Author Archives: Scalper1

Video: The Devil Is In The Details

The conventional thinking is that all quantitative managers are the same – that they analyze the same data, read the same academic research, and use the same concepts to identify attractive stocks. In this video, Robert Furdak, Co-Chief Investment Officer at Man Numeric, challenges this view by arguing that ‘the devil is in the details’ and that the distinctions in how quantitative managers construct and combine models to generate trading signals are significant. To illustrate this, he looks at existing value models that most people might think would be highly correlated to show that returns become progressively better (and volatility decreases) as the value models become more evolved. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The value of an investment and any income derived from it can go down as well as up and investors may not get back their original amount invested. Opinions expressed are those of the author, may not be shared by all personnel of Man Group plc (‘Man’) and are subject to change without notice.

Raskob’s Folly: When Optimism Fails

Optimism has a funny way of feeding off itself sometimes, bleeding into enthusiasm and excess. You’ve seen this story before with the internet boom and the housing bubble. But before that, it led to the rise of the 1920s, where people like John J. Raskob fueled the easy money market that “Everybody Ought to be Rich”. Raskob’s bold claim in the August 1929 issue of Ladies’ Home Journal was typical for the time: Suppose a man marries at the age of twenty-three and begins a regular saving of fifteen dollars a month – and almost anyone who is employed can do that if he tries. If he invests in good common stocks and allows the dividends and rights to accumulate, he will at the end of twenty years have at least eighty thousand dollars and an income from investments of around four hundred dollars a month. He will be rich. And because anyone can do that I am firm in my belief that anyone not only can be rich but ought to be rich. – John J. Raskob The Roaring ’20s ushered in a new economic prosperity that would last. Or so people thought. Raskob’s idea was simple. Systematically invest $15/month into stocks of good companies. At the end of 20 years, you could live off the $80,000 nest egg that he promised. (Let’s put these dollar amounts into perspective. The average person spent about 18 cents per meal in the 1930s, with an average income around $1,100. By 1950, the average income was about $3,200. So, $15/month – $180 per year – was possible, and interest on $80,000 would easily cover the average person’s income 20 years later.) Raskob’s idea wasn’t too far-fetched… except for his expectations. A month after his interview, on September 3rd, the market peaked at Dow 381, and on October 29th, the market crashed. The Dow wouldn’t see 381 again until 1954. Raskob’s timing was terrible. Or was it? I ran the numbers to see what would happen if someone jumped on the bandwagon and invested $15 on the first of every month starting in August 1929 until the end of 1949. Instead of finding “good companies”, I settled for investing in the Dow (but also ran the numbers for the S&P 500, along with a 60/40 split with 10-year Treasuries). Totals for 15/month Investment from Aug. ’29 to Dec. ’49 Total Investment Dow S&P 500 60/40 Dow/US 10-year 60/40 S&P/US 10-year $3,675 $9,951.70 $9,744.93 $7,924.93 $7,943.37 The S&P 500 and the Dow produced fairly similar results. The $15/month fell far short of Raskob’s expectations, but it shows he wasn’t entirely wrong. Putting money away every month was probably the best idea for the time, since it performed better thanks to the market crash . So, a savvy investor with a secure job, disposable income, trust in the financial system, and an iron stomach could have done just fine. Of course, for the average person, this was literally impossible. If the aftermath of the ’29 crash didn’t scare investors away, the Great Depression did. If they weren’t unemployed, their pay was being cut. Few people trusted their local bank. Why would they trust Wall Street? The average person wasn’t saving or investing. They were trying to survive. (The assumption of frictionless investing – no cost or taxes – covers the rest). But since we’re dealing in hypotheticals, I thought I’d reach a bit further to see if any other investment or strategy got closer to Raskob’s $80,000 target. Other Investment Totals for 15/month from Aug. ’29 to Dec. ’49 Savings Account Gold Small Cap Stocks Large Cap Mom. Small Cap Mom. Large Cap Value Small Cap Value $3,858.48 $2,043.07 $5,108.12 $14,157.04 $37,333.19 $15,730.23 $25,541.50 Everything fell short by more than half (I actually ran the scenario for more options, but left out the middling performers). The benefit of hindsight makes this a fun exercise, but that’s it. Costs, taxes, and the law (you couldn’t own gold after 1933) make it impossible or would severely drag down real results further (accuracy of the data from that far back is another issue to consider). Besides, it’s unlikely the average person suffered through the crash of ’29, the volatility of the 1930s, and the Great Depression and came out unscathed. It’s more likely they never got started. Even though stocks were the best-performing asset over that time, they were also the most hated, which explains a lot. Still, the lessons remain. Excessive optimism causes people to ignore the risk of being wrong. Raskob’s folly was an extremely enthusiastic view of the future, but his call to average into the market was solid advice, because averaging into a depressed market can actually help performance. Hated assets eventually perform well enough to become loved again. And as tough as it might be, saving more money and staying the course probably offers the best protection in case optimism fails you.

