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The Ins And Outs Of Municipal Closed-End Funds

Given the likely continuation of the record low fixed income yield environment for the foreseeable future, potential periods of heightened, future stock market volatility and attractive current yields versus comparable taxable investments, municipal bonds and municipal bond-oriented investment strategies, including closed-end funds , have been in high demand of late. For example, as you will see from the table below, all U.S. Traded Tax-Free National Muni Bond CEFs are now trading, on average, above their 10 year average premium/discount. This has not been the case in the last two years. Click to enlarge Source: Wells Fargo Advisors/Morningstar as of April 14, 2016 . In addition, with respect to municipal bond-focused mutual funds, U.S. Municipal bond funds recently posted their 28th consecutive week of inflows. Consider the mutual fund flow information for Municipal Bond funds relative to Taxable Bond funds below from the Investment Company Institute’s (ICI) Trends in Mutual Fund Investing report for the first two months of 2016. Mutual Fund Classification February 2016 January 2016 January – February 2016 January – February 2015 Domestic Equity -3,330 -15,480 -18,809 8,376 World Equity 10,820 10,507 21,326 13,599 Hybrid -1,457 -10,639 -12,096 6,057 Taxable Bond -3,980 -9,425 -13,405 19,914 Municipal Bond 4,690 4,269 8,959 7,230 Taxable Money Market 44,925 -10,874 34,051 -45,488 Tax-exempt Money Market -7,642 -9,372 -17,013 -2,039 Total 44,026 -41,013 3,013 7,649 Overall, the strong demand for, and low underlying supply of, municipal bonds have kept prices high and yields relatively low during the first quarter, yet I would anticipate demand remaining high for municipal bond-oriented investment strategies for the balance of 2016. As a result, for those interested in adding, or increasing, allocations to municipal bonds through CEFs to their client portfolios, the following overview of the municipal bond CEFs may prove helpful. At present, there are 176 closed-end funds in the Tax-Free Income category outstanding across 19 different strategies; some national and some state specific, according to CEFConnect.com. Category Strategy # of CEFs Tax-Free Income High Yield 6 Tax-Free Income National 88 Tax-Free Income (State) Arizona 2 Tax-Free Income (State) California 22 Tax-Free Income (State) Connecticut 1 Tax-Free Income (State) Florida 1 Tax-Free Income (State) Georgia 1 Tax-Free Income (State) Maryland 2 Tax-Free Income (State) Massachusetts 4 Tax-Free Income (State) Michigan 4 Tax-Free Income (State) Minnesota 2 Tax-Free Income (State) Missouri 1 Tax-Free Income (State) New Jersey 8 Tax-Free Income (State) New York 21 Tax-Free Income (State) North Carolina 1 Tax-Free Income (State) Ohio 3 Tax-Free Income (State) Pennsylvania 6 Tax-Free Income (State) Texas 1 Tax-Free Income (State) Virginia 2 Since CEFs contain their own unique set or risk considerations, including but not limited to the utilization of leverage, it is critical in my view to employ a comprehensive set of selection criteria beyond just looking for those CEFs that have the highest current yield and/or are trading at the deepest discount relative to their own net asset value (NAV). In this regard, some of the screening criteria that we consider at SmartTrust® when selecting municipal CEFs for our applicable unit investment trust (UIT) strategies include, but is not limited to, the following: · Market Cap & Liquidity – measured by total net assets, in U.S. dollars, and average trading volumes of the CEF. We generally look for CEFs with total net assets of $100mm or greater, while also giving consideration for average trading volume. · Distribution Rate – this is the current distribution rate, or yield, of the CEF and is a measure of the current annualized distribution amount divided by the current price – not the NAV. · Distribution Amount – most current cash distribution amount per share. We are only interested in looking at regular income distributions and disregard returns of principal, special (i.e. non-regular) distributions, short term capital gains and long term capital gains. · Earnings per Share (EPS) – this is the most current amount that the CEF earned per share. We generally exclude those CEFs with negative earnings per share. · Earnings/Distribution Coverage Ratio – this ratio compares current earnings to current monthly distribution amounts where ratios over 100% indicate that the CEF is “over-covered” from an earnings/distribution standpoint and ratios under 100% indicate that the CEF is “under-covered” from an earnings/distribution standpoint. We prefer CEFs that have a high Earnings/Distribution Coverage Ratio. · Undistributed Net Investment Income (UNII) – the life-to-date balance of a fund’s net investment income less distributions of net investment income. UNII appears in shareholder reports as a line item on a fund’s statement of changes in net assets. We consider UNII as a cash buffer or a cash reserve to a CEF portfolio. We typically do not consider CEFs with negative UNII balances. · UNII/Distribution Coverage Ratio – this ratio compares current UNII balances to current monthly distribution amounts to determine how many months of distribution coverage are covered by the CEF’s UNII balance. · Premium / (Discount) -the amount which a closed-end fund market price exceeds (premium) or is less than (discount) the net asset value of that CEF. We contend that a CEF trading at a premium does not