear market. He provided the following table: I can tolerate losing this percent in a bear market Invest this much in stocks 35% 80% 30% 70% 25% 60% 20% 50% 15% 40% 10% 30% 5% 20% 0% 10% Every December I evaluate my finances and plan for the coming year. I calculate my desired asset allocation, which might not be the same as last year’s. If my current allocation is within an absolute 5% or so of my desired allocation, I do nothing. Otherwise, I may trade a few funds or ETFs to implement my new allocation. In reality, this rarely happens because my allocation doesn’t often stray very far. Because I am willing to lose 15% in a severe bear market, I don’t labor over my portfolio value daily. I probably check it four times a year, at most. I retired to enjoy the remainder of my life, not to fret over the stock market. Here’s some advice from other advisors I trust. Wade Pfau suggests reading this piece in the New York Times entitled, ” 6 Tips for Investors When the Stock Market Tumbles. ” It’s a good one. Dana Anspach suggests that if you feel that you must do something, instead of selling stocks, enroll in her free online class on retirement – another great idea. Joe Tomlinson and I provided suggestions in Robert Powell’s USA Today column, ” Advice for investors during crazy stock market volatility .” If you’re retired or plan to be soon, set your asset allocation to a level of equities that you can tolerate. By definition, that means you won’t feel the need to do anything at all when stocks tumble. For young people still accumulating savings for retirement, invest most of your portfolio in stocks and don’t you do anything, either. In fact, do less than nothing. Time will fix this for you. As I recall, the 22% loss on a single day on Black Monday in 1987 didn’t feel totally awesome, either, but now it is barely a blip on the history of the S&P 500. So, here’s my advice: pick an allocation you can stomach and ignore the noise. If you owned too much equity this time, gradually adjust it downward. You’ll know you’re at the right allocation when the market takes a dive and you don’t feel a need to call me. Oh, and don’t panic.

Damage Control: Is It Too Late Too Become More Defensive?

A manufacturing recession doesn’t matter… until it does. Consider industrial production. For the third straight month, industrial production, which includes mining, utilities, as well as manufacturing, contracted. How anemic is American industry right now? The year-over-year percentage change provides a helpful snapshot of the weakness. Not surprisingly, media mega-stars routinely dismiss manufacturers, miners and utility providers as relics of yesterday’s economy. They maintain that consumers are the only ones who count in a consumption-based society. The erosion of the high-paying careers in those segments notwithstanding, might the rosy projections for household consumption be misleading? After all, retail sales (ex auto) pulled back 0.1% in December, even as economists anticipated 0.2% growth. We can look at consumer trends in a variety of ways. As I pointed out in my most recent commentary (1/12/16), year-over-year percent growth in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) has been declining steadily for roughly 18 months. Meanwhile, year-over-year percentage changes in retail sales (ex auto) emulate what is taking place in American industry. So what happened to the “clear-cut” benefit of lower oil prices? Weren’t they supposed to be a giant tax cut for the American consumer, prompting them to spend? Not when wage growth is tepid. And not when many households have chosen to increase their savings. It should not go unnoticed that the S&P SPDR Retail Index has quickly descended into bear territory. The SPDR S&P Retail ETF (NYSEARCA: XRT ) is currently down about 22.3%. Even more disheartening for those who had not become more defensive in their asset allocation over the past year? The price of XRT is lower than it was two years ago. Ironically enough, the question is no longer whether U.S. stocks have entered a bear market in the same way that the retail segment has. Indeed, Bespoke Research already demonstrated that the average large-company stock, the average mid-sized company stock and the average small-company stock have all surpassed the 20% bear market threshold. In the same vein, the median stock in the Russell 3000 and the Value Line Index show the same. The only question now is whether or not there will be enough buying interest in market-cap weighted indices like the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrials to avoid a similar fate. The SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) does have impressive support at the 185 level. In my estimation, the best shot that the major benchmarks have in avoiding a “bear market headline” is the same injection that occurred during the euro-zone crisis in 2011. Specifically, nearly all of the U.S. indexes and overseas benchmarks fell 20%-40% during that summer. The Dow and the S&P 500 escaped a similar fate with depreciation of “just” 19%-19.9%, due to “well-timed” stimulus promises by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the U.S. Federal Reserve. Already, Fed fund futures have pushed out their anticipation of a second rate hike out to Q3 (July-September) from March. The market does not believe the Fed party line of 4 rate hikes in 2015. In fact, if the Dow and the S&P 500 do fall to significantly lower levels, one might anticipate the central bank of the United States reversing course; perhaps the notion of negative interest rates and/or QE4 might be introduced to the investing public. Historically speaking, however, the wildcard of a Fed reversal may not be enough to calm the nerves of panicky market-based participants. Take a look at this table for the S&P 500’s first five trading days in January. (Note: I won’t even incorporate the horrific second week that investors are dealing with right now.) The worst first five days for the S&P 500 occurred right here in 2016. But that’s not all. In the table, seven of the nine worst starts ultimately offered poor risk-reward results, either with additional losses or sub-par total gains through year-end. “Wait a second, Gary. Those other two years in 1991 and in 1982 show extraordinary price appreciation. Isn’t that reason enough to be optimistic?” Not if you recognize that the price gains that occurred in 1991 came at the conclusion of the 20% losses for the 1990-1991 stock market bear. And not if you realize that the price appreciation that followed in 1982 came at the end of the 27% losses for the 1981-1982 stock market bear. Right now, we’re not coming off of a 20% price collapse of the S&P 500. It follows that to the extent one wants to take the history of market direction into account, one would have to look at 2016’s prospects in an unfavorable light. I spent the better part of 2014 explaining the benefits of a barbell approach for a late-stage bull . We matched large-cap U.S. stock assets like the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: IVV ), the Health Care Select Sect SPDR ETF (NYSEARCA: XLV ) and the iShares S&P 100 ETF (NYSEARCA: OEF ) with longer-term investment grade bonds like the Vanguard Extended Duration Treasury ETF (NYSEARCA: EDV ), the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: IEF ) and the SPDR Nuveen Barclays Municipal Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: TFI ). By May of 2015, I expressed the tactical asset allocation changes that I believed were necessary in an unfavorable risk-reward environment, encouraging investors to lower their overall exposure to risk assets . Trying to exit markets during panicky sell-offs rarely proves beneficial. That said, if you believe that you may have been too assertive with your exposure to riskier holdings, you might wait for an inevitable bounce higher. One can work his/her way to a more defensive stance until the fundamental, technical and economic backdrop improves. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.