Tag Archives: applicationtime

PPL Corp. – Early Birds Catch The Worm

PPL has changed their business strategy to focus on a niche market. It is now a regulated utility focused on transmission and distribution assets. The company’s risk profile has been reduced. PPL could become a takeover target. PPL Corp. (NYSE: PPL ) is beginning to look attractive. In early June, PPL spun off their fleet of merchant power plants to a new company called Talen Energy (Pending: TLN ). By spinning off one part of their business, PPL changed its profile from a hybrid to a niche utility. The new PPL is a regulated utility. It is no longer exposed to the volatility associated with nation’s new deregulated power markets. It is no longer exposed to financial and political risks associated with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions. Instead, most of their revenues will be regulated and their earnings will become stable. PPL’s potential value is understood in the context of industry trends. Until recently, large utilities hedged their bets by spreading their positions along the utility value chain. Most wanted to diversify their portfolio of assets by owning power plants, transmission lines, pipelines, distribution wires, metering systems and energy service companies. They wanted to own regulated assets. They also wanted to own deregulated assets. For those utilities who tried owning everything, it did not work out well. Some were burned by the market. Others were overwhelmed with indirect expenses. A few saw their bond ratings limited as investors assessed their risks. Today, utilities are adopting a new strategy. One by one, the nation’s largest utilities are shifting their portfolios. One example is Duke Energy (NYSE: DUK ). Last April, Duke sold two deregulated businesses to Dynegy (NYSE: DYN ) for $2.8 billion in cash. One business was Duke’s fleet of deregulated power plants. The other was their deregulated energy services business. Today, most of Duke’s assets are regulated. Another example is Dominion Resources (NYSE: D ). Dominion sold a fleet of deregulated power plants and prematurely retired a nuclear plant. They also sold their deregulated energy services business to NRG Energy (NYSE: NRG ). While they still own a merchant nuclear facility, most of Dominion’s assets are regulated. Some utilities are unable to sell disaffected assets. Instead, they decided to do the next best thing. They decided to change the percentage of assets within their portfolio. To change their portfolio to more favorable emphases, they buy more of one asset and reduce numbers of other assets. Today, two large utilities are attempting to change their portfolios by acquiring distribution-only utilities. One example is NextEra Energy (NYSE: NEE ). NextEra is attempting to acquire Hawaiian Electric Industries’ (NYSE: HE ) utility. They are also attempting to acquire OnCore Electric Delivery (the Texas-based electric distribution utility owned by bankrupt Energy Future Holdings Corp.). By acquiring more distribution utilities, NextEra increases their footprint, reduces their reliance on one state’s regulator and de-emphasizes their generating profile. Another is example Exelon (NYSE: EXC ). They cannot easily sell their huge fleet of merchant power plants, which is mostly nuclear. They can adjust their profile by acquiring a wires-only utility, which is one reason why they are in the process of acquiring Pepco Holdings (NYSE: POM ). Pepco is mostly a regulated wires-only utility. If Exelon’s acquisition is successful, Exelon will become more of a regulated utility and less of a merchant utility. As a result, their access to capital is improved and their cost of capital is reduced. These examples are relevant to the new PPL. Now that PPL is mostly a wires-only utility, the company has become a niche player. This change in strategy should be attractive to investors. It could also be attractive to other utilities who might want to expand their footprint or alter their profiles. To be clear, the new PPL could be an attractive takeover target. If another utility attempts to buy PPL, shareholders could be rewarded. It may take time. It may not happen overnight. However, PPL is paying a stock dividend. That dividend could help buy shareholder patience. However, investors should be careful. There is a reason PPL’s dividend is attractive. It is possible PPL’s management could lower the dividend. The possibility seems remote. In their February conference call , PPL’s chairman and CEO addressed the complany’s dividend plans: But as we’ve said, post spin, our intent is to continue to maintain the same level of dividend prior to the spin. And we’ll look at opportunities where appropriate to grow it if we can. So that’s kind of still the game plan going forward. There appears to be equivocation. We can see why in their May conference call . In that call, PPL’s CFO addressed the dividend issue again: We recognize that the domestic payout ratio to fund our dividend was over 100% beginning in 2016. With our ability to dividend between $300 million and $500 million a year from WPD over the next few years, we would target to get the domestic payout ratio back under 100% for 2016 and continue to lower that domestic payout ratio in 2017 and 2018. Today, forward ratios appear to support PPL’s dividend goals. If everything goes as planned, the dividend should remain intact and possibly grow. However, PPL owns WPD utility system. WPD serves end-users in Wales and England. It has several subsidiaries operating in Wales and England. Over 40% of PPL’s assets are owned by their WPD subsidiaries. Approximately 33% of PPL’s forward revenues are derived from WPD subsidiaries. With billions of dollars in another country, PPL is exposed to United Kingdom’s economy and currency. They are also exposed to U.S. taxes on repatriated funds. If any unforeseen event takes place, there is risk PPL’s dividend may require adjustment. As a reminder, Exelon surprised their shareholders by cutting their dividend . Prior to acquiring Constellation Energy, Exelon’s management suggested dividends could be maintained. A few months after they completed their Constellation acquisition, Exelon’s dividends were cut. The stock tumbled. For PPL investors, the challenge is the company’s fundamentals. It is difficult to reference a baseline when the baseline suddenly shifts. In PPL’s case, when they spun off their generating company, it became difficult to reference past performance. As a result, it may take several quarters for investors to digest the full effects PPL’s spin-off. Nevertheless, speculators may want to accept management’s guidance and jump in. As uncertain as they may be, some ratios look attractive. PPL’s current yield is about 5%. Its price/earnings ratio is below 11, its forward earnings appear healthy, and its risk/reward suggests buying now — even if some critical facts are largely unknown. Fundamental investors may want to wait. PPL’s management has aggressive capex plans. They may attempt to buy a competitor and expand their wires business. There could be some dilution. Ratios could be adjusted. Then again, a hungry utility may want to jump in, pay a premium and buy PPL. In that case, ratios and earnings estimates are largely academic. Those who bought early may catch the worm. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Tax Efficient Large-Cap Portfolio Management System With Minimum Volatility Stocks Of The S&P 500