Is Indexing Just Another Wall Street Fad?

Here’s an interesting comment from value investor Seth Klarman on the rise of indexing (this is from 1991!): Klarman is obviously biased because he’s in the business of selling a high fee asset management platform. If indexing is right, then his form of highly active alpha chasing asset management is wrong. This is basically what Bill Ackman was saying when he lashed out against indexing earlier this year. Anyhow, I think Klarman and Ackman are brilliant and I could never do what they’ve done over the years, but I did want to highlight some of the comments here because there are common concerns that I don’t think are fully warranted. SK: Indexing is predicated on efficient markets. CR: No, this is one point I’ve reiterated in my repetitive posts on the myth of passive investing . Indexing doesn’t work because markets are efficient. Efficiency has nothing to do with it . Indexing works because the costs of active management are so high. Bogle outlined this thinking back in 2003 . SK: The higher the percentage of all investors who index, the more inefficient the markets become as fewer and fewer investors would be performing research and fundamental analysis. CR: This is the paradox of indexing. Indexing, by definition, requires active management. In order for the passive indexers to remain passive, they need active managers to make the markets that fulfill their indexing needs. There cannot be a world of only passive indexers. So, if indexing is eating the world, then there should be more opportunities for active managers in the form of market making and index arbitrage opportunities. Active managers like high frequency trading firms are flourishing in this world. Indexing doesn’t kill active management. It just forces it to change. And if Klarman is right, then he should embrace indexing as it could create more opportunities for more active managers to discover inefficiencies. SK: If everyone practiced indexing… CR: Nope, this is impossible. Indexing requires active management to implement the various index fund strategies that exist. Speaking of which, there are so many “indices” out there today that the whole idea of indexing has become rather nebulous. The indexing world is comprised of all sorts of different strategies that try to take advantage of different inefficiencies in the market. Index funds are just product wrappers doing exactly what Seth Klarman is trying to do in his hedge fund. For instance, the Vanguard Value Fund is trying to capture the value premium by holding a specific set of stocks that meet a certain “value” criteria. The only real difference between this index fund and Seth Klarman’s hedge fund is that the Vanguard fund is lower fee, more tax efficient and more diversified. SK: “[Indexing] means that in a proxy contest, it makes no real difference to the manager of an index fund whether the dissidents or the incumbent management wins the fight”. CR: The vast evidence on the failure of active managers over the decades shows that public market investors don’t understand corporations better than managements. I don’t see how this evidence adds credence to the idea that we should want public investors to be even more active in the daily management activities of corporations… If anything, the failure of active managers means we should want public investors to voice fewer opinions about how companies should be run and instead of voting with their proxies, stick to voting with their wallets. SK: I believe that indexing will turn out to be just another Wall Street fad. CR: Well, this was fabulously wrong. Indexing assets have exploded since 1991 as more active strategies have floundered.