necessarily mean it is overvalued and a CEF trading at a discount is not necessarily undervalued. There is nothing written in stone that states that a closed-end fund (CEF) ever has to trade at its net asset value. · 52 Week Average Premium / (Discount) – to help gauge the relative value of the current premium / (discount) of a given CEF, we compare the current to premium / (discount) to the 52 week average premium / (discount). Such comparisons are done not only for the CEF itself but also in relation to their category/strategy. For example, CEFs trading below their 52 week averages represent greater relative value to us than those CEFs trading above their 52 week averages. · Effective Leverage ( and type of leverage employed ) – total economic leverage exposure of the CEF and includes structural leverage, which is calculated using leverage created by a fund’s preferred shares or debt borrowings by the fund, as well as leverage exposure created by the fund’s investment in certain derivative investments (including, but not limited to, reverse repurchase agreements). Leverage is typically represented as a percentage of a fund’s total assets. Given the current record low interest rate environment, many CEF managers are still currently employing some form of leverage to enhance their portfolio yields and take advantage of low relative borrowing costs. For example, approximately 97% of all tax-free income CEFs currently employ some form of leverage. Recognizing that portfolio leverage may increase the volatility of a given CEF and leverage itself can provide less value when short-term rates approach or exceed long-term rates, we pay careful attention to the type and amount of leverage that each CEF strategy employs, especially as we are now within what is likely to be a protracted period of gradually rising interest rates. · Expense Ratio – it is important to be cognizant of the effect that the underlying CEF expense ratios have on the overall portfolio performance of the strategy. · Credit Quality – most CEF sponsors report the credit quality breakdown of the underlying bond holdings within their portfolios at different reporting periods. · Maturity – most CEF sponsors report the maturities of the underlying bond holdings within their portfolios at different reporting periods. · Option Adjusted Duration (OAD) – while all CEF sponsors do not necessarily report the OAD of the underlying bond holdings within their portfolios at different reporting periods, financial software providers, such as Bloomberg, do calculate and provide this interest rate sensitivity based information. · AMT Percentage – most CEF sponsors report the AMT percentages of the underlying bond holdings within their portfolios at different reporting periods. This information may be helpful for portfolios allocations to high new worth clients who are within a higher tax bracket. · % of Portfolio Pre-refunded – most CEF sponsors report the percentage of their portfolios that are pre-refunded related to the underlying bond holdings within their portfolios at different reporting periods. We generally look favorably on pre-refunded bonds. To appreciate our perspective, it is necessary to understand how pre-refunded bonds work. Pre-refunded bonds are issued to fund another callable municipal bond, where the issuer of the municipal bond actually decides to exercise its right to buy its bonds back before the bond’s scheduled maturity date. The proceeds from the issue of the lower yield and/or longer maturing pre-refunding bond will usually be invested in U.S. Treasury bills until the scheduled call date of the original bond issue occurs, thereby reducing the credit risk of the original bond issuance. While no screening criteria can guarantee the success of a selected investment strategy, I believe that the multi-factor approach described above can be helpful in uncovering municipal CEFs that strive to pay high, sustainable levels of tax-free income, and provide for total return potential, over the life of each CEF investment strategy. Disclosure: Hennion & Walsh is the sponsor of SmartTrust® Unit Investment Trusts (UITs). For more information on SmartTrust® UITs, please visit smarttrustuit.com . The overview above is for informational purposes and is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any SmartTrust® UITs. Investors should consider the Trust’s investment objective, risks, charges and expenses carefully before investing. The prospectus contains this and other information relevant to an investment in the Trust and investors should read the prospectus carefully before they invest. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Bigger Is Better? For Investment Managers, Maybe Not

It’s no secret that America has long operated under an obsession with size. Over the last couple of decades, the average house size has continually increased (even as lots are shrinking ), cars have become supersized , food portions have grown, retail stores continue to sprawl, and even our waistlines have gradually expanded. Everything, it seems, is increasing in mass or breadth , as our national focus on size-above-all becomes ever more pathological with each passing year. This “bigger is better” mentality bleeds over into our financial lives, as well. Even as we rail against the “Too Big To Fail” banks for destabilizing our economy and extracting rents from working-class Americans, we continue to bank with them en masse, lured by the convenience and security of working with a known brand name. As a result, the big banks