This model invests periodically in eight highly liquid large-cap stocks selected from those considered to be minimum volatility stocks of S&P 500 Index. Most stock positions are held for longer than one year, resulting in a Tax Efficiency ratio of 81.4%. When adverse stock market conditions exist the model shorts the 3x leveraged Ultra Pro S&P 500 ETF – hedge/current holding ratio= 45%. The model produced a simulated average annual return of about 36% from Jan-2000 to end of June-2015. The Minimum Volatility Stock Universe of the S&P 500 Minimum volatility stocks should exhibit lower drawdowns than the broader market and show reasonable returns over an extended period of time. It was found that a universe of stocks mainly from the Health Care, Consumer Staples and Utilities sectors satisfied those conditions. This minimum volatility universe of the S&P 500 currently holds 117 large-cap stocks (market cap ranging from $4- to $277-billion), and there were 111 stocks in the universe at the inception of the model, on Jan-2-2000. The Best8(S&P 500 Min-Volatility)-US Tax Efficient This model differs from our Best8(S&P500 Min-Volatility) system with regard to the hedge used and additional sell rules to make holding periods mostly longer than one year so that long term capital gain tax rates would apply. Also a position showing a loss greater than 25% may be sold earlier. All other parameters and ranking system are the same. Under some conditions, such as mergers, a stock will be sold and replaced. This may invoking a short term gain for tax purposes if the holding period was less than one year. The model assumes that stocks are bought and sold at the next day’s average of the Low and High price after a signal is generated. Variable slippage accounting for brokerage fees and transaction slippage was taken into account. Tax Efficiency of the Best8(S&P500 Min-Volatility)-US Tax Efficient An analysis of all the realized trades is shown in Table 1. There were 91 winning stock trades of which 86 had holding periods longer than 1 year. All winning hedge trades had holding periods less than 1 year. The Tax Efficiency was defined as the ratio of total $ gains of winners held longer than 1 year to total $ gains of all winners: 81.4% for this model. By comparison, the Tax Efficiency of the Best8(S&P500 Min-Volatility) system which trades frequently was only 18.6% as shown in Table 2. Since both models show the same annualized return of about 36% it would be more advantageous to follow the Tax Efficient system when trading outside a tax-sheltered account. Performance In the figures below the red graph represents the model and the blue graph shows the performance of benchmark the SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF ( SPY). Figures 1, 2 and 3 show performance comparisons: Figure 1: Performance 2000-2015 and hedging with short the ProShares UltraPro S&P 500 ETF ( UPRO). Annualized Return= 36.1%, Max Drawdown= -19.8%. The model uses a hedge ratio of 45% of current holdings during down-market conditions. (Note: The inception date of UPRO was June 23, 2009. Prior to this date values are “synthetic”, derived from the S&P 500.) Figure 2: Performance 2000-2015 without hedging. Annualized Return= 21.4%, Max Drawdown= -34.7%. The drawdown figure confirms that minimum volatility stocks perform better than the broader market which had a -55% max drawdown. Figure 3: Performance 2009-2015 with hedging. Annualized Return= 35.8%, Max Drawdown= -17.4%. (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) Figures 4 to 8 show performance details: Figure 4: Performance 2000-2014 versus SPY. Over the 15-year period $100 invested at inception would have grown to $9,889, which is 54-times what the same investment in SPY would have produced. Figure 5: 1-year returns. Except for 2006 the 1-year returns were always higher than for SPY. There was never a negative return in one calendar year. Figure 6: 1-year rolling returns. The minimum 1-year rolling return of the 3-day moving average was -2.9% early in 2008. Figure 7: Distribution of monthly returns. One can see that the monthly returns follow a normal distribution, displaced to the right relative to the returns of SPY. Figure 8: Risk measurements for 15-year and trailing 3-year periods. (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) (click to enlarge) Disclaimer One should be aware that all results shown are from a simulation and not from actual trading. They are presented for informational and educational purposes only and shall not be construed as advice to invest in any assets. Out-of-sample performance may be much different. Backtesting results should be interpreted in light of differences between simulated performance and actual trading, and an understanding that past performance is no guarantee of future results. All investors should make investment choices based upon their own analysis of the asset, its expected returns and risks, or consult a financial adviser. The designer of this model is not a registered investment adviser.

