Tag Archives: advice

Warren Buffett’s Stellar Record In Defying Economic Gravity

One of the more intriguing observations in Berkshire Hathaway’s new letter to shareholders is Warren Buffett’s reference to what I like to call economic gravity, a.k.a the law of large numbers. There are several ways to keep it at bay (maybe), but in the end it wins no matter what you do. Buffett and company, of course, have an extraordinary history of excelling where so many others have stumbled in this regard. But an unusually long run of success is taking its toll. As Buffett himself recognizes, gravity’s pull is increasing on Berkshire’s prospects. The observation inspires some brief ruminating on how to think about economic gravity generally in the realm of designing and managing investment portfolios. Let’s begin with the salient fact that deserves to precede any discussion of investing that ties in with Buffett, namely: he’s an anomaly in terms of his investment record. That’s something to cheer about if you’ve been a Berkshire shareholder over the last 50 years. But he’s managing expectations down these days: The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains – measured by percentages, not by dollars – cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great. Eventually – probably between ten and twenty years from now – Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings… Success ultimately plants the seeds of its own destruction… or mediocrity. Buffett, of course, has skirted this curse quite spectacularly through the decades, largely through an uncanny mix of raw talent and steely discipline. A handful of other investors have achieved something similar over long periods of time, but theirs is a tiny club and membership opportunities are limited in the extreme. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of investment results fall within two standard deviations of the median performance for a relevant benchmark, and that’s not going to change… ever. We’re all fishing in the same pond. The critical differences that separate portfolios (and results) come down to two key factors: asset allocation and rebalancing. Buffett, of course, has opted for a fairly unique asset allocation, as reflected in the companies he’s purchased through the years. The list is a reflection of his talents as an analyst. It’s fair to say that he’s favored a degree of concentration, in large part due to his well-founded confidence in his capabilities to identify value. As for rebalancing, he largely shuns that aspect of portfolio management, which is a direct function of his confidence in security selection. It’s been a winning mix, in large part, due to talent. Concentrated bets with minimal rebalancing has been the basic strategy that’s kept economic gravity to a minimum at Berkshire through time. The results speak for themselves. But gravity- mediocre performance – wins in the end. The best-case scenario is minimizing its bite for a lengthy run, which surely describes Berkshire’s history. For mere mortals in the money game, however, gravity tends to weigh on results much sooner. The reason, of course, is a simple but extraordinarily powerful bit of wisdom attributed to Professor Bill Sharpe a la “The Arithmetic of Active Management” : Properly measured, the average actively managed dollar must underperform the average passively managed dollar, net of costs. There is a finite amount of positive alpha (market-beating performance) and it’s financed exclusively by negative alpha. Buffett’s spectacular achievements over the past 50 years have come at the expense of countless losing investment strategies. But having beaten the grim reaper of financial results for so long, the game is getting harder, as it must. The key point is that mediocrity beckons for every investor… eventually. For some of us (very few of us!) the day of reckoning is far off, due to talent and perhaps even some luck. But for the vast majority of investors (professional and amateur) this is one of those rare instances in money management when the future’s quite clear. This outlook suggests that it may be best to embrace mediocrity from the start via index funds and focus on those aspects of portfolio design and management where the odds look a bit more encouraging for enhancing results a bit. Whereas Buffett favored concentration and minimizing rebalancing, the average investor should do the opposite. In short, hold a multi-asset class portfolio, keep the mix from going to extremes (i.e., periodic rebalancing), and use index funds to keep costs low. It’s the anti-Buffett strategy, which is exactly the wrong strategy if you’re Warren Buffett. Then again, if you wait long enough, perhaps this advice becomes relevant even for the Oracle of Omaha.

Intelligent Investing Is (Literally) Child’s Play!