continue to get larger still, to the point that they’re now bigger than ever (and, coincidentally or not, failing some government-led stress tests). Click to enlarge Unsurprisingly, this same mentality holds true when it comes to our investments, and the advisors we choose to work with. Most individuals simply default to working with the big wirehouse brokerages (Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo, etc.), even when they could be obtaining better service (and true fiduciary advice ) by working with a smaller, independent Registered Investment Adviser firm. And yet, there’s a growing body of evidence that smaller (and not bigger) might actually be better for many things, including our investment returns. In early 2013, a study released by Beachhead Capital found that among approximately 3,000 long/short hedge funds, the funds managed by firms with total assets under management (AUM) between $50 million and $500 million outperformed those run by larger firms over essentially every time period studied. And the amount of outperformance was significant — 2.54% per year over five years, and 2.20% per year over ten years, with the outperformance concentrated in the years immediately preceding and following the financial crisis of 2009. Risk measures were roughly the same for the different types of firms, so the outperformance can’t be explained by greater risk-taking. And while “dispersion” measures were greater among the smaller advisors — meaning that returns varied more for smaller firms than for larger ones — the overall difference in performance is too large to be ignored. These findings run counter to what much industry research might predict. Whether at hedge funds or at investment advisory firms, scale is generally expected to improve purchasing power, and to allow for access to a broader range of investment vehicles (like certain swaps and derivatives or other over-the-counter products that smaller firms simply can’t access via their existing custodial channels). If nothing else, size is supposed to improve the terms that managers are able to negotiate, whether via lower commissions or fees or via improved investor protections in potential bankruptcies or other corporate restructurings. And yet, intuition aside, these benefits of scale simply don’t seem to be flowing through to the bottom line, for the firms or their investors. Beachhead presented a number of potential explanations for the disparity, a few of which I’ll paraphrase here. Some investments don’t benefit from scale Contrary to conventional wisdom, bigger isn’t always better in the markets; sometimes, size can be a limiting factor, constricting the types of investments that a firm can realistically add to its portfolio. Take the case of the Harvard Management Company, the group tasked with managing Harvard University’s sizeable endowment . For years, HMC’s investment performance was top-notch, consistently beating its peers as its talented managers consistently generated high double-digit annual returns. But as HMC’s portfolio continued to grow, it found itself running out of viable places to put all of its money. In many markets, they had already become the single largest owner of available shares, and to increase the size of their stakes in those investments would impede their ability to exit (or trim) those positions in the future. In some markets, HMC had effectively become the market, simply by virtue of its size. Funds (or managers) in that position are left with two basic options: either begin to branch out into ever more esoteric investments and asset classes, or else pile into the so-called “hedge fund hotels” , those few investment vehicles that have the opportunity for outsized gains, but are also large and liquid enough to accept massive inflows of capital without enduring wild market-moving price shifts. Neither option is particularly attractive, from the investment manager’s point of view. Choosing the “esoteric investments” route often means accepting significantly less liquidity (and an attendant increase in volatility), which tends to limit flexibility while also exacerbating the impact of downturns on fund returns. Indeed, this is exactly what happened to HMC during the 2009 financial crisis, a dynamic that led to a reconsideration of overall investment strategy. But the “hedge fund hotel” route is similarly problematic: for one, how can a fund distinguish itself from its peers when all funds own the same investments? Wouldn’t larger firms then, by definition, simply trend toward standard “average” market performance over time? And, perhaps more concerningly, what happens when a majority of the large funds all run for the “hotel” exits at the same time? At best, the fund is, again, forced to endure greater portfolio volatility, and at worst, the managers are trampled like so many young men in Pamplona . The fact is some investment opportunities are small enough that only a small advisor can really avail itself of the benefits — the market for the investment could be so limited that the large manager’s entrance would simply overwhelm the market and thus eliminate any mispricing opportunity. Even if the large fund were successful in its trade, the gross size of the gain might be so small as to barely impact total fund returns. Think of the old parable of Bill Gates stooping down to pick up a 100 dollar bill (or a mythical 45,000 dollar bill ) — reaching down to pick up that $100 would have little to no impact on his net worth, and it might even be a complete waste of his time