Tag Archives: alt-investing

A Game Of Thrones Using ETFs

By Michael Mell As hedge funds arguably best embody the spirit of active management you know it’s a watershed moment when “exchange-traded funds, which are the primary vehicle for passive management, now have assets under management greater than hedge funds, according to a count from research firm ETFGI.” Industry-wide, it has been observed that “growth in ETF assets continues to outpace assets under management (AuM) expansion in the wider asset management industry.” So while the active versus passive debate is often positioned as on-going, one could argue that it’s over (or ending very soon). Passive has won (or is winning). The game of thrones is over; house passive sits triumphant on the iron throne. Thus one would think that we have arrived at a moment where believers in passive investing should celebrate. Not unlike the legions of undead preparing to attack the wall a rude awakening is upon us. A bifurcation is occurring in the ETF industry, and it has a direct impact on the passive versus active debate, because to date, ETFs have been the primary vehicle for executing a passive strategy. “In early November 2014, the SEC approved another version of non-transparent active investment product called exchange-traded managed funds (ETMFs). The SEC approval of ETMFs and potentially other requests for non-transparent active ETFs could lead to another phase of growth and innovation for ETFs in the U.S.” So while the index based ETF industry has been growing and fueling victory for the passive vs. active debate “traditional fund providers are taking action , creating ETF teams of their own as a precursor for potential future launches.” In other words, in the future hordes of active mutual fund companies may raise their dying products from the dead in the body of “ETFs”. With active ETFs, ETMFs, and “ETFs” tracking indices by providers you’ve never heard of and “ETFs” with indices calculated by smaller players who may or may not be here tomorrow, it’s getting scary out there for anyone seeking to gain some type of reliable beta exposure. On the other hand, “the vast majority (approximately 99%) of U.S. ETF assets are currently in passively-managed index products. Active ETFs accumulated approximately $16 billion assets under management (AUM) between 2008 and mid-2014.” So breathe easy right? No because winter is coming, change is upon us. However as I referenced in an earlier blog , there is a way to know if your ETF is truly passive and it will be more important than ever to use that formulaic approach to see what’s actually under the hood of an “ETF”. Disclosure: © S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 2015. Indexology® is a trademark of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC (SPDJI). S&P® is a trademark of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC and Dow Jones® is a trademark of Dow Jones Trademark Holdings LLC, and those marks have been licensed to S&P DJI. This material is reproduced with the prior written consent of S&P DJI. For more information on S&P DJI and to see our full disclaimer, visit www.spdji.com/terms-of-use . Share this article with a colleague