Summary In any large group of investors, some are bound to have outperformed simply by pure chance – it does not prove that they are skilled. The fact that even children and pets can outperform professional fund managers proves that luck is what mainly drives investment results. Even buying stocks you understand, as advocated by Warren Buffett, does not lead to superior investment performance. Stocks selected at random perform just as well – and often times even better – than stocks carefully selected by the so-called “experts.”. The common wisdom is that the more time one spends researching stocks, the better one’s investment results will be. But if this was true, then why do actively managed funds consistently underperform the market? Many of these funds spend enormous resources on research in an attempt to uncover the best stocks, and yet their performance is often surpassed by blindfolded monkeys throwing darts at a stock board. How can this be? How much of a role does luck play in investment success? This article will attempt to answer these important questions. Everyone is Above Average in their Own Minds Overconfidence refers to the human tendency to overestimate one’s own abilities and knowledge relative to others. This is sometimes called the “Lake Wobegon Effect” – a fictional town where all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average. In the real world, for instance, 84% of Frenchmen feel that their lovemaking abilities put them in the top half of French lovers. And in the U.S., 93% of people believe their driving skills put them in the top 50% of U.S. drivers (although it does make me curious about how bad the last 7% of drivers are – they are probably dead by now). To see how prevalent the Lake Wobegon Effect (i.e., overconfidence) was in the financial markets, I once conducted a survey asking professional traders at a large, proprietary trading firm to rank their trading skills as either “below” or “above” average compared to their peers at the firm. Out of the 87 participants, 84 rated themselves as above average. This, of course, is a mathematical impossibility since only half of them, not 97%, can be better than average. Curiously enough, though, many of these “above average” traders ended up blowing up during the 2008 financial crisis. Their overconfidence led to massive risk-taking, which caused their eventual downfall. But in addition to irrational risk taking, overconfidence also leads to excessive trading. There are two major problems with overtrading: the first, and the most obvious problem, is that it increases taxes and trading fees; and second, the shares that individual traders sell, on average, do better than those they buy, by a very substantial margin. Essentially, this means that less really is more when it comes to trading. This is why the best predictor of future performance is the level of turnover, not pursuit of specific investment styles/philosophies. Perhaps Winnie-the-Pooh put it best when he said “Never underestimate the value of doing nothing.” More people should heed this advice. Luck is More Important than Skill (in Investing) Not only does overconfidence led to excessive trading and risk taking, it also makes people blind to the fact that investing – like casino gambling – is largely a game of luck. This is why past investment track records are less relevant than what most people think. Since there are literally tens of millions of investors in the world, it is a statistical certainty that a very tiny percentage of them will become a Warren Buffett or a George Soros. Likewise, if there were an equal number of coin-flippers, a few would, by pure chance alone, flip heads 20 or more times in a row – it does not prove that they are skilled coin-flippers. Because luck is what mostly determines success, the type of investment style/philosophy employed (e.g., value, growth, momentum, etc.) is of little importance. Buffett’s approach, for instance, is to buy undervalued stocks and wait for them to appreciate to fair value; conversely, Soros does not pay too much attention to valuation – he is famous for making some of his largest trading decisions based on nothing more than how much his back is hurting that day. Although using completely opposite investment approaches, both Buffett and Soros were still able to amass huge fortunes. This shows that, with luck on one’s side, literally any investment strategy can work. In fact, even random stock selection – like a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at a stock board – gives one as good a chance at beating the market as any other strategy. Interestingly enough, most of the time the monkeys actually perform better than the so-called “professionals,” probably because they have lower turnover and charge lower fees (bananas are pretty cheap). A few years ago, I began conducting a random stock picking experiment. I enlisted the help of my trusty five-year old sidekick Jimmy (or Jim as he prefers to be called). Jim was tasked with pulling 10 slips of paper at random out of a hat. Every slip of paper in the hat had a ticker symbol on it – there were 500 slips in total (each representing one company in the S&P 500 index). I then created a portfolio that is equally invested in those 10 companies, and tracked their