to bother with picking it up. For a panhandler, though (or a poor college student, or me or you), that $100 would make a meaningful impact on our bottom line. The same holds true in the markets: sometimes, the available opportunity in a specific investment is limited to a set dollar amount, an amount that will certainly help improve small manager returns, but that would have little to no measurable impact on the returns of the larger fund. Beachhead refers to this dynamic as the “broader opportunity set” dynamic, and it is very real. If it weren’t, then “hedge fund hotels” would never have existed in the first place. As it stands, the larger you get, the fewer markets (or opportunities) you can find that are large and liquid enough to accommodate your increased size. Hence, in some markets, smaller advisors are at an inherent advantage in terms of percentage performance. The “talent” gap It’s generally assumed that the most talented managers will be enticed to work at the largest firms, since those firms have the greatest resources and opportunities, enabling young and talented advisors to thrive and become rich. However, there’s a counter-narrative in play that makes at least as much sense. If you’re truly talented, and capable of generating outsized returns, why would you want to sell that skill off, enabling a large corporation to profit from your work? Wouldn’t you be better off launching your own firm, so as to profit off of your own work, rather than counting on your boss (or a board of directors) to determine your ultimate compensation? Indeed, there’s an argument to be made that smaller advisors represent a specific type of self-selection: only those advisors who are very confident in their ability to survive on their own will even bother to break away and start their own operation. Yes, they’ll be smaller by definition, but their talent and ability to generate returns for investors will be unaffected by a switch in the logo on their business card. As demonstrated above, the advisors might even be able to open up their investment opportunity set by doing so. Arguably, those who choose to work at the largest firms (and stay there for the long run) are simply those who crave the stability and comfort that those firms provide or promise. Particularly for the millennial generation, there seems to be a trend toward entrepreneurship and betting on oneself , and that trend impacts the investment advisory industry as well. If you’re an investor, do you want to hire the manager who needs (or who thinks he needs) a big brand name in order to succeed, or one who trusts in his ability to swim on his own, even without the resources and advantages that the larger firm provides? That remains an open question, but the evidence is beginning to mount in favor of the smaller firm. The importance of each individual client One dynamic that Beachhead does not mention, but that may be particularly important for those looking to choose an investment manager, is what I will call the “burning platform” issue. At a large firm, complacency can often be a very powerful force. For the big wirehouse brokerages, a sudden loss of 1 or 2 or clients (or even, say, 5-10% of clients) may not be meaningful enough to really impact the bottom line over the long run. Sure, a few layoffs and restructurings might result, but the viability of the business is rarely threatened. At smaller firms, though, the experience and importance of each individual client is amplified. A period of sustained underperformance that leads to client attrition could , in fact, threaten the long-term viability of the firm, as well as the paychecks of the managers in question. The closer a manager is to the end user — and the greater the importance of each individual client — the less room for complacency and apathy there will be. At smaller firms, there’s simply less room for ignorance of client needs — you either perform or you’re history, generally speaking. At the end of the day, while we all might derive some comfort from size, research shows that betting on smaller managers can often be a savvy move. Ultimately, brand names are little more than a signalling mechanism — “we’re safe, we’ve been vetted,” say the big brands. You can trust them, they’d argue, because their size indicates that many others have (presumably) done their research and chosen to work with them already. 50 million Elvis fans can’t be wrong , right? Thus, when we blindly choose to work with the big brand name, what we’re effectively doing is outsourcing our due diligence to others. Instead of choosing to learn about the firms or managers in question, we simply rely on the brand name to protect us, because it’s the seemingly “safe” play. Increasingly, that approach doesn’t hold water. As an investor, take it upon yourself to learn more about the actual services that are offered, the actual philosophies that guide different offerings, and really get to know the diversity of service offerings. All of the various industry players have different strengths and weaknesses, the relative merits of which may or may not be important to you; don’t assume that the big guy has exactly what you want and need just because they’re big. In reality, it’s rarely the case. Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. Business relationship disclosure: The author is a contract employee and partial owner of myFinancialAnswers.com, and he is compensated to provide industry commentary for the site. The opinions provided here may also be published at myFinancialAnswers.com.