5 Reasons To Lower Your Allocation To Riskier Assets

Fewer and fewer components are holding up the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ. If foreign stocks are faltering at a time as when half of U.S. stocks are in their own downtrends, it may reasonable to assume that the major U.S. benchmarks could buckle. There are a number of headwinds that are likely to bring about a substantive correction to the Dow, S&P 500 and NASDAQ in the near-term. For months, I have been discussing the likely implications of deteriorating market breadth. For instance, fewer and fewer components are holding up the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ. Only a small number of industry sectors are keeping the popular benchmarks in the plus column. Similarly, half of the stocks in the S&P 500 currently demonstrate bearish downtrends. And declining stock issues are significantly pressuring advancing stock issues for the first time since July of 2011. Historically, when a handful of stocks like Amazon (NASDAQ: AMZN ), Apple (NASDAQ: AAPL ), Facebook (NASDAQ: FB ), Gilead (NASDAQ: GILD ), Google (NASDAQ: GOOG ) and Walt Disney Co (NYSE: DIS ) account for all of the gains for a major index like the S&P 500 – when 250 of the index constituents show bearish patterns – the narrow breadth tends to drag the benchmark’s price downward. To be fair to the bull case, the major indices have held up so far. Nevertheless, U.S. equities in the Dow and the S&P 500 have been churning sideways for the better part of seven months. What about the prospect for underperforming sectors of the economy contributing to widespread market gains? I wouldn’t hold my breath on the possibility of wider breadth in the near term. Materials and resources-related companies continue to be plagued by slumping oil and weak commodity demand around the globe. Most economists believe that while the rout in commodities may conceivably abate, a significant increase in global demand or a sharp decline in global supply is unlikely. In the same manner, the manufacturing segment’s pullback may be structural, not cyclical. Miners, industrial conglomerates and utilities probably won’t be getting wind at their back anytime soon. For better or worse, the primary hope for continued appreciation in the U.S. indices rests atop the shoulders of the healthcare juggernaut, dot.com usage and the iPhone-oriented consumer. Indeed, investors have been remarkably willing to pay almost any price for the growth of the “Facebooks” and “Gileads” of the world. On the flip side, can the market-cap behemoths do any wrong? Of course they can. It wasn’t so long ago that Facebook shares face-planted for a 50% loss out of the IPO gate? Similarly, Apple tumbled 45% at the tail-end of 2013. Even at this moment, questions about the viability of the iWatch and the corporation’s ability to grow at a rapid pace in future quarters is keeping the shares of the largest company on the planet from breaking through resistance. For the time being, however, let’s assume that the “Big Six” identified earlier maintain their proverbial cool. And let’s assume that the narrow breadth in the U.S. benchmarks (as well as sky-high stock valuations) are not enough to dent the positive impact provided by health care and retail/consumer stocks. Is it possible that waning enthusiasm for foreign equities might couple with the weakness in U.S. market internals and sky-high valuations to eventually topple the major U.S. benchmarks? Looking back to the last stock market smack-down might provide some clues. Specifically, in 2009 and 2010, stocks throughout the world staged a revival. What’s more, in the same manner as they had in the previous decade, foreign stocks significantly outpaced U.S. stocks in 2009 and 2010. In fact, the global growth theme that dominated the initial decade of the 21st century remained in the driver’s seat. The dominance ended in October of 2010, however. Not only were the “emergers’ emerging at a slower pace, particularly China, but central bank stimulus supplanted the global growth story altogether. Consider the Vanguard FTSE All-World ex-US ETF (NYSEARCA: VEU ): SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) price ratio below. VEU:SPY began descending in the 4th quarter of 2010. The fading relative strength for VEU:SPY cemented itself early in 2011, when 200-day trendline support shifted to resistance. Not only did the weakness in U.S. market internals matter in July 2011 via the NYSE Advance Decline (A/D) Line, but relative weakness in foreign stocks also mattered. Fewer and fewer U.S. stocks were participating in the rally by July of 2011 and fewer and fewer international stocks were participating in the worldwide equity rally. It is worth noting that the deterioration of the VEU:SPY price ratio over the last three months of 2015 may be another headwind to U.S. benchmark gains. Historically, all stock assets typically exhibit positive correlations. It follows that, if foreign stocks are faltering at a time as when half of U.S. stocks are in their own downtrends, it may reasonable to assume that the major U.S. benchmarks could buckle. By way of review, there are a number of headwinds that are likely to bring about a substantive correction to the Dow, S&P 500 and NASDAQ in the near-term: Federal Reserve and the Rate Hike Quagmire . By itself, a bump up in overnight lending rates may not be a big deal. Conversely, participants may perceive inaction (an unwillingness to do anything) or too much activity (back-to-back rate hikes on wishy-washy data) as a major policy mistake. Extremely High Valuations and Eroding Domestic Internals . High valuations alone can always move higher; excitement can turn to euphoria. Yet history has rarely been kind to the combination of stock overvaluation and narrowing leadership (i.e., bad breadth). Fading Effects Of Quantitative Easing/Other Stimulative Measures In Foreign Stocks . Both Europe and Japan had seen their prices surge shortly after confirmation of asset purchases. Over the last three months, those fortunes have cooled relative to the U.S. In some instances, as has been the case in China, stimulative measures that didn’t work eventually turned to direct (as opposed to indirect) market manipulation. Is the world losing faith in its central banks? The Return of Credit Risk Aversion In Bonds . Seven months into 2015 and the widely anticipated jump in 10-year yields is nowhere to be seen. In fact, the 10-year at 2.25% is roughly in the exact same place as it was when the year started. It has been lower (much lower); it has been higher, not far from 2.5%. Yet the bottom line is that treasuries via the iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: IEF ) is rising in relative strength when compared with a high yield bond proxy like the iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF (NYSEARCA: HYG ). Economic Weakness in the U.S. and Across the Globe. Latin America, Asia, Europe . Name the region and the economic deterioration is palpable. In contrast, many portray the U.S. economy in a positive light. Headline unemployment is low, home prices are high and Q2 GDP at 2.3% is faster than what we witnessed in Q1. Yet labor force participation (employment) is at 1977 levels, home ownership is at the lowest levels since 1967 and GDP has grown at an anemic 2% over the last six years. That’s not what a recovery typically looks like. It is no wonder that revenue (sales) at U.S. corporations will be negative for the second consecutive quarter. And when both the quality of job growth as well as the weakness in revenues are tallied, nobody should be surprised at the snail’s pace of wage growth either (2%). In spite of parallels that one can draw between the previous correction and/or prior bear markets (e.g., eroding domestic market internals, extremely high domestic stock valuations, near-term foreign stock weakness, etc.), the observations are not synonymous with prediction of disaster; rather, the observations lead me to conclude that a reduction of risk asset ownership is warranted for tactical asset allocation strategists. Practically, then, if you typically have 65% in equity (split between foreign and domestic, large and small) and 35% in income (investment grade and high yield), you might want to reduce the overall exposure to riskier assets until a significant correction transpires. How might I do it? I might have 55% in equity (mostly large-cap domestic), 25% allocated to income (mostly investment grade) and 20% cash/cash equivalents. Not only will you have reduced the amount of equity, you will have reduced the type of equity. Not only will you have reduced the income, but you will reduced the type of income. The efforts should assist in weathering the probable storm, as well as allow one to raise risk exposure at more attractive pricing. Is it possible that a tactical asset allocation shift might move further away from riskier assets? Like 35% equity, 25% income and 40% cash/cash equivalents? Yes. However, one would need to see a further breakdown of technicals and fundamentals beforehand. Disclosure: Gary Gordon, MS, CFP is the president of Pacific Park Financial, Inc., a Registered Investment Adviser with the SEC. Gary Gordon, Pacific Park Financial, Inc, and/or its clients may hold positions in the ETFs, mutual funds, and/or any investment asset mentioned above. The commentary does not constitute individualized investment advice. The opinions offered herein are not personalized recommendations to buy, sell or hold securities. At times, issuers of exchange-traded products compensate Pacific Park Financial, Inc. or its subsidiaries for advertising at the ETF Expert web site. ETF Expert content is created independently of any advertising relationships.