performance over the course of a year. This experiment was conducted for three consecutive years (2012-2014), with the results show below. Exhibit 1: Random Stock Selection Outperforms Most Hedge Funds Note: (1) Jim picked a new set of stocks at the start of every year, which means his portfolio was completely rebalanced once per year. (2) The performance returns exclude dividends paid. Source: A North Investments, State Street Global Advisors, Barclay Hedge Fund Index The performance was impressive to say the least. Jim’s random stock picks significantly outperformed both the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA: SPY ) as well as the average hedge fund for three consecutive years. But Jim’s outperformance is not surprising or unique – even non-humans can do it! Back in 2012, a ginger cat named Orlando had managed to outperform many fund managers. The cat simply selected stocks by throwing his favorite toy mouse on a grid of numbers allocated to different companies. In another funny example, a Russian circus chimpanzee named Lusha picked stocks that tripled in value over a year’s time. Lusha was presented with cubes representing 30 different stocks and selected eight to invest money in by picking the cubes. Her chosen portfolio outperformed 94% of Russian investment funds! The undeniable fact that children and pets can outperform professional fund managers proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that luck is what mainly drives investment results. If investing truly did involve skill, then the professionals would consistently outperform – just like we can expect a world-class chess grandmaster to consistently beat even the luckiest amateur chess player. Rather than seeking expert advice, then, most people are better off investing their savings by selecting stocks at random or by buying into an index fund or ETF which tracks a reputable selection of securities. Not only does this reduce long term risk, it also saves paying fees to fund managers with seven-figure salaries and hefty bonuses. For those who are interested (or perhaps have no children or pets to help them pick stocks), below I have provided a list of Jim’s random stock picks for 2015. I am willing to bet that little Jim’s portfolio will once again outperform the average high-fee-charging hedge fund! Exhibit 2: Jim’s Random Stock Picks for 2015 Source: A North Investments The Futility of Equity Research One of Buffett’s personal investing rules (right after “never lose money”) is to only buy companies you understand. This sounds like a very reasonable rule in theory. But as Yogi Berra once said, “In theory there is no difference between theory and practice; in practice there is.” In a way, Buffett seems to believe that having more knowledge about a company makes it easier to predict how much its intrinsic value (and its stock price) will change over time. This simply does not appear to be the case. Take, for instance, Google (NASDAQ: GOOG ) (NASDAQ: GOOGL ) founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin. Several years before Google’s massive IPO that made them both billionaires, they attempted to sell the whole company for a paltry $1.6 million. Luckily for them, no one in Silicon Valley was interested in buying the young company with its unique search technology. It can easily be said that nobody in the world possessed more knowledge about Google than its two founders, and even they could not predict the Google phenomenon (as the attempt to sell proves). It would then be foolish to believe that it is possible to make any better predictions about companies’ futures just by reading their old SEC filings. This explains why actively managed funds, even after spending millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours every year conducting detailed research in a futile attempt to find the best stocks, consistently underperform passive index funds and dart-throwing monkeys. As it is so often said, the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and over again and expecting different results. That pretty well describes the actively managed fund industry. But what about small individual investors? There is a long-held belief that smaller investors have an advantage over the Wall Street crowd, since they are not subject to institutional constraints. Chief among these is the freedom to invest in small, thinly traded stocks, which research has shown tend to have higher returns than their larger counterparts. Still, I would argue that the future price behavior of each individual stock, regardless of size, always remains completely random and unpredictable – essentially making it impossible to consistently pick the best ones. In other words, smaller investors possess no advantage at all. To prove this empirically, I simply tracked the performance of every Seeking Alpha “Pro Top Idea” published during January 2014 (only the “long” recommendations). Not only are all of these relatively small companies, but they were specifically picked by the experts as the best stock ideas with the most near-term upside potential. These stock recommendations, 40 in total, were combined into an equally weighted portfolio, and the portfolio’s overall performance was tracked over the course of the year. The end results were even worse