Lessons From The Fall Of SunEdison

“The boom is drawn out and accelerates gradually; the bust is sudden and often catastrophic.” – George Soros, Alchemy of Finance There was a very interesting article in The Wall Street Journal a few days ago on the story of “the swift rise and calamitous fall” of SunEdison (NYSE: SUNE ). Like a number of other promotional, Wall Street-fueled rise and falls, SunEdison became a victim of its own financial engineering, among other things. SUNE saw rapid growth, thanks in large part to easy money provided by banks and shareholders. Low interest rates and deal-hungry Wall Street investment banks helped encourage rapid expansion plans at companies like SunEdison and provided the debt financing. Yield-hungry retail investors suffering from those same low interest rates on traditional (i.e., prudent) fixed-income securities helped provide the equity financing. Just like MLPs and a number of similar structures popping up in related industries, SunEdison provided itself with an unlimited source of growth funding by creating a separate business (actually, a couple of separate businesses) that are commonly referred to as yield companies, or “yieldcos”. These yield companies are, in effect, nothing but revolving credit facilities for their “parent” business, and the credit line is always expanding (and the yield company is the one on the hook). The scheme works as follows: a company (the “parent”) decides to grow rapidly. To finance its growth, it creates a separate company (the “yieldco”) that exists for the sole purpose of buying assets from the parent (usually at a hefty premium to the parent’s cost). To source the cash needed to buy the parent’s assets, the yieldco raises capital by selling stock to the public, by promising a stable dividend yield. The yieldco uses the cash raised from the public to buy more assets from the parent, and the parent, in turn, uses these cash proceeds to buy more assets to sell (“drop down”) to the yieldco, and the cycle continues. Thanks to a yield-deprived public, these yieldco entities often have an unlimited source of funds that they can tap whenever they want (SUNE’s yieldco, TERP, had an IPO in 2014 that was more than 20 times oversubscribed). As long as the yieldco is paying a stable dividend, it can raise fresh capital. As long as it raises capital, it can buy assets from the parent, who gets improved asset turnover and faster revenue growth. In SunEdison’s case, the yieldco is Terraform Power (NASDAQ: TERP ). (There is TerraForm Global (NASDAQ: GLBL ) as well). I made a very oversimplified chart to try and demonstrate the crux of this relationship: It Tends to Work, Until it Doesn’t Buffett said this recently regarding the conglomerate boom of the 1960s, whose business models also relied on a high stock price and heavy doses of stock issuances and debt: If the assets that the yieldco is buying are good quality assets that do, in fact, produce distributable cash flow (i.e., cash that actually can be paid out to shareholders without skimping on capital expenditures that are required to maintain the assets), then the chain letter can continue indefinitely. The problem I’ve noticed with many MLPs is that the company’s definition of distributable cash flow (DCF) is much different than what the actual underlying economics of the business would suggest (i.e., a company can easily choose to not repair or properly maintain a natural gas pipeline. This gives it the ability to save cash now [and add to the DCF, which supports the dividend], while not worrying about the inadequately maintained pipe that probably won’t break for another few quarters anyhow). Another thing I’ve noticed with businesses that try to grow rapidly through acquisitions is that the financial engineering can work well when the asset base is small. When Valeant (NYSE: VRX ) was a $1 billion company, it had plenty of acquisition targets that might have created value for the company. When VRX became a $30 billion company, it is not only harder to move the needle, but every potential acquiree knows the acquirer’s game plan by then. It’s hard to get a bargain at that point, but it’s also hard to abandon the lucrative and prestigious business of growth. ( Note : Lucrative depending on which stakeholder we’re talking about.) In SunEdison’s case, the Wall Street Journal piece sums it up: “As SunEdison’s acquisition fever grew, standards slipped, former and current employees, advisers, and counterparties said. Deals were sometimes done with little planning or at prices observers deemed overly rich… Some acquisitions proceeded over objections from the senior executives who would manage them, said current and former employees.” So, the game continues even when growth begins destroying value. Once growth begins to destroy value, the game has ended – although it can take time before the reality of the situation catches up to the market price. Basically, it’s a financial engineering scheme that gives management the ability (and the incentives, especially when revenue growth or EBITDA influences their bonus) to push the envelope in terms of what would be considered acceptable accounting practices. In some recent yieldco structures, I’ve observed that when operating cash flow from the assets isn’t enough