Crisis? Tempted To Flee To Shelter Of Big Funds? Bad Idea

A new report out of the Cass Business School, City University, London, indicates that investors, especially in times of crisis (that is, when the use of the adjective “hedge” in front of “fund” is most apropos), are better off investing with a small fund rather than a large one. This is counter-intuitive, in that it is precisely in times of crisis that the temptation to flee to the larger institutions is most powerful for many investors. Yet the negative statistical correlation between size and performance was largest in three periods within the database of this study, times of crisis: 1999 to 2000, 2003 to 2004, and 2008 to 2010. Why? Largely because of the restrictions that the larger funds place on redemptions. More obviously, diseconomies of scale play a role, and can themselves vary with the business cycle. Size and Time The authors (Andrew Clare, Dirk Nitzsche, Nick Motson) describe their study as based on a more comprehensive database that that of earlier studies along the same lines. Specifically, their database consisted of 7,261 funds and their performance over a twenty year period (1994 to 2014). One important side issue for their study involves the evolution of average industry size over time. Bigger Than It Used to Be (click to enlarge) As the above table shows, the average size of funds has grown, consistently over every decile, through the 20 year period included in the TASS data the authors reviewed. This is what one would expect even before looking at such data, having only a headline-inhabitant’s view of the industry, but it does highlight the issue of whether and to what extent the size/performance relationship itself has varied over the years. Another counter-intuitive finding to emerge from their study: age is also negatively correlated with performance. This seems odd because common sense might indicate that a small fund that has been around for several years (and has remained small) is a fund that has failed to attract investors, likely in turn because it has failed to perform. A large fund may well be a fund that became large because of performance and thus new investment. So … why the negative correlation here? The authors don’t offer a hypothesis. Time and Context They do say, though, that the age/performance relationship is considerably less impressive than the size/performance relationship. Here, again, one has to look at the development of the industry over the 20 years discussed in order to develop a sense of the context for the relationships found in the data. The age/performance relationship was statistically significant in the earlier years of the study’s sample, but by the period since 2003, especially since 2009, this relationship has become “not significantly different from zero.” So the authors focus on the stronger relation of the two they have identified, that between size and performance, and they look at it strategy by strategy, for L/S Equity, Emerging Markets, Event Driven Funds, and Managed Futures. They find considerable variation by strategy. In particular, Managed Futures don’t follow the general rule at all, the relationship between size and performance is positive in that context. It is positive in a way that doesn’t appear “statistically different from zero,” but still … it is not negative. That indicates “that this strategy is less constrained than others by size.” On the other side, the strategy that makes the greatest case for the proposition that petite is sweet is: L/S Equity.