How Does VXUP/VXDN’s Corrective Distribution Work?

It’s now clear that the AccuShares Spot CBOE VIX Up Shares ETF (NASDAQ: VXUP )/the AccuShares Spot CBOE VIX Down Class Shares ETF (NASDAQ: VXDN ) naysayers were right – the actual behavior of these funds is nowhere close to Accushares’ claim that ” VXUP and VXDN are the first securities to offer direct “spot” exposure to the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). ” Accushares has said nothing publicly about the poor behavior of the funds. Their only response has been to move up the “go live” date of their Corrective Distribution process. This is a desperation move. Apparently not understanding what has happened to them they are rushing to use the last weapon at their disposal to fix their horrible tracking error (as high as 18%) relative to the VIX. This move will reduce their tracking problem for less than a day and add yet another complexity to these already complicated and broken funds. Accushares’ Corrective Distribution (CD) is intended to reduce any ongoing differences between VXUP/VXDN’s Net Asset Value (NAV) and its market price. I don’t know what specific scenarios they were targeted with in this process, but I’m guessing they were worried about a slow, progressive creep in the market prices versus the NAV. The CD is triggered if there are 3 consecutive days where the tracking error (difference between NAV and closing price) is 10% or greater. To be a valid closing price the last trade must occur within 30 minutes of market close. When the CD is triggered it doesn’t occur immediately, it’s scheduled to accompany the next monthly Regular Distribution or a Special Distribution if that occurs first. A Special Distribution is triggered by a greater than 75% rise in the VIX compared to the reference VIX value established at the beginning of the monthly cycle. Accushares did not expect frequent CDs to be required; in the prospectus they state: “The Sponsor expects that Corrective Distributions will be infrequent, and may never occur.” It’s likely they will occur on a near monthly basis. When there is a significant gap between the VIX’s value and VIX futures prices (which is most of the time) the VXUP/VXDN tracking error will be large. See this post for a near real time accounting of these errors. With a combined Regular Distribution and Corrective Distribution three things occur: The NAV of the higher valued fund is set to equal the NAV of the lower valued fund. A dividend is issued that compensates the holders of the higher valued fund for the drop in NAV value. The dividend is either in cash or an equal number of VXUP/DN shares with a net value equal to the cash dividend. Accushares issues a new complementary share to every shareholder. If you have VXUP, you will get VXDN shares and vice versa. This is the Corrective Distribution mechanism. Since Accushares can’t create assets out of thin air, they must compensate for the newly doubled number of shares outstanding by dropping their value by half (or do a 2:1 reverse stock split). The effect of the Corrective Distribution is not obvious. Working through an example is a good way to understand it. Imagine that a CD has been triggered and that a Regular Distribution is about to occur. You own 1,000 shares of VXUP. Let’s assume that the market price of VXUP is $27.5, the VXUP NAV is $25, and that the VXDN NAV is $22 at market close right before the distribution. You would receive a dividend of $3/share due to the resetting of VXUP’s $25 NAV value down to VXDN’s ending cycle value of $22. You would also receive 1,000 shares of VXDN. The new NAV value would be $22/2 = $11/share because Accushares doubled the number of shares outstanding. Before the CD the VXUP shares in your account were worth $27.5 X 1,000 = $27.5K. After the Regular/Corrective Distribution your account has: Your net account value drops to $25K – your $2.5K premium over NAV has disappeared. Any premium over the closing NAV value is wiped out by the CD. The next day VXUP will likely trade at a multiple percentage points over NAV, but your VXDN shares will likely be trading at a symmetrical discount from NAV, so the net value of your shares will remain at around $22K. Accushares has essentially cashed out your account at the NAV price – no premium for you… No diligent shareholder will willingly take this sort of loss, nor short seller pass up this opportunity for profit; the market will ensure the value of these funds converges near to NAV the eve of the distribution. From an entertainment value perspective, there will be a couple of things to watch once the CD mechanism becomes effective: Will traders attempt to prevent CDs from happening? Imagine a scenario where some groups are trying to prevent a CD from happening by selling, or short selling shares, while others hoping to profit from a CD are buying shares hoping to keep the tracking error above 10%. How low will the tracking errors go before the CD date? Short sellers would tend to drive the tracking errors to zero, but the about to expire VIX futures values will be decaying rapidly at that point, so significant intra-day profits might still be available to arbitrageurs on the last days of trading. The net effect of the CD will be to complicate and disrupt an already difficult situation. It won’t fix the funds. What Accushares should do is eliminate the Corrective Distribution. Once broken is better than twice broken. Disclosure: None