than expected. As shown below, the Pro Top Ideas even underperformed hedge funds, generating a negative return of 1.8% in 2014. Every single one of these 40 recommendations is extensively researched, well-written, and sounds very convincing, and yet these expert stock picks were easily outperformed by a child picking stocks at random out of a hat. To be fair, a small number of Pro Top Ideas did generate impressive 30%+ returns; however, any set of 40 randomly selected stocks will also contain a few that will provide similar returns, there is no need to waste time conducting research on them. Exhibit 3: Professional Stock Pickers Underperform Note: (1) Performance tracked from January 2, 2014 (the first trading day) to December 31, 2014 (the last trading day). (2) Only the “long” Pro Top Ideas were included; companies that were acquired during the year were excluded. Source: A North Investments, State Street Global Advisors, Barclay Hedge Fund Index, Seeking Alpha The main point is that no amount of research will make someone a better stock picker. It might sound counterintuitive, but the empirical evidence is overwhelmingly in support of this conclusion. This is because the price behavior of stocks is influenced by an infinite number of variables (most of them unknown), so attempting to predict which stocks will perform the best at any given time is impossible. It should also be noted that high subjective confidence (e.g., “high conviction stock picks” made by some suit-and-tie-wearing investment guru) is not to be trusted as an indicator of accuracy; if anything, low confidence could be more informative. Summary and Conclusion In any large group of investors, some are bound to have outperformed by pure chance alone – it does not prove that they possess skill. In other words, luck is what separates good investors from bad ones. But since luck has a tendency to revert to the mean in the long run, investing with a hotshot fund manager could be hazardous to one’s wealth. For this reason, most people are far better off investing their savings by selecting stock at random or by buying into a low-cost index fund or ETF which tracks a reputable selection of securities. This reduces risk and over time will produce higher after-tax returns. Disclosure: The author has no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…) The author wrote this article themselves, and it expresses their own opinions. The author is not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). The author has no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Are Some Decisions To Allocate To U.S. Equities Due To Survivorship Bias?

By David Foulke The CFA Institute Magazine recently published an interview (a copy is here ) with C. Thomas Howard, CEO of Athena Investment Services. Howard has some pretty explicit views on why investors should allocate all of their assets to U.S. stocks: The primary driver of long-horizon wealth is expected returns. Why would you invest in anything but stocks? Why isn’t your portfolio 100% stocks? Do you believe stocks are going to have the highest return? By the way, stocks have averaged 10% a year for a long period of time. Bonds have averaged about 6%. The difference between a portfolio that’s 100% stocks and one that is a mixture of stocks and one that is a mixture of stocks and bonds over long periods of time is huge, possibly millions of dollars. Why would I want to buy anything but the highest expected return, asset-wise? U.S. stocks have offered the best returns for a long time, and therefore the U.S. stock market is where you want to be invested. This is an interesting argument. Certainly, Howard is right that the U.S. stock market has been the best place to be invested. For instance, Mehra and Prescott in their 1985 paper, “The Equity Premium Puzzle” (a copy can be found here ), demonstrated how the risk premium on U.S. Equities from 1889-1978 averaged roughly 6%. The paper was notable in that it suggested that existing general equilibrium models were unable to explain the size of this premium, which was dramatically higher than for other economies. Academics struggled to explain the persistently strong U.S. stock market. This is the “puzzle” to which the paper’s title refers. In 1998, Reitz proposed that investors in U.S. markets might be more risk averse due to the potential occurrence of large drawdowns, or “crashes.” In a risky market that could crash dramatically, risk averse investors might expect high equity returns as compensation for bearing the risk of such crashes. Perhaps this explained high returns in the U.S. As academics pondered the effect of possible crashes on risk premia, they increasingly questioned that it was risk aversion to crashes that was driving returns. Some thought these unexplainable returns might have something to do with whether a market simply survived, which by definition meant that it consistently recovered from periodic drawdowns over long time frames. Was their some bias introduced to a market’s returns that was associated with the mere fact of its survival? In their paper, “Global Stock Markets in the Twentieth Century” (a copy can be found here ), the authors Jorion and Goetzmann explored this question. They examined 39 global stock markets from 1921 through 1996 and, as