to pay for the dividend, cash from debt or equity issuances can make up the difference – something akin to a Ponzi. Incoming cash from one shareholder is paid out to another shareholder as a dividend. Even when fraud isn’t involved, this system can still collapse very quickly if the assets just aren’t providing enough cash flow to support the dividend. Incentives The incentives of this structure are out of whack. The parent company wants growth, and since it can “sell” assets to a captive buyer (the yieldco) at just about any price, it doesn’t have to worry too much about overpaying for these assets. It knows the captive buyer will be ready with cash in hand to buy these assets at a premium. In SunEdison’s case, management’s incentive was certainly to get the stock price higher because, like many companies, a large amount of compensation was stock-based. But their bonuses also depended on two main categories: profitability and megawatts completed. Both categories incentivize growth at any cost – value per share is irrelevant in this compensation structure. You might say that profitability sounds nice, until you read how management decided to measure it : “the sum of SunEdison EBITDA and foregone margin (a measure which tracks margin foregone due to the strategic decision to hold projects on the balance sheet vs. selling them).” Hmmm… that is one creative definition of profitability. Not surprisingly, all the executives easily met the “profitability” threshold, and bonuses were paid – this is despite a company that had a GAAP loss of $1.2 billion and a $770 million cash flow loss from operations. Growth at Any Cost At the root of these structures is often a very ambitious (sometimes overzealous) management team. The Wall Street Journal mentioned that Ahmad Chatila, SUNE’s CEO, said that SunEdison ” would one day manage 100 gigawatts worth of electricity, enough to power 20 million homes .” Just last summer, Chatila predicted the company would be worth $350 billion in 6 years , and one day would be worth as much as Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ). These aggressive goals are often accompanied by a very aggressive, growth-oriented business model, which can sometimes lead to very aggressive accounting practices. I haven’t researched SunEdison or claim to know much about the business or the renewable energy industry. I’ve followed the story in the paper, mostly because of my interest in David Einhorn, an investor I admire and have great respect for. Einhorn had a big chunk of capital invested in SUNE. David Einhorn is a great investor. He will (and maybe already has) made up for the loss he sustained with SUNE. This is not meant to be critical of an investor, but to learn from a situation that has obviously gone awry. Parallels Between SUNE and VRX The SUNE story is very different from VRX, but there are some similarities. For one, well-respected investors with great track records have invested in both. But from a very general viewpoint, one thing that ties the two stories together is their focus on growth at any cost. To finance this growth, both VRX and SUNE used huge amounts of debt to pay for assets. Essentially, neither company existed a decade ago, but today, the two companies together have $40 billion of debt. Wall Street was happy to provide this debt, as the banks collected sizable fees on all of the deals that the debt helped finance for both firms. Investing is a Negative Art A friend of mine – I’ll call him my own “west coast philosopher” (even though he doesn’t live on the west coast) – once said that investing is a negative art. I interpret this as follows: choosing what not to invest in is as important as the stocks that you actually buy. Limiting mistakes is crucial, as I’ve talked about many times . While mistakes are inevitable, it’s always productive to study your own mistakes as well as the mistakes of others to try and glean lessons that might help you become a little closer to mastering this negative art. One general lesson from the SUNE (and VRX) saga is that business models built on the foundation of aggressive growth can be very susceptible to problems. It always looks obvious in hindsight, but a strategy that hinges on using huge amounts of debt and new stock to pay for acquisitions is probably better left alone. Sometimes, profits will be missed, but avoiding a SUNE or a VRX is usually worth it. General takeaways: Be wary of overly aggressive growth plans, especially when a high stock price (and access to the capital markets) is a necessary condition for growth. Be skeptical of management teams that make outlandish promises of growth, and be mindful of their incentives. Be careful with debt. Try to avoid companies whose only positive cash flow consistently comes from the “financing” section of the cash flow statement (and makes up for the negative cash flow from both operating and investing activities). Simple investments (and simple businesses) are often better than complex ones with lots of financial engineering involved. Here is the full article on SUNE , which is a great story to read. Editor’s Note: This article covers one or more stocks trading at less than $1 per share and/or with less than a $100 million market cap. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.