before, saw evidence of the outperformance of the U.S. stock market, which provided a real return of 4.32% over the period, the highest of all countries. During this period, however, several of these 39 markets experienced interruptions to their functioning, caused by forces such as war, political instability, hyperinflation, and so forth. The authors compared what happened when they considered both “loser” markets, and how long they were viable, in addition to the survivors, like the U.S. and others, who were “winners” over long periods. The figure below plots annual returns against the length of the history of each market: (click to enlarge) There appears to be a clear relationship between returns and longevity of markets, with longer-lived markets generating higher returns. Over the period, the median return for all 39 countries was 0.75%, representing the return earned by holding a globally diversified portfolio since 1921. Notably, there were 11 “winner” countries, which had continuous returns going back to 1921. For this group, the median return was dramatically higher, at 2.35%. Also, note that the U.S. appears at the upper right of the figure. These results suggest that returns for the U.S. 1) are uncommon at 4.3% versus 0.8% for all other countries, and 2) could be explained by survival, as could higher returns for the other survivors. If you happened to invest in a country that survived, you would have earned higher returns. The paper also examined Reitz’s hypothesis. Recall that Reitz had suggested that investors demanded a higher return as compensation for the risk of a crash. If this were true, then you would expect to see the “losers” exhibit higher equity premia. As the figure above illustrates, the opposite appears to be the case. A regression of these points would slope upward to the right. The returns of the winners may thus be conditional on their survival. If you think about investing in a particular country as like drawing a ball from an urn, then how meaningful is it to say that we can expect future returns to resemble past returns in that country, if those past returns are a result of survivor bias? Survivor bias refers to how we can focus on survivors in a data set, and ignore failures, which provide additional information about risk. Hindsight may be 20/20, but predicting the future is not, and if we condition on only the surviving winners, we ignore the possibility that we may be investing in a previous winner that may turn into a loser in the future. In a PBS interview (a copy is here ) Jack Bogle stated the following: Good markets turn to bad markets, bad markets turn to good markets. So the system is almost rigged against human psychology that says if something has done well in the past, it will do well in the future. That is not true. And it’s categorically false. And the high likelihood is when you get to somebody at his peak, he’s about to go down to the valley. The last shall be first and the first shall be last. Indeed, why should it be easy to predict which markets will survive? As Bogle points out, it may be precisely the past winners who are about to fail. Or as Jeremy Siegel stated in his paper, “The Equity Premium: Stock and Bond Returns since 1802”: Certainly investors in…1872…did not universally expect the United States to become the greatest economic power in the next century. This was not the case in many other countries. What if one had owned stock in Japanese or German firms before World War II? Or consider Argentina, which, at the turn of the century, was one of the great economic powers. It’s probably likely that Argentinian investors predicted continued economic dominance at the turn of the century. They were wrong. The outcome of World War II, which today looks obvious, could have played out in many different ways, and the U.S. might very well have turned into a loser. The Japanese certainly thought they would emerge as the dominant power after the war, or they wouldn’t have fought the war. Same for Germany. If the outcome of WW II had been different, we might today be studying the stock markets of Japan, Germany or other European countries, instead of the U.S. Who is to say the U.S. will not enter a hyperinflationary period or a sustained major war? Such an outcome for the U.S. is obviously not without precedent elsewhere. When we look at past U.S. returns, we are looking at a market that did not fail, but does it follow that it cannot fail in the future? Conditioning on past survival can subject investors to risks, which they are not accounting for. Even with strong past returns, we need to consider survivor bias, and that we are necessarily betting on a winner. Interestingly enough, Warren Buffett and Jack Bogle offer investors puzzling investment advice in the face of the results presented by Jorion and Goetzmann and a simple knowledge of survivor bias. First, Warren’s advice: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) Next, Jack Bogle’s advice : I wouldn’t invest outside the U.S. If someone wants to invest 20 percent or less of their portfolio outside the U.S., that’s fine. I wouldn’t do it, but if you want to, that’s fine. We have to question whether the advice from Buffett/Bogle considers the reality of survivor bias or their own